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The Human Right of Self-Defense 
 
David B. Kopel,1 Paul Gallant2 & Joanne D. Eisen3
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Any law, international or municipal, which prohibits recourse to 
force, is necessarily limited by the right of self-defense.”4
 
 Is there a human right to defend oneself against a violent attacker? Is 
there an individual right to arms under international law? Conversely, are 
governments guilty of human rights violations if they do not enact strict 
gun control laws? 
The United Nations and some non-governmental organizations have 
declared that there is no human right to self-defense or to the possession 
of defensive arms.5 The UN and allied NGOs further declare that 
 1. Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado; Associate Policy Analyst, 
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., http://www.davekopel.org. Author of The Samurai, the Mountie, 
and the Cowboy: Should America Adopt the Gun Controls of Other Democracies? (1992). Coauthor 
of Gun Control and Gun Rights (2002). French, Spanish, and Portuguese translations of national 
constitutions and of English decisions written in Law French are by Kopel. 
 2. Senior Fellow, Independence Institute, Golden Colorado. 
http://www.independenceinstitute.org. 
 3. Senior Fellow, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado. Coauthor (with Kopel and 
Gallant) of numerous articles on international gun policy in publications such as the Notre Dame 
Law Review, Journal of Law, Economics & Policy, Texas Review of Law and Politics, Engage, 
UMKC Law Review, and Brown Journal of World Affairs. We would like to thank Peter Allen for 
editing assistance; Tyler Martinez, John Pate for research assistance; Dr. Rob S. Rice 
(ccat.sas.upenn.edu/rrice/rrice.html) and Prof. Michael Hendy (www.curculio.org) for help with 
Latin and Italian (Hendry) translations and other assistance with pre-modern sources; and Dr. 
Jeanine Baker for statistical assistance. The authors are solely responsible for any errors. 
 4. In re Hirota and Others, 15 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT’L L. CASES 356, 364 (Int’l 
Mil.. Trib. for the Far East, 1948) (no. 118, Tokyo trial) (also stating that under the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, a state is the initial judge of the necessity of self-defense against an impending attack, but not 
the final judge); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 181 (2d ed. 
1994) (“This postulate [from Hirota] may have always been true in regard to domestic law, and it is 
currently accurate also in respect of international law . . . . [T]he right of self-defence will never be 
abolished in the relations between flesh-and-blood human beings . . . . “). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 6, 15 and Parts II–III; see also Sami Faltas, Glenn 
McDonald. & Camilla Waszink, Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons 
Collection and Destruction Programmes, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Geneva, Small Arms Survey), at 
8, available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/o_papers_pdf/2001-op02-
weapons_collection.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (stating that “when successful, practical 
disarmament will tend to reinforce the state’s monopoly of force [and] must therefore be 
accompanied by safeguards against the abuse of this monopoly.”). 
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insufficiently restrictive firearms laws are themselves a human rights 
violation, so all governments must sharply restrict citiz en firearms 
possession.6
This Article investigates the legal status of self-defense by 
examining a broad variety of sources of international law. Based on those 
sources, the Article suggests that personal self-defense is a well-
established human right under international law and is an important 
foundation of international law itself. 
Since the 1990s, the United Nations has been focusing increasing 
attention on international firearms control. UN-backed programs have 
promoted and funded the surrender and confiscation of citizen firearms 
in nations around the world.7 The United Nations subsidized the 
proponents of an October 2005 national gun confiscation referendum in 
Brazil.8 A subcommission of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
(HRC) has declared that there is no human right to personal self-defense 
and that extremely strict gun control is a human right which all 
 6. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human 
Rights, 58th Sess., Adoption of the Report on the Fifty-eighth Session to the Human Rights Council, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/L.11/Add.1 (Aug. 24, 2006), available at 
http://hrp.cla.umn.edu/documents/ A.HRC.Sub.1.58.L.11.Add.1.pdf. [hereinafter U.N. Human 
Rights Council]. 
 7. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Micro-disarmament: The 
Consequences for Public Safety and Human Rights, 73 UMKC L. REV. 969 (2005) (describing 
efforts to confiscate guns from citizens in Cambodia, Albania, Mali, and other nations). 
 8. See UNESCO, International Programme for the Development of Cooperation, New 
Projects Approved 2005: Part III: Latin American and the Caribbean (UNESCO headquarters: 
Paris, Mar. 7–9, 2005), at 13–18, available at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/18699/ 
11134898021Latin_America_and_Caribbean_2005__new_projects_approved_.pdf/Latin+America+
and+Caribbean+2005++new+projects+approved+.pdf (UNESCO grant to the Brazilian gun 
prohibition lobby Viva Rio, to promote women’s participation in the gun confiscation referendum); 
UN highlights Brazil gun crisis, BBC NEWS, June 27, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/4628813.stm (“The UN has urged lawmakers to approve plans for a referendum in October 
on whether to ban the sale of firearms . . . . The UN and disarmament groups are using shocking 
statistics to put pressure on Brazil’s parliamentarians.”); Cf. Tip of the Hat, SMALL ARMS & HUMAN 
SEC. BULL., Oct. 2004, at 7 (UNESCO awarded a prize to the Brazilian gun prohibition lobby Viva 
Rio for a campaign to urge Brazilians to voluntarily surrender their guns to the government), 
available at http://www.iansa.org/documents/2005/Bul4English.pdf. 
The referendum was defeated. See Brazilians Reject Gun Sales Ban, BBC NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005. 
Rubem Fernandes, the head of Viva Rio, explained what he had learned from the experience: “First 
lesson is, don’t trust direct democracy.” Rebum Fernandes, Lessons From the Brazilian Referendum, 
Remarks to the World Council of Churches, (Jan. 17, 2006) in WAYNE LAPIERRE, THE GLOBAL 
WAR ON YOUR GUNS 187 (2006). He also noted that the argument “I have a right to own a gun” 
became “a very profound matter” in the debate on the referendum. Id. Fernandes was speaking at 
PrepCom 2006, a UN-sponsored meeting to prepare participants for the major UN gun control 
conference in June–July 2006. Side Events, Prepcom 2006 (Preparatory Committee for the 
Conference to Review Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, 
Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects), United 
Nations, Jan. 9–20, 2006, available at http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/prepcom/side-
events.html. 
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governments are required to enforce immediately. 9 The full Human 
Rights Council is expected to take up the issue and promulgate similar 
orders.10 The declaration implements a report for the HRC prepared by 
Special Rapporteur Barbara Frey.11
According to the Frey standard adopted by the United Nations, even 
the most restrictive gun laws in the United States, such as those in 
Washington, D.C., or New York City, are violations of current human 
rights law, because they are insufficiently stringent. For example, a 
person in New York City who obtains a permit to possess a shotgun may 
use that shotgun for a variety of purposes (e.g., collecting, shooting clay 
pigeons, bird hunting, or home-defense), whereas the UN and Frey 
would require that a license enumerate “specific purposes” for which a 
gun could be used.12 In addition, every jurisdiction in the United States is 
in violation of present human rights law (according to the UN) in that 
state laws allow law enforcement officials to use deadly force (e.g., a 
handgun) to prevent the commission of certain crimes (such as rape or 
sexual assault on a child) even when the law enforcement officer has no 
reason to believe that the victim might be killed or seriously injured.13
The anti-self-defense and anti-firearms ownership mandates from the 
United Nations are unlikely to be directly adopted as law by Congress or 
by state legislatures in the United States. Nevertheless, there are a variety 
of ways, discussed infra, in which purported international law mandates 
can be imposed on American citizens without legislative consent.14
Part II of this Article sets forth the basic claims about human rights 
and firearms made by the United Nations and by international gun 
prohibition activists. Part III details the report on gun control, self-
defense, and human rights prepared by the United Nations Special 
 9. See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 6. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 48–50. 
 11. For Frey’s interim reports, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on 
the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, 55th Sess., Prevention of Human Rights Violations 
Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29 (June 25, 2003) 
(prepared by Barbara Frey), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/ 
8de4967bdc9b662dc1256d720052bbf1/$FILE/G0314738.pdf; see also Barbara Frey, Progress 
Report on the Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, delivered to the Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37 (June 21, 2004), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/ 
smallarms2004-2.html. 
 12. See infra Part III.C. 
 13. See text at Part III.C., note 48 item 8. The U.N. subcommission’s report does not 
specifically mention self-defense standards for non-government actors. However, item 14 of the 
subcommission’s report (requiring governments to prevent serious human rights violations by 
private persons) would appear to also mandate a ban on defensive use of firearms by private persons 
in self-defense against non-lethal threats (e.g., rape), in light of the Frey Report’s insistence that such 
use of force is a serious violation of human rights. See id. at item 14; Frey Report, infra note 48. 
 14. See text at Part III.C. 
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Rapporteur on firearms and human rights violations. 
Part IV examines the claims of the UN Report in light of the work of 
the classical founders of international law, including Hugo Grotius. Part 
V examines those same claims in light of the history of major legal 
systems which have contributed significantly to the creation of 
international law, including Roman law, Spanish law, Islamic law, and 
Anglo-American law. Part VI looks at contemporary constitutions, 
statutes, and treaties. 
Part VII addresses the claim that gun control is already an 
international human right because it is necessarily implicit in the right to 
life. 
Part VIII investigates whether a right to self-defense would 
necessarily imply a right to arms. This Article concludes that it must 
imply such a right, although not necessarily a right to possess firearms 
under all circumstances. 
 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL GUN PROHIBITION AGENDA AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, many disarmament activists have 
turned their focus from controlling government-owned arms of mass 
destruction to prohibiting civilian possession of firearms. Increasingly, 
firearms prohibition advocates have claimed that firearms prohibition is 
necessary to protect human rights.15 The theory posited by the 
 15. See, e.g.: 
Scholars: 
Derek Miller & Wendy Cukier, Can. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade, Regulation of Civilian 
Possession of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Biting the Bullet, Policy Briefing 16, at 5, available at 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf (follow “BtB civ 
possession.pdf” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 5, 2007) (“[T]he proliferation of weapons, and in 
particular the issue of civilian possession, is regarded as the leading threat to Human Security. 
Maintaining a focus on the reduction of small arms death and injury in the context of international 
Human Rights is widely seen as critical.”); WENDY CUKIER, ANTOINE CHAPDELAINE & CINDY 
COLLINS, GLOBALIZATION AND FIREARMS: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 11 (Fall 2000), 
available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/E2-372-2000E.pdf (“The problem of firearms is a 
concern for a wide range of constituencies . . . . While they focus on different aspects of the problem 
and solutions appropriate to different contexts, the overarching goal many share is the prevention of 
firearms injury and death in the context of international humanitarian and human rights.”); Carmen 
Rosa de León-Escribano, Cent. Am. Network for the Constr. of Peace and Human Sec. [IEPADES], 
Small Arms and Development in Post Conflict Societies 10 (July 2006) (citing an International 
Action Network Against Small Arms (IANSA) document: “There are clear signs which show that 
small firearms—as instruments of violence—contribute to human and social destruction, 
endangering human rights and the rule of law and undermining political stability and economic 
development.”). 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): 
Joint letter from Int’l Sec. Info. Serv. Eur. et al. to Eur. Parliament, Mar. 15, 2001, 
http://www.quaker.org/qcea/archive/smallarmsletter.htm (“[T]he international NGO community has 
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identified the proliferation and misuse of small arms as a serious humanitarian challenge with 
implications for development, human rights, peace and global justice.”); UN Arms Control Meet 
Opens with Call for Global Treaty, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 26, 2006 (According to Amnesty 
International Secretary General Irene Khan, “Arms proliferation has facilitated some of the worst 
human rights tragedies of our times, including massacres, mass displacement, torture and 
mistreatment.”); Thalif Deen, Disarmament: Does the World Really Need 14 Billion Bullets a Year?, 
INTERPRESS SERVICE, June 15, 2006 (“The bullet trade is out of control,” says Oxfam, and “it is 
fueling conflict and human rights abuses worldwide.”); Small Arms Working Group [SAWG], Small 
Arms and Human Rights, at 10, Jul. 26, 2006, 
http://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/sawg/2006factsheets/Small_Arms_and_Human_ 
Rights.pdf (“Small arms are used to commit a wide variety of human rights abuses . . . .”); DEBBIE 
HILLIER & BRIAN WOOD, OXFAM GB & AMNESTY INT’L, SHATTERED LIVES: THE CASE FOR TOUGH 
INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL, at 24 (2003) (“[T]he easy availability of arms tends to increase 
the incidence of armed violence, prolong wars once they break out, and enable grave and widespread 
abuses of human rights.”); Friends Comm. on Nat’l Legislation [FCNL], What is the UN Programme 
of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons?, para. 2, Aug. 7, 2006, 
http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php? item_id=1836&issue_id=46 (“The connection between the 
growing proliferation of SALW and the usage of these weapons to commit heinous crimes, violate 
human rights and threaten human security . . . .”); Environmentalists Against War [EAW], Curb 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, para. 10, July 20, 2004, 
http://www.envirosagainstwar.org/know/read.php?itemid=1666 (“These weapons directly contribute 
to widespread human rights violations . . . .”); Human Rights Watch [HRW], Small Arms and 
Human Rights: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper for the U.N. Biennial Meeting on Small 
Arms, at 3, July 7, 2003, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/ small-arms-070703.htm (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2006) (“Small arms facilitate countless human rights abuses and violations of international 
humanitarian law around the globe.”); Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk, SMALL ARMS 
SURVEY 1 (2004) (“The widespread proliferation and misuse of small arms threatens the realization 
of basic human rights and security in various ways.”); Int’l Action Network on Small Arms 
[IANSA], 2006: Bringing the Global Gun Crisis Under Control, at 8, 2006, 
http://www.iansa.org/members/IANSA-media-briefing-low-res.pdf (“More human rights abuses are 
committed with small arms than with any other weapon.”); Amnesty Int’l, UN: Oral Statement on 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, para. 2, Aug. 15, 2002, www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ 
ENGIOR400222002?open&of=ENG-325 (“A wide variety of cases of serious human rights abuse 
examined by Amnesty International involve the deliberate or reckless misuse of small arms and light 
weapons”); 2006 Review Conference at risk of failure, Response from IANSA to the President’s Non-
paper of 3 July 2006, REVCON NEWS, July 5, 2006, http://www.iansa.org/un/review2006/documents/ 
RevConNewsWednesday5july.pdf (“Illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons fuels gross violations of international human rights law and serious breaches of 
international humanitarian law.”); The Arias Found. for Peace and Human Progress [AFPHP], The 
Arms Trade Treaty: No More Arms for Atrocities, at 3 available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/ACT300022003ENGLISH/$File/ 
ACT3000203.pdf (follow ACT300022003ENGLISH hyperlink near document title “no more arms 
for atrocities”) (“The proliferation and misuse of conventional arms—everything from tanks to 
grenade launchers to hand pistols—fuels poverty, conflict and human rights violations around our 
world.”); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Targeting the Weapons: Reducing the Human Cost 
of Unregulated Arms Availability, at 5, June 2005 (“Inadequate controls on arms transfers, combined 
with the frequent use of weapons in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights, 
contribute to undermining respect for the law.”); World Council of Churches [WCC], WCC 
Executive Committee Statement on the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, at 2, Sept. 16, 
2005 (“Their presence [small arms and light weapons] fuels conflict, exacerbates abuses of human 
rights . . . .”); South Asian Movement Against Small Arms, Issue 1, Aug. 2005 (“[T]he proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons . . . also gives rise to abuse of human rights, strengthens the 
criminals and instills fear among the innocent.”). 
Media: 
UN World Conference on Small Arms Collapses Without Agreement, AFRICA NEWS, July 7, 2006 
(“The Control Arms Campaign has called on governments to establish such a treaty and to agree 
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disarmament community is that fewer firearms will lead to fewer human 
rights abuses. 
The theory is enthusiastically promoted by the world’s leading gun 
control lobby, the International Action Network Against Small Arms 
(IANSA), an umbrella network to which almost all national and regional 
gun control groups belong.16 IANSA’s director, speaking on behalf of the 
organization, has endorsed the prohibition of possession of a firearm for 
self-defense.17 IANSA also works toward the confiscation of all non-
governmentally-owned firearms, except for single-shot low-power rifles 
owned by hunters.18 Amnesty International and Oxfam work very closely 
with IANSA, and the three of them have formed a fourth lobbying group 
global guidelines for small arms sales to stop weapons fuelling human rights abuses and poverty 
around the world.”); Empty Rhetoric on Gun Control Means Little to Those in Conflict, THE IRISH 
NEWS LTD., June 19, 2006 (“[I]rresponsible arms sales continue to fuel conflicts, undermine 
development and contribute to countless human rights abuses.”); Brian Wood, A Dirty Trade in 
Arms, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, June 2006, http://mondediplo.com/2006/06/10dirtytrade (“The 
proliferation of arms, especially small arms, has had a lasting [negative] impact on human rights.”). 
U.N.: 
S.C. Res. 1467, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1467 (March 18, 2003), available at 
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/ small-arms-annex-070703.pdf (“The Security Council expresses 
its profound concern at the impact of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. . . . These 
contribute to serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, which the 
Council condemns.”); Patricia Lewis, U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research [UNIDR], Disarmament 
Forum: Taking Action on Small Arms, at 3, Feb. 2006 (“[S]mall arms play a huge role in crime, 
sexual violence, domestic violence, suicide and human rights abuses such as torture.”). 
Governments: 
Press Release, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliamentarians in Nairobi Urge All Parties to Ensure 
that Food Relief Should Not be Used for Political Ends (May 12, 2006), http://www.ipu.org/press-
e/nai9.htm ([T]hey urged parliaments to combat SALW proliferation and misuse as a key element in 
national strategies on conflict prevention, peace-building, sustainable development, protection of 
human rights . . . .”); Malawi Forms NGO to Control Firearms, AFRICA NEWS, Apr. 27, 2006 
(Acting Inspector General of Malawi Police, Often Thyolani: “The availability and spread of these 
weapons [small arms] is one of the main factors undermining development and fuelling conflict, 
crime and human rights abuses.”). 
 16. IANSA is headquartered in London. 
 17. When IANSA Director Rebecca Peters debated Wayne LaPierre, the Executive Vice 
President of the National Rifle Association at the Oxford Union, LaPierre argued that people should 
be able to have guns to resist criminals or genocidaires. Peters retorted: “It’s not going to be up to 
each individual person to be like a hero in a movie defending against this threat to freedom.” 
LaPierre touted a NRA advertising campaign which had asked: “[S]hould you shoot this rapist 
before he cuts your throat?” Peters replied: “Women need to be protected by police forces, by 
judiciaries, by criminal justice systems. People who have guns for self-defense are not safer than 
people who don’t. . . . [H]aving a gun in that situation escalates the problem.” Rebecca Peters & 
Wayne LaPierre, IANSA, The Great Gun Debate, Debate at King’s College (Oct. 12, 2004), 
http://www.iansa.org/action/nra_debate.htm  [hereinafter Peters & LaPierre Debate]. 
 18. See, e.g., Peters & LaPierre Debate, supra note 17; Q&A Early Afternoon (CNN 
International television broadcast, Oct. 23, 2002) available at http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0210/23/i_qaa.01.html (Peters states that civilians should not have “rifles that they 
can kill someone at 100 meters distance, for example. There needs to be a much greater degree of 
proportionality in the firepower that’s available.”). 
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known as “Control Arms.”19
IANSA and the United Nations work together in support of their 
common agenda. IANSA is “the organization [sic] officially designated 
by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA) to coordinate 
civil society involvement to the UN small arms process.”20 On June 26, 
2006, the day the United Nations gun control conference opened, UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomed IANSA head Rebecca Peters 
and re-iterated the UN’s support for her efforts.21 At the conference, 
IANSA staff served on the delegations of some nations. 
The 2006 gun control conference was the follow-up to the UN’s first 
major gun control conference, held in 2001.22 The conferences were 
intended to produce a treaty or some other legally binding international 
instrument. One proposed provision was a ban on the transfer of firearms 
to “non-state actors”, which meant anyone not approved by the national 
government; examples would include the Kurds in Iraq under the 
Saddam Hussein regime, rebel groups in Sudan, and the army and navy 
of Taiwan (which the UN considers to be a province of China).23 
Historically, the “non-state actor” ban would have outlawed aid to anti-
Nazi guerillas during World War II, anti-communist rebels during the 
Cold War, and the American rebels during the War for Independence.24 
Another objective was complete registration of all firearms and all 
firearms owners in national and international databases.25 Because of 
 19. See, e.g., HILLIER & WOOD, supra note 15. 
 20. IANSA’s 2004 Review—The Year in Small Arms, http://www.iansa.org/documents/ 
2004/iansa_2004_wrap_up_revised.doc (last visited Sept. 27, 2007). 
 21. Annan Receives Arms Petition by One-millionth Signer, Vows to Transmit Call Onward, 
U.N. NEWS CENTRE, June 26, 2006, available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18997 &Cr=small&Cr1=arms; see also Control 
Arms, http://www.controlarms.org/events/unreview.htm. 
 22. Preparatory conferences were held in 2003 and 2005. The post-2001 conferences were 
held under the title of “The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade 
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.” 
 23. The U.N. News Centre refers to “Taiwan” as “Taiwan, Province of China.” See Saint 
Kitts and Nevis Says Taiwan, Province of China, Should Be UN Member, UN NEWS CENTRE, Oct. 2, 
2007, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=24138&Cr=general& 
Cr1=debate. The U.N. Statistics Division calls Taiwan a “province” of China. See United Nations 
Statistics Division, “Series by Country: China,” http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/ 
cdb_da_itypes_cr.asp?country_code=157. The United Nations Global Youth Leadership Summit 
expelled two Taiwanese citizens from a 2006 meeting because the United Nations does not 
recognize Taiwan “as a nation separate from China.” Darren Sands & Iris Kuo, “Taiwanese 
observers asked to leave summit,” United Nations Office of Sport for the Development of Peace, 
available at http://www.un.org/youthsummit/journal.asp?page=JournalTues3. 
 24. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Firearms Possession by 
“Non-State Actors”: the Question of Sovereignty, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 373 (2004); David B. 
Kopel, The UN Small Arms Conference, 23 SAIS REV. 319 (2003). 
 25. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Gunning Against Guns, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2001, 
available at http://davekopel.com/NRO/2001/Gunning-Against-Guns.htm. 
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opposition from the United States and some other countries, neither of 
the conferences achieved their goal, and no treaty or other binding 
international legal instrument was produced.26
Shortly after the end of the 2006 conference, a subcommittee of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council declared that strict gun control is 
already mandated by international human rights law.27 Oxfam and 
Amnesty International have also stated this position.28
 
III. THE FREY REPORT FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION/COUNCIL 
 
A.  The Background of the Creation of the Frey Report 
 
On August 14, 2002, the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
appointed University of Minnesota Law Professor Barbara Frey as 
Special Rapporteur on the prevention of human rights violations 
committed with small arms and light weapons.29 Frey was already known 
to the Human Rights Commission since she was an alternate expert 
member of the U.S. delegation to a HRC subcommission, having been 
nominated in 2000 to a four-year term by the Clinton administration, 
which strongly supported UN gun control efforts. 
In international organizations, a Special Rapporteur is an expert who 
is chosen to advise the organization on a particular issue.30 A Special 
 26. See, e.g., The UN Small Arms Conference, supra note 24; Nick Wadhams, U.N. 
Conference on Arms Ends in Failure, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 7, 2006 (“A two-week U.N. 
conference reviewing efforts to fight the illegal weapons trade ended in failure Friday, with nations 
too divided on too many contentious issues to agree on the best way to combat a scourge that fuels 
conflict worldwide.”); Lynne Griffith-Fulton, The Small Arms Review Conference Ends With No 
Agreement, 27 THE PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR 3–4 n.3 (2006). 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mons06a.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2007). 
 27. See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 6. 
 28. Under international human rights law, every person has a duty to respect another’s right 
to life. More importantly, states have a duty to take positive measures to prevent acts of violence and 
unlawful killings, including those committed by private persons. There is growing recognition that 
states’ duties under international human rights law include exercising due diligence to ensure that 
basic rights—certainly the right to life and security of the person—are not abused by private actors. 
Where a foreseeable consequence of a failure to exercise adequate control over the civilian 
possession and use of arms is continued or increased violence, then states might be held liable for 
this failure under international human rights law. HILLIER & WOOD, supra note 15, at 81. 
 29. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2002/25, 
The Prevention of Human Rights Violations Caused by the Availability and Misuse of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, ¶ 5, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29 (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch 
/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/6d123295325517b2c12569910034dc4c/10a32527edc27cd4c1256c1d0038ee
46?OpenDocument. 
 30. See, e.g., Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Special Procedures of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Urgent Appeals and Letters of Allegations on Human Rights 
Violations, available at http://www.ohchr.info/ 
english/bodies/chr/special/communications%20english.pdf (describing functions of Special 
Rapporteurs for the Human Rights Commission). 
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Rapporteur has a duty of “impartiality,” at least in theory.31 The Human 
Rights Commission’s description of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate 
indicated the kind of reports the Commission wanted; the mandate 
precluded any investigation of whether firearms are ever used to protect 
human rights or whether the confiscation of firearms (or other 
restrictions on firearms) are ever enforced in ways which violate human 
rights. Rather, the Special Rapporteur’s sole mission was to detail the 
link between firearms possession and human rights violations.32
As Special Rapporteur, Frey began producing interim papers and 
studies.33 On March 16–18, 2005, in her capacity as Special Rapporteur, 
Frey participated in a multi-day political strategy meeting in Brazil 
assisting the proponents of an October 2005 referendum to ban the 
personal possession of firearms in Brazil. The meeting was part of a 
public relations program for the gun confiscation referendum which was 
funded by UNESCO.34 (In the election, 64% of Brazilian voters rejected 
the gun prohibition referendum.)35
 
 
 31. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Special Procedures Assumed by the 
Human Rights Council, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm. 
 32. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 29, ¶ 5 (Frey was tasked with 
“preparing a comprehensive study on the prevention of human rights violations committed with 
small arms and light weapons . . . .”). “Small arms and light weapons” is a term which includes 
mortars, machine guns, portable anti-tank weapons, and a variety of other military weapons. SMALL 
ARMS SURVEY 2002: COUNTING THE HUMAN COST 10 (Peter Batchelor & Keith Krause eds., 2002) 
(“small arms” are “revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine 
guns, and light machine guns.” “Light weapons” are “heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel 
and mounted grenade launchers, portable antitank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable 
launchers of anti-tank and antiaircraft missile systems, and mortars of less than 100mm caliber”). 
Frey, however, wrote only about firearms and presumed that all firearms (including non-military 
type firearms) were “small arms and light weapons.” 
 33. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of 
Human Rights, 55th Sess., Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and 
Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29 (June 25, 2003) (prepared by Barbara Frey), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/8de4967bdc9b662dc1256d720052bbf1 
/$FILE/G0314738.pdf; Progress Report on the Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed 
with Small Arms and Light Weapons, supra note 11. 
 34. Brazil . . . Strengthening of Communications Networks and International Partnerships 
(International Programme for the Development of Communications, UNESCO), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/file_download.php/53d7121e58db595db8571998a273f592Latin+ 
America+and+Caribbean+2005++new+projects+approved+.pdf. Viva Rio, the Brazilian gun 
prohibition lobby, receives funding from UNESCO and UNICEF. Viva Rio, “Fight for Peace Sports 
Centre” (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2004), at 5 available at http://www.globalgiving.com/pfil/ 
807/projdoc.doc. 
 35. See Brazilians Reject Gun Sales Ban, BBC NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005. Among the reasons for 
the defeat were Brazil’s traditions of hunting and target shooting; concerns about the notoriously 
corrupt Brazilian police; the need for self-defense in Brazil’s crime-ridden cities, many of which 
enjoy little protection from the police; and concerns about corruption in the regime of President Lula 
da Silva, who was the main proponent of the referendum. 
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B.  The Human Rights Commission 
 
In December 2005, the United Nations abolished the Human Rights 
Commission. The Commission had been widely criticized for inattention 
to human rights. The Human Rights Commission had encouraged 
terrorist bombings of Israeli civilians,36 refused to pass resolutions 
criticizing human rights violations perpetrated by the genocidal regime in 
Zimbabwe,37 and refused to condemn the Libyan and Sudanese slave 
trade.38 Mary Robinson, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, helped allow the Durban Conference Against Racism to become 
a forum for aggressive and vicious anti-Semitism, and to fail to mention 
the existence of—let alone condemn—the current slave trade in Africa.39 
In 2005, the Commission was chaired by a representative of the Libyan 
dictatorship of Moammer Qaddafi, 40 a regime which, ever since 
 36. A few days after thirty Israelis celebrating the Passover Seder were murdered by a 
terrorist bomber, the Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution endorsing “all available means 
including armed struggle” against Israelis. See Anne Bayefsky, How the U.N.’s Human Rights 
Investigations Do Yasser Arafat’s Dirty Work, N.Y. SUN, Apr. 29, 2002. The resolution was 
understood as endorsing suicide bombing of civilians; hence, Britain and Germany, which often 
abstain on anti-Israel resolutions, voted against the resolution. The resolution passed by 40 to 5. See 
DORE GOLD, TOWER OF BABBLE: HOW THE UNITED NATIONS HAS FUELED GLOBAL CHAOS 41–42 
(2005). 
 37. See Brett D. Schaefer, No Funding for U.N.’s Farcical Rights Council, BALT. SUN, Oct. 
10, 2007, available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-
op.un10oct10,0,1259104.story; Joseph Klein, They Deserve Each Other, 
FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Apr. 10, 2006, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx? 
GUID={F4D00D8E-263D-4AE6-98DB-101F4EDAF2B0} (“Iran hopes to emulate the example of 
its fellow repressive regimes like Sudan, Zimbabwe and Cuba who have avoided challenges to their 
human rights records in the past by taking over the machinery of the Human Rights Council’s 
predecessor, the UN Commission for Human Rights.”). 
 38. Nile Gardiner & Baker Spring, Reform the United Nations, Oct. 27, 2003, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/BG-1700.cfm; Letter from Tommy 
Calvert, Jr., Chief of External Operations, Abolish: The Anti-Slavery Portal Jan. 27, 2003, 
http://ga0.org/freedom_action/alert-description.html?alert_id=2002698. 
 39. The World Conference Against Racism began to go off-track when the February 2001 
pre-conference in Tehran turned into an anti-Israel fest, and Ms. Robinson applauded the 
conference’s results. As the Durban conference neared, Robinson sided with the Arab dictatorships 
in equating Israel with Nazi Germany. Under Robinson’s supervision, the Tehran pre-conference 
barred participation by Jewish, Baha’i, and Kurdish NGOs. Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An 
Insider’s View of the UN World Conference Against Racism, 26 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 31 
(2002). Ms. Robinson is a strong advocate of the U.N.’s gun control campaign. See Interview by 
Control Arms with Mary Robinson, Honorary President, Oxfam Int’l, 
http://www.controlarms.org/famous_faces/ mary_robinson.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007); 
Campaign Launched to Control Small Arms Trade, THE DAILY STAR, Jan. 18, 2004, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/01/18/d40118130381.htm. 
 40. Najat Al-Hajjaji, the Libyan ambassador to the United Nations. One of the best-known 
HRC’s Special Rapporteurs is Jean Ziegler, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. Mr. Ziegler is 
also vice president of North-South XXI, the organization that bestows the “Moammar Khaddafi 
Human Rights Prize.” Mr. Ziegler won the $250,000 prize himself in 2002, sharing the award that 
year with French holocaust denier Roger Garaudy. U.N. Watch, Jean Ziegler’s Campaign Against 
America: A Study of the Anti-American Bias of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
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Qaddafi’s coup in 1969, has had one of the worst human rights records in 
the world. 
Given the Human Rights Commission’s complicity with 
genocidaires, terrorists, and slave-traders, and given that some 
Commission member governments are state sponsors of genocide, 
terrorism, and slave-trading,41 those governments’ interest in appointing 
a Special Rapporteur dedicated to gun prohibition was consistent with 
those governments’ pragmatic interest in preventing resistance by the 
victims of genocide, slave-capturing, and state terrorism.42
The Human Rights Commission’s reputation as an adversary of 
human rights harmed the UN’s reputation, and finally led Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to ally, at least publicly, with reform advocates.43 In 
March 2006, the old UN Human Rights Commission was replaced by the 
new UN Human Rights Council. As with the old Commission, the new 
Council did not require that members have a democratic form of 
government, or meet any tangible standards regarding human rights.44 
Members of the Council in 2007 included dictatorships such as Cuba, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Russia, China and Pakistan.45 The new Human 
Oct. 2005, http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.1289203/apps/s/content.asp? 
ct=1760293; see also U.N. Watch, Switzerland’s Nominee to the UN Human Rights Council and the 
Moammar Khaddafi Human Rights Prize, June 20, 2006, http://www.unwatch.org/ziegler/ (follow 
“Exposed: Jean Ziegler & the Khaddafi Prize”). 
 41. See supra text accompanying notes 36 –40; see infra text accompanying notes 43–47. 
 42. For one notable example of the type of resistance that successful gun confiscation would 
prevent, see Vahram Leon Shemmassian, The Armenian Villagers of Musa Dagh: A Historical-
Ethnographic Study, 1840–1915 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA) (on file with 
authors) (detailing successful use of firearms by Armenian villagers in Musa Dagh, in modern-day 
Turkey, in 1915, to resist mass murder by the Ottoman Empire). 
 43. E.g., Kofi Annan, Office of the Spokesman for the U.N. Secretary-General, Sec’y-Gen.’s 
Address to the Comm’n on Human Rights,, Apr. 7, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/ 
sgstats.asp?nid=1388 (“We have reached a point at which the Commission’s declining credibility 
has cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole, and where piecemeal 
reform will not be enough.”); Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International 
Organization Affairs, United States State Department, The UN Commission on Human Rights: 
Protector or Accomplice?, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, Apr. 19, 2005, 
available at http://www.state.gov/ p/io/rls/rm/44983.htm. 
 44. Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.48 (Apr. 3, 2006), 
(declaring that votes for membership in the Council “shall take into account the contribution of 
candidates to the promotion and protection of human rights and their voluntary pledges and 
commitments made thereto” and that Council members shall “uphold the highest standards in the 
promotion and protection of human rights”). That the language is of no practical significance in 
keeping extreme abusers of human rights off the Council is demonstrated by election of Cuba, Saudi 
Arabia, and other extreme violators of human rights to the Council. Even a proposal to bar 
membership to governments which are under Security Council sanctions for human rights abuses 
were rejected. Eye on the U.N., Summary of the Outcome of the Human Rights Commission 
Negotiations: Nothing to Show, http://www.eyeontheun.org/un-reform.asp?p=77 (last visited Nov. 
11, 2007). 
 45. Brett D. Schaefer, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Repeating Past Mistakes, 
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Rights Council appears to often follow the same path as the old Human 
Rights Commission.46 For example, like the Commission, the Council 
identifies a litany of human rights abuses allegedly perpetrated by Israel, 
but never any abuses perpetrated by Israel’s adversaries. In the Council’s 
first year of operation, the only country which was named as actually 
being engaged in human rights violations was Israel.47
 
C.  The Frey Report 
 
Having been selected as Special Rapporteur by the old Human 
Rights Commission, Frey delivered her final report to the new Human 
Rights Council on July 27, 2006.48 On August 24, 2006, the UN Human 
Rights Council’s subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights endorsed the Frey report, and announced that all national 
governments were required by international human rights law to 
implement various listed gun control provisions; the subcommission 
recommended that the full Human Rights Council also adopt the report 
and issue a similar mandate.49 Of course the subcommission has little 
power to enforce its wishes directly, but the declaration gives national 
government officials, including courts, considerable support to promote 
restrictive gun laws which are, according to the UN, mandated by 
Address Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Sept. 6, 
2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/hl964.cfm. The Council has forty-
seven members, of which only half (twenty-four) are rated “free” by Freedom House. Freedom 
House, Freedom in the World 2006: Selected Data from Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties, Sept. 1, 2006, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/charts2006.pdf. 
 46. Schaefer, supra note 45. 
 47. Id.; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Report to the General Assembly on the First Session 
of the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10/Add (July 5, 2006) (prepared by Musa 
Burayzat), available at http://www.ohchr.org/English/bodies/hrcouncil/ docs/L.10add.1.doc; U.N. 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Second Special Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/S-2/2 (Aug. 11 2006), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/specialsession/A.HRC.S-2.2_en.pdf 
(condemning Israel for its tactics in the war in Lebanon, but not criticizing any of the numerous 
violations of international human rights law by Hezbollah, including the use of civilians as human 
shields, and the deliberate targeting of Israeli civilians for terrorist missile attacks); Brett D. 
Schaefer, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Disastrous First Year and Discouraging 
Signs for Reform, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/ 
tst072607a.cfm (stating that seventy percent of the HRC’s resolutions in its first year were aimed at 
Israel; John Duggard, the Council’s Special Rapporteur for human rights in the “occupied 
Palestinian territory” considers his mission to include reporting only on human rights abuses by 
Israelis, but not by Arabs). 
 48. See U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human 
Rights, Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
U.N Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/27 (July 27, 2006) (prepared by Barbara Frey), available at 
http://www.geneva-forum.org/Reports/20060823.pdf. [hereinafter Frey Report]. 
 49. U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, supra note 6. 
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international law. The full Human Rights Council is scheduled to take up 
the issue, and indications at the time of this writing suggest that the full 
Council will ratify most or all of Frey’s report. The Chairman of the full 
Human Rights Council has already announced his enthusiastic support 
for the Frey Report, the subcommission’s adoption of the report, and the 
prospect of using the Human Rights Council to advance a worldwide gun 
control mandate.50
The Frey Report, then, is not simply a scholarly paper that will be 
filed away in a United Nations library. It is an effort to establish a new 
norm of international human rights law, and this effort to establish the 
new norm is supported by the United Nations Human Rights Council, as 
one aspect of the UN’s far-ranging support for restrictive and 
confiscatory firearms policies. 
The United Nations General Assembly began drafting an 
international Arms Trade Treaty in late 2006. A stated purpose of the 
Arms Trade Treaty is to prohibit arms transfers which violate human 
rights.51 As interpreted by the HRC and Frey, every firearms sale in the 
United States would be a human rights violation; this is because even the 
most restrictive jurisdictions in the United States—such as Washington, 
D.C., or New York City—do not meet the minimum Frey/HRC gun 
control standards.52
 50. Luis Alfonso de Alba, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Human Rights Council 
and Efforts to Reduce Small Arms and Light Weapons Related Violence, in Small Arms and Human 
Security Bulletin, HD, 3–4, Nov. 2006–Feb. 2007, 
http://www.hdcentre.org/Small%20Arms%20and%20Human%20Security%20Bulletin (link to issue 
8). 
 51. Arms Trade Treaty, How Would an ATT Work? http://www.armstradetreaty.org/att/ 
howwould.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). The Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee includes 
IANSA itself, and is dominated by IANSA members, such as the Brazilian gun prohibition lobby 
Viva Rio, Oxfam, and Amnesty International. Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, About Us, 
http://www.armstradetreaty.org/att/aboutus.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). The Steering 
Committee’s “About Us” page lists only two “Useful websites”: IANSA and Control Arms (a 
prohibitionist consortium of IANSA, Oxfam, and Amnesty International). Arms Trade Treaty 
Steering Committee, About Us. 
 52. For example, New York City and Washington, D.C., allow persons to acquire long guns 
(rifles or shotguns) to be used for any and all lawful purposes. (D.C. law allows armed self-defense 
in business premises, but not in the home; New York City allows self-defense in the home or in 
business premises.) The New York and D.C. laws violate the HRC Sub-Commission requirement 
that “Possession of small arms shall be authorized for specific purposes only; small arms shall be 
used strictly for the purpose for which they are authorized.” U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion 
and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, supra note 6. 
The HRC Sub-Commission requires that gun possession be allowed only with a license that must be 
periodically renewed. U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, 
supra note 6. Although all American states require some form of background check for retail 
purchases of firearms (and some have a similar requirement for informal private transfers, such as 
gifts) only a few American states require a license for handgun possession; few states require a 
license for long gun possession. Hardly anywhere, except in New York State for handguns, does the 
licensing requirement inquire (as the HRC demands) into the applicant’s “purpose” for wanting a 
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With the proposed Arms Trade Treaty being vigorously promoted by 
IANSA and its allied delegations at the United Nations, the Frey/HRC 
declarations about human rights and firearms will likely be incorporated 
into the new treaty. 
While it is unlikely that a severely restrictive international gun 
control treaty could be ratified by two-thirds of the United States Senate, 
there are many mechanisms by which unratified treaties can work their 
way into U.S. law. For example, some eminent international 
disarmament experts have taken the position that the president of the 
United States may announce that a treaty has entered into force, and 
thereby become the law of the United States even if the U.S. Senate has 
never voted to ratify the treaty.53 The United States Supreme Court has 
cited unratified treaties (and even an African treaty), and various 
contemporary foreign law sources, as guidance for interpreting United 
States constitutional provisions.54 Likewise, other scholars, writing in a 
UN publication, argue that United Nations gun control documents 
(notwithstanding the fact that the documents, on their face, have no 
binding legal effect) represent “norms” of international law.55 Attorney 
Joseph Bruce Alonso has detailed how the theories being developed by 
gun. 
The HRC Sub-Commission states that “Governments should take steps to encourage voluntary 
disarmament.” U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, supra 
note 6. Some American cities occasionally encourage disarmament, by promoting “buy-back” 
programs in which people receive cash or some other benefit for surrendering their guns. But the 
much more common program is for American governments to encourage armament, by running 
hunter safety education and other programs encouraging people to learn how to use firearms safely. 
While all American states require safety training in order to acquire a hunting license, and most 
states require safety training in order to obtain a permit to carry a concealed handgun for protection 
in public places, very few states require a safety test or formal training to possess a handgun, and 
almost none impose a test or training requirement for long guns. The HRC Sub-Commission states 
that safety training should be mandatory for possession of any gun. U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the 
Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, supra note 6. 
 53. Baker Spring, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Current Nuclear Proliferation Challenges, 
Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl968.cfm (discussing Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Comm’n, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical Arms, June 1, 2006, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf). 
 54. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 55 (2005) (rejecting a U.S. Senate reservation to the 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; citing the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United States has not ratified, and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing the never-ratified Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (citing European 
court cases, and favorably citing an amicus brief filed by Mary Robinson, a gun prohibitionist who 
promoted anti-Semitic propaganda at the U.N. Durban Conference on Racism, see Lantos, supra 
note 39); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (citing the European Union’s position on capital 
punishment). 
 55. Nadia Fischer, Outcome of the United Nations Process: The Legal Character of the 
United Nations Programme of Action, in ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW at 165–66 
(2002). 
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IANSA and its allies would allow American manufacturers, 
governments, or gun owners to be sued in foreign courts.56 
 
D.  No Right of Self-Defense 
 
The most startling of the claims in the Frey/HRC report is that there 
is no human right of self-defense. She states: 
 
No international human right of self-defence is expressly set 
forth in the primary sources of international law: treaties, 
customary law, or general principles. While the right to life is 
recognized in virtually every major international human rights 
treaty, the principle of self-defence is expressly recognized in 
only one, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights), article 2.57
 
Frey specifically cites, and rejects, an article arguing that there is a 
human right of self-defense against genocide.58 Elsewhere, she has, in 
accord with the IANSA position, stated that “It is the State that must be 
responsible—and accountable—for ensuring public safety, rather than 
civilians themselves.”59
Frey then argues that a state’s failure to restrict self-defense is itself a 
human rights violation. According to Frey, a government violates the 
human right to life to the extent that a state allows the defensive use of a 
firearm “unless the action was necessary to save a life or lives.”60 Thus, 
firearms “may be used defensively only in the most extreme 
 56. Joseph Bruce Alonso, The Second Amendment and Global Gun Control, 15 J. ON 
FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y. 1 (2003). 
 57. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 21. 
 58. Id. at 16 n.14 (discussing David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Is Resisting 
Genocide a Human Right?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (2006) (“The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights affirms the existence of a universal, individual right of self-defense, and also a right 
to revolution against tyranny. . . . Taken in conjunction with Anglo-American human rights law, the 
human rights instruments can be read to reflect a customary or general international law recognizing 
a right of armed resistance by genocide victims.”). 
 59. Reducing Gun Violence, Improving Security: National Arms Control Efforts, SMALL 
ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY BULLETIN, April (Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, Switz.), 
Apr. 2005. 
 60. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 26 (citation markers omitted): 
“International bodies and States universally define self-defence in terms of necessity and 
proportionality. Whether a particular claim to self-defence is successful is a fact-sensitive 
determination. When small arms and light weapons are used for self-defence, for instance, unless the 
action was necessary to save a life or lives and the use of force with small arms is proportionate to 
the threat of force, self-defence will not alleviate responsibility for violating another’s right to life.” 
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circumstances, expressly, where the right to life is already threatened or 
unjustifiably impinged.”61 Frey also states that law enforcement officials 
may only use firearms in similar circumstances.62
In other words, it is a human rights violation for a state to allow its 
citizens or its law enforcement officers to use firearms to protect victims 
of rape, robbery, or mayhem. As this paper will detail infra, in Parts IV, 
V, and VI, Frey’s hyper-narrow conditions on permissible self-defense—
and her denial of the existence of a human right to self-defense—are 
inconsistent with a long and well-established tradition of human rights 
law. 
The issue of whether international law mandates highly restrictive 
gun control, as Frey and the HRC claim, is discussed in Part VII. Then, 
Part VIII addresses the related question of to what extent, if any, an 
international right of self-defense would imply a right to some type of 
arms, or to firearms. 
 
IV.  THE FOUNDERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Regarding the vast body of non-treaty international law, Frey offers a 
throwaway line: “No international human right of self-defence is 
expressly set forth in the primary sources of international law: treaties, 
customary law, or general principles.”63 Such assertion is incorrect. 
Frey’s claim that non-treaty sources of international law do not 
recognize a right of self-defense is unsupportable when those sources are 
examined. In fact, the fundamental “general principle” of international 
law is the personal right of self-defense—as shall be detailed. 
 One source of international law is the opinion of leading 
scholars.64 During the classical period of international law, the opinion of 
scholars was perhaps the most important source of international law, 
since there were few treaties of broad applicability. 
 61. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 27 (citation markers omitted): 
The use of small arms and light weapons by either State or non-State actors automatically raises the 
threshold for severity of the threat which must be shown in order to justify the use of small arms or 
light weapons in defence, as required by the principle of proportionality. Because of the lethal nature 
of these weapons and the jus cogens human rights obligations imposed upon all States and 
individuals to respect the right to life, small arms and light weapons may be used defensively only in 
the most extreme circumstances, expressly, where the right to life is already threatened or 
unjustifiably impinged. 
 62. Id. ¶¶ 28–29. 
 63. Id. ¶ 21. 
 64. See, e.g., Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38, § 1(d) (The International Court of Justice shall 
apply “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.”). 
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We begin this survey with the first international law treatise, from 
Italy in the fourteenth century.65 We then follow the development of 
international law in the treatises of the great Spanish and Italian scholars 
through the early seventeenth century. 
Dutchman Hugo Grotius published the greatest and most influential 
treatise of international law in 1625.66 It remained of preeminent 
importance even in the early twentieth century. 
Second only to Grotius’s magnum opus was Samuel Pufendorf’s 
1674 eight-volume work.67 Most of the international law treatises were 
written in Latin, the universal second language of educated persons in 
Europe and the Americas. Both Grotius and Pufendorf became even 
more influential thanks to the French translations, with copious 
annotations, by Jean Barbeyrac. The Barbeyrac editions became the 
standard editions of Grotius and Pufendorf, and the foundation for 
English translations. 
The 1725 treatise of Switzerland’s Emmerich de Vattel is generally 
considered to complete the trilogy of the three classic works of 
international law.68 Another Swiss scholar, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui was 
notably influential, especially among the American Founders.69
Among all the scholars, we see some consistent themes: personal 
self-defense is an essential human right. Self-defense is likewise an 
essential foundation of international law, as the rules and limits of 
personal self-defense were scaled up to international application, with 
appropriate modifications. 
The scholars were highly concerned with shaping international law 
so as to impose rules on the conduct of war. The code of chivalry had 
once provided some limits on warfare (such as not targeting civilians), 
but as warfare passed from the hands of armored, aristocratic knights to 
large mercenary armies, warfare became more brutal, most notably in the 
Thirty Years War, which devastated German civilians. 
The great international law scholars succeeded, as warfare in the 
eighteenth century was fought according to standards which were more 
respectful of the rights of non-combatants than were the wars of the 
 65. “Multa ignoramus quae nobis non laterent, si veterum lectio nobis esset familiaris.” (We 
are ignorant of many things that would not be hidden from us if the readings of old authors were 
familiar to us.) Arthur Lyon Cross, English History and the Study of English Law, 2 MICH. L. REV. 
649, 652 (1904) (quoting the Roman philosopher, Macrobius); The Case of Marshalsea, 10 COKE 
REP. 68, 73 (E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling, 1738) (1614) (quote rendered as “Quod multa ignoramus 
quae nobis non laterent si veterum lectio fuit nobis familiaris.”). 
 66. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 67. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 68. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 69. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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preceding century. The scholars changed the way that governments 
behaved—convincing the governments that they had a legal obligation to 
constrain the conduct of their militaries; the way the scholars succeeded 
was by building a system of international law in which the right of 
personal self-defense was the cornerstone. 
 
A.  Before Grotius 
 
1.  Giovanni da Legnano 
 
Hailed as “a second Aristotle,” the fourteenth century Milanese 
scholar Giovanni da Legnano authored “the earliest attempt to deal, as a 
whole, with the group of rights and duties which arise out of a state of 
War.”70 Legnano was no Aristotle, but he may justly be regarded as the 
scholar who began the systematic analysis of international law which has 
continued to the present. 
Legnano classified wars into different categories, including 
“universal corporeal war” (nation against nation), “reprisal” (a 
government taking revenge against foreigners for harm done to one of its 
subjects), and “particular war” (self-defense).71 Like the scholars in the 
succeeding centuries, Legnano saw no fundamental difference between 
individual violence and government violence. To be sure, there were 
important distinctions among the various categories of war, but all types 
of fighting were simply variants on the same theme. 
As with most scholarship of the time, Legnano’s principal sources 
were Roman law,72 the Bible, other philosophers, and logic. 
According to Legnano, “self-defense proceeds from natural law, and 
not from positive law, civil or canon.”73 While positive law did sanction 
self-defense, self-defense was not an artificial creation of positive law, 
 70. Thomas Erskine Holland, Introduction to GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, DE BELLO, DE 
REPRESALIIS ET DE DUELLO ix (Thomas Erskine Holland ed. 1917) (1360) [hereinafter LEGNANO]. 
Legnano is a city in northern Italy, near Milan. For many of the authors discussed in this Part, the 
author’s “name” is a combination of a given name (e.g. “Giovanni”) and a geographical location 
indicating where the author is from (e.g., “da Legnano”). The geographical location is not really a 
“name” in the modern sense; nevertheless, we follow the convention of many authors in using the 
geographical appellation as if it were a “last name” in modern usage. 
 71. LEGNANO, supra note 70, at 217. 
 72. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 73. LEGNANO, supra note 70, at 278. “Positive law” is law formally created by a government 
or governments. The works of the founding classical authors have been reprinted many times, in 
many different editions. We recognize that not all present or future readers will be using the same 
printed editions which we have used. Some readers may also wish to consult editions written in other 
languages. Thus, the page numbers which we use in our pinpoint cites may not be the page numbers 
in the editions which some readers may use. 
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but rather was an inherent instinct.74
Although the fourteenth century world was strictly hierarchical, 
Legnano allowed for self-defense against one’s superior, or even against 
a judge, if it were clear that the defender was the victim of an 
unprovoked violent attack.75 Even a slave could defend his own life 
against a master, because the law did not allow masters to kill their 
slaves.76
Self-defense is lawful, wrote Legnano, not only in defense of life, 
but also in defense of lawfully possessed property,77 with deadly force if 
necessary.78 The principle of self-defense allows a person to come to the 
aid of a relative or friend whose person or property is being attacked.79 
Aiding others is not compulsory, however, unless a person can do so 
safely.80
Notably, a victim is not required to use only the precise level of force 
that his assailant uses: “suppose a strong and vigorous man strikes me 
with his fist, and I am a poor fellow who cannot stand up to him with the 
fist. May I defend myself with a sword?” Legnano answered in the 
affirmative.81
 
2.  Honoré de Bonet and Christine de Pisan 
 
Honoré de Bonet’s The Tree of Battles popularized Legnano’s ideas 
in a simpler form.82 Like many other international law writers, Bonet was 
very concerned with curbing the tendency of soldiers to victimize non-
combatant peasants and other non-combatants.83
In the hierarchical world of the Middle Ages, Bonet showed the 
primacy of the right of self-defense by explaining that subordinates could 
rightfully defend themselves against their superiors: a serf against his 
lord, a monk against his abbot, a son against his father; to fail to defend 
oneself against a deadly attack would be tantamount to suicide, and 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 289. 
 76. Id. at 291. 
 77. Id. at 297. 
 78. Id. at 299–300. 
 79. Id. at 294–95. 
 80. Id. at 295. 
 81. Id. at 303. 
 82. HONORÉ BONET, THE TREE OF BATTLES (G.W. Coopland trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
1949) (late 14th century). 
 83. Id. at 188–89 (arguing that traditional practices should be enlarged regarding non-
combatants having a right to safe conduct passage during war, regarding the protection of all animals 
used for tilling the soil, and that farm laborers should have the same immunity from military attack 
as does the farmer owner). 
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would lead to damnation.84 Of course it was permissible to defend one’s 
wife.85 More generally, the defense of the innocent needed no license 
from the sovereign.86 Helping a third person who is the victim of a 
potentially homicidal attack was allowed, but not required. 87
The Founding Mother of international law, Christine de Pisan (1364-
1430), spread the ideas of Legnano and Bonet further.88 Pisan’s father 
was an Italian scholar who was called to join the court of France’s King 
Charles V; her father ensured that she received a broad and deep 
education, of the type that at the time was only provided to boys.89 After 
her husband died when she was only twenty-five years old, she made 
herself the first woman to support herself by writing.90 She wrote a 
variety of works of fiction and non-fiction, which extolled heroic women 
and women’s rights to self-determination.91
In 1409 she penned Le Livre des Faits d’Armes et de Chevalrie (The 
Book of Feats of Arms and Chivalry).92 Later in the century, William 
Caxton translated the book into English. Because Pisan and Bonet were 
writing in a vernacular language (French), their ideas were accessible to 
a larger audience than the Latin-reading élites who were the main 
audience for other scholars. The English translation of Pisan further 
magnified her influence. 
Le Livre des Faits d’Armes et de Chevalrie was written for knights, 
and included advice about military strategy and tactics (mainly based on 
Roman sources), as well as standards for the legitimate conduct of 
warfare—particularly the imperative not to deliberately harm non-
combatants. Pisan affirmed that a knight could defend himself, including 
with deadly force, for “a man in deffense is permytted to hurt another”, 
since “Iuste deffense” was “preuyleged.”93 She rejected the idea that a 
victim could be prosecuted for using deadly force just because the 
 84. Id. at 170. 
 85. Id. at 166. 
 86. Id. at 137. 
 87. Id. 
 88. CHRISTINE DE PISAN, THE BOOK OF FAYETTES OF ARMES AND OF CHYVALRYE (A.T.P. 
Byles, ed., William Caxton trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1932) (1409). 
 89. A.T.P. Byles, Introduction to CHRISTINE DE PISAN, THE BOOK OF FAYTTES OF ARMES 
AND OF CHYVALRYE, at xi (A.T.P. Byles ed., 2002). 
 90. Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, s.v. “Christine de Pisan,” 
http://encarta.msn.com/text_761553009__0/ Pisan_Christine_de.html  (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
 91. Id. (discussing ÉPÎTRE AU DIEU D’AMOUR [LETTER TO THE GOD OF LOVE] (1399) 
(rejecting courtly love conventions which idealized and falsified women’s nature); BOOK OF THE 
CITY OF LADIES (1405) (biographies of heroic women from antiquity and from Christian history; 
arguing that women are as intelligent as men, are not blameworthy for rape, and can be great 
warriors); DITIÉ EN L’HONNEUR DE JEANNE D’ARC [SONG IN HONOR OF JOAN OF ARC] (1429)). 
 92. Byles, supra note 89, at xii. 
 93. PISAN, supra note 88, at 211. 
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government claimed that the assailant’s attack was not intended to be 
deadly.94
 
3.  Francisco de Victoria 
 
During the sixteenth century, the higher education system of Spain 
was the greatest in the world, and the greatest of the Spanish universities 
was the University of Salamanca. At Salamanca, as at other universities, 
the most prestigious professorship was that of head Professor of 
Theology—a position which included the full scope of ethics and 
philosophy. 
When the Primary chair in Theology at the University of Salamanca 
became open in 1526, Francisco de Victoria (1486–1546) was selected to 
occupy the most important position in the University.95 He was chosen, 
in accordance with the custom of the time, by a vote of the students.96 As 
one of Victoria’s biographers observed, “It is no slight tribute to 
democracy that a small democratic, intellectual group should have 
chosen from among the intellectuals the one person best able to defend 
democracy for the entire world.”97
Victoria came from the Dominican Order—which governed itself 
through democratic, representative procedures, according to procedures 
in the Order’s written constitution.98 During the period between the 
destruction of the Roman Republic by Julius Caesar in the first century 
BC, and the founding of the Dominicans in the thirteenth century AD, the 
Western world had very little experience with functional, enduring 
systems of democratic government. The Dominican Order served as one 
of the incubators of democracy for the modern world. 
 94. Id. at 211–12. 
 95. Ernest Nys, Introduction to FRANCISCO DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IURE BELLI 
RELECTIONES 69 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bates trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1532). 
An important predecessor of Victoria was Alfonso Tostado, a leading Spanish theologian and 
canonist of the fifteenth century. He addressed many topics, including just war. Tostado wrote that: 
“in a just war everything that a man can seize becomes the property of the captor, both by divine law 
and by the Law of Nations, and it is just to kill; but an unjust war does not differ from brigandage.” 
Id. at 63. Except for the requirement that a war be just, Tostado set no limits on how the war be 
conducted, save that there must be no “violation of truth.” Id. As a modern commentator explains, 
Tostado saw personal self-defense and national self-defense as essentially identical: “The author has 
before his eyes, we must point out, not only public war, but also private war, when it is conducted in 
accordance with the rules laid down by the law of the country.” Id. 
 96. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRANCISCO DE 
VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS 73 (Oxford University Press 1934). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 275–80 (citing ERNEST BARKER, THE DOMINICAN ORDER AND CONVOCATION: A 
STUDY OF GROWTH AND REPRESENTATION IN THE CHURCH DURING THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 
(1913)). 
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University lectures were open to the public, and Victoria attracted 
huge audiences of students and laymen. He quickly became known as the 
best teacher in Spain.99 He was the founder of the “celebrated school of 
Salamanca”: a group of Spanish scholars, at the University of Salamanca 
and other Spanish universities, who applied new insights to the 
Scholastic system of philosophy.100 (Scholasticism, a dialectical 
methodology for academic inquiry, had been developed centuries before 
by Thomas Aquinas and other scholars.) 
Victoria had been educated in Paris, and, as an eminent Dominican 
scholar, he was part of a continent-wide community of Dominican 
intellectuals. Accordingly, Victoria was an internationalist. In addition, 
“Victoria was a liberal. He could not help being a liberal. He was an 
internationalist by inheritance. And because he was both, his 
international law is a liberal law of nations.”101
Francisco de Victoria’s classroom became “the cradle of 
international law.”102 “Victoria proclaimed the existence of an 
international law no longer limited to Christendom but applying to all 
States, without reference to geography, creed, or race.”103
Victoria was a key source for Grotius104 as transmitted via the 
Spanish legal scholars Ferdinand Vasquez and Diego Covarruvias.105
The Spanish conquest of the New World impelled the sixteenth-
century’s scholarly inquiry into international law. Many Spaniards were 
intensely concerned with whether the conquests had been moral and 
legal. Indeed, it is to the credit of Spain that many of its leading 
intellectuals and scholars strongly denounced the abuse of Indians and 
urged that Spanish policy conform to international law. The actual 
 99. Id. at 95. 
 100. Nys, supra note 95. The earlier Scholastics, including Aquinas, argued for a right of 
personal defense, and for a right to community self-defense to overthrow a tyrant. See David B. 
Kopel, The Catholic Second Amendment, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 519 (2006). Another leading 
Salamancan was the Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1536–1624). Today, Spain’s leading liberal think tank 
is named for him, the Instituto Juan de Mariana. (www.juandemariana.org). In 1599, Mariana wrote 
De Rege et Regis Institutione (The King and the Education of the King) which elaborated the right of 
popular revolution against tyrants. J.H.M. Salmon, Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontism, and 
the Royalist Response, 1580–1620, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 1450–
1700, at 75–77 (J.H. Burns ed., 1996) (citing 2 JUAN DE MARIANA, DE REGE ET REGIS 
INSTITUTIONE, at ch. 6 (1599)). 
 101. SCOTT, supra note 96, at 280. 
 102. Id. at 75. 
 103. Id. at 10a–11a. In Spanish, “Victoria” is the proper spelling for the man in general (e.g., 
“Victoria was very intelligent”), while “Vitoria” is the spelling for discussion of him as a theologian 
or jurist (e.g., “Vitoria developed more sophisticated answers to some of the questions raised by 
Thomas Aquinas.”). Id. at 70. To avoid confusion, this Article uses “Victoria” (except when a direct 
quote or formal citation uses “Vitoria”). 
 104. See discussion infra text accompanying notes Part IV.B.1. 
 105. Nys, supra note 95, at 98. 
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behavior of the Spanish government in the New World was hardly 
admirable on the whole, but Spain was far ahead of France, England, and 
other colonial powers, because Spain at least had a group of influential 
scholars who raised the right questions—and who sometimes affected the 
course of government policy. 
The issue of treatment of the Indians had been raised at the Spanish 
court of Queen Isabella as early as 1494; a special commission of 
theologians and canonists had actually convinced the Queen of the legal 
and moral necessity of a humanitarian policy, but the Queen eventually 
yielded to the demands of colonists who insisted on unfettered power of 
exploitation.106
The debate continued in Spain during ensuing decades, leading to 
Francisco de Victoria’s 1532 treatise De Indis (On the Indians).107 The 
first two sections of the treatise demolished every argument that 
Christianity, or the desire to propagate the Christian faith, or even the 
express authority of the Pope, could justify the conquest of the Indians. 
Victoria wrote that heretics, blasphemers, idolaters, and pagans—
including those who were presented with Christian evangelization and 
then obstinately rejected it—retained all of their natural rights to their 
property and their sovereignty.108
In section three, Victoria examined other possible justifications for 
the conquest. He argued in favor of an unlimited right of free trade. 109 If 
a Frenchman wanted to travel in Spain, or to pursue peaceful commerce 
there, the Spanish government had no right to stop him. Similarly, the 
Spanish had the right to engage in commerce in the New World. A 
Frenchman had the right to fish or to prospect for gold in Spain (but not 
on someone’s private property), and the Spanish had similar rights in the 
New World. If the Indians attempted to prevent the Spanish from 
engaging in free trade, then the Spanish should peacefully attempt to 
reason with them. Only if the Indians used force would the Spanish be 
allowed to use force, “it being lawful to repel force with force.”110
Victoria also argued in favor of a duty of humanitarian intervention, 
because “innocent folk there” were victimized by the Aztecs’ “sacrifice 
of innocent people or the killing in other ways of uncondemned people 
for cannibalistic purposes.”111 The principle of humanitarian intervention 
 106. Id. at 84. 
 107. Id. at 69. 
 108. VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 115–49. The famous phrase was causa iusti belli non est 
diversitas religionis. 
 109. Id. at 151–54. 
 110. Id. For the Roman law principle which Victoria quoted, see discussion infra Part V.D. 
 111. VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 159. 
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against human sacrifice and other atrocious crimes against humanity was 
not limited to Spaniards and Aztecs, but was universally applicable.112
A related theory was that “title may be found in the cause of allies 
and friends.”113 He noted that the Spanish had allied with the Tlaxcalans 
in their just war against the Aztecs, and that in successful pursuit of this 
just war, the Spaniards were entitled to the ordinary fruits of conquest 
and victory.114
Historically, it was the combination of the two theories which had 
actually led to the Spanish victory over the Aztecs. In the thirteenth 
century, the Aztecs had begun conquering Mexico, and by the fifteenth 
century, they had brought most of central Mexico under their control. 
Rather than assimilating the conquered tribes into a unified empire, as 
the ancient Romans had done, the Aztecs used the other tribes as “human 
stockyards.”115 The conquered tribes were required to supply, 
collectively, between 20,000 and 200,000 victims for human sacrifice 
every year. Aztecs were not sacrificed.116
The Aztec priests, often wearing flayed human skins, skillfully cut 
out the hearts of living victims. Their favorite victims were children, 
whose tears were supposed to be a special source of pleasure to the Aztec 
gods. The dead bodies were then eaten by the Aztec upper class, which 
used cannibalism as their major source of protein.117
Hernando de Cortes landed in Mexico with 508 soldiers, 100 sailors, 
sixteen horses, and firearms.118 Although the Aztecs had neither firearms 
nor horses, it would have been impossible for Cortes to conquer the 
Aztecs if not for the alliances Cortes formed with other Indian tribes, 
who contributed 200,000 fighters to his cause.119
While Spanish title in the New World could be legitimately 
defended, according to Victoria, Spain’s subsequent abuses of the 
Indians could not. As Victoria put it: “I fear measures were adopted in 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 160. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Roger McGrath, Atrocities Azteca, CHRONICLES, Oct. 2006, at 13. 
 116. Id.; see also ROSS HASSIG, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND WAR 30 (Gabriel Palmer-
Fernandez ed., 2004) (During the 1487 rededication of the Great Temple in Tenochtitlan, 80,400 
victims were slaughtered in human sacrifice). 
 117. McGrath, supra note 115. 
 118. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Cortés, Hernán, Marqués Del Valle De Oaxaca,” 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9026431/Hernan-Cortes-marquis-del-Valle-de-Oaxaca (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 119. Id. Spanish title to the Inca Empire would also, under Victoria’s theory, be legitimate, 
since the Inca and his minions were also enthusiastic practitioners of human sacrifice. See generally, 
BURR CARTWRIGHT BRUNDAGE, EMPIRE OF THE INCA (1985). 
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excess of what is allowed by human and divine law.”120 Or as he wrote 
on another occasion: the pillage of the Indians had been “despicable,” 
and the Indians had the right to use defensive violence against the 
Spaniards who were robbing them.121
Victoria produced a follow-up treatise, commonly known as On the 
Law of War, in which he examined the lawfulness of how the Spanish 
had conducted their wars in the New World, as measured by international 
legal standards of war.122
In the treatise, Victoria explained various reasons why personal and 
national self-defense are lawful; one reason is that a contrary rule would 
put the world in “utter misery, if oppressors and robbers and plunderers 
could with impunity commit their crimes and oppress the good and 
innocent, and these latter could not in turn retaliate upon them.”123
His “first proposition” was: Any one, even a private person, can 
accept and wage a defensive war. This is shown by the fact that force 
may be repelled by force.124 Hence, any one can make this kind of war, 
without authority from any one else, for the defense not only of his 
person, but also of his property and goods.125
From the first proposition, about personal self-defense, Victoria 
derived his second proposition: “Every state has authority to declare war 
 120. VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 158. 
 121. SCOTT, supra note 96, at 79–81. 
 122. Victoria’s treatises are actually compilations of his lecture notes, although they are so 
thorough they read very much like a book. 
 123. 2 VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 167. 
 124. Here Victoria cited Justinian’s Digest, the Roman law treatise discussed infra at text 
accompanying notes Part V.D. 
 125. 2 VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 167. Victoria was a prolific scholar, and wrote about self-
defense in other treatises as well. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, ON HOMICIDE & COMMENTARY ON 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IIa–IIae, at 193–95 (John P. Doyle trans., 1997) (Distinguishing “will” from 
“intent” and pointing out that a person acting in self-defense might “will” the death of an assailant 
but not “intend” the death—just as a person who asked that his own gangrenous arm be amputated 
might “will” the amputation but not “intend” it.). Could a person exempt himself from a moral 
obligation to obey the law, if he sincerely believed that the rationale for the law was inapplicable to 
him? Victoria said “no.” As an example, he pointed to the law against the nighttime carrying of 
weapons: 
 
For the fact that dangers often arise from the practice of carrying weapons by 
night, is sufficient reason for prohibiting the practice to all; otherwise the law 
would be entirely inefficacious, since every individual would suppose that it 
had not been laid down for him, but for others; and in like manner, with 
regard to other precepts, the reason should be viewed not from a particular but 
from a universal standpoint. 
 
Francisco de Victoria, Reflectio of the Reverend Father, Brother Franciscus de Victoria Concerning 
the Civil Power (De Potestate Civili) (Gwladys L. Williams trans.), in SCOTT, supra note 96, at xc. 
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and to make war” in self-defense.126 State self-defense is broader than 
personal self-defense, since personal self-defense is limited to immediate 
response to an attack, whereas a state may act to redress wrongs from the 
recent past.127
The personal right to self-defense was likewise used to create 
humanitarian restrictions on war. Victoria examined whether, in national 
warfare, it is lawful to deliberately kill innocent non-combatants. 
Victoria explained such killings could not be just, “because it is certain 
that innocent folk may defend themselves against any who try to kill 
them.”128 Because self-defense by innocents is just, the killing of 
innocents is unjust. “Hence it follows that even in war with Turks it is 
not allowable to kill children. This is clear because they are innocent. 
Aye, and the same holds with regard to the women of unbelievers.”129
To a reader in 2008, it sounds strange to hear an eminent Catholic 
theologian refer to “unbelievers.” Nonetheless, Victoria’s point was that 
international law protected everyone, not just Christians. He believed 
that basic moral principles applied globally. He was likewise at the 
forefront in insisting that the moral rules which applied to ordinary 
individuals also applied to the great and the powerful, including 
governments. Victoria was the world’s most renowned scholar urging 
humanitarian limits on war; the principle he used to prove those 
humanitarian limits was the personal right of self-defense. 
In other writings, Victoria directly connected the right of self-
defense to a right of defense against tyranny—either in a personal or in a 
political context.130  Thus, a child has a right of self-defense against his 
own father if the father tries to kill him; a subject may defend himself 
against a murderous king; and people may even defend themselves 
against an evil pope.131 And, of course, innocent Indians or Muslims may 
defend themselves against unjust attacks by Christians. 
In 1536, Pope Paul III held a conference in Rome where Victoria’s 
ideas were presented. The next year, the Pope declared that anyone who 
enslaved an Indian would be excommunicated, and he forbade Catholics 
from taking the lives or property of Indians, including non-Christian 
Indians.132
 126. 2 VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 168. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 178–79. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 2 VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 195–97; BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS 
296 (1997). 
 131. Id. 
 132. POPE PAUL III, SUBLIMUS DEI (1537) reprinted in LEWIS HANKE, ALL MANKIND IS ONE: 
A STUDY OF THE DISPUTATION BETWEEN BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS AND JUAN GINÉS DE 
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In 1542, the Spanish King Charles I enacted The New Laws of the 
Indies for the protection of Indians.133 Unfortunately, the laws met with 
substantial resistance from the Spanish colonists. In 1550, the king and 
his “Council of Fourteen” heard argument on the issue in “the Valladolid 
debate.” Unfortunately, the Council appears not to have issued a 
decision, thereby leaving the Indians unprotected, in practice, until the 
promulgation of new laws in 1573, which may well have been influenced 
by the arguments raised previously by Victoria and other 
humanitarians.134
 
4.  Pierino Belli 
 
In the mid-sixteenth century, the Italian Pierino Belli (1502-1575) 
served as a high-ranking military advisor to the Holy Roman Emperor 
Charles V and King Philip II of Spain. In 1561, he was appointed as a 
counselor to the Duke of Savoy, and in that capacity provided guidance 
on many important legal issues.135
Belli wrote a treatise, published in 1563, in which he explicated the 
international law of war, based on natural law. Belli’s explicit purpose 
was to moderate the conduct of war, particularly the wholesale pillaging 
and abuse of civilians which characterized the era.136
Belli advocated far-reaching restrictions on the methods of just 
warfare, including a significant time lapse between when war is declared 
and when the fighting begins, moderate treatment of prisoners, respectful 
treatment of all non-combatants, and generous treatment of the 
inhabitants of an occupied territory, so long as they did not wage war 
against the occupying army.137
Although Belli’s book was highly praised upon publication, its 
reputation was somewhat obscured in subsequent centuries because 
Alberico Gentili (a major influence on Grotius)138 did not give Belli the 
SEPÚLVEDA IN 1550 ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS CAPACITY OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 
21 (1994) (English translation). 
 133. Id. Charles I of Spain also ruled the Holy Roman Empire as Charles V. Another scholar 
active in carrying forward the arguments for the rights of the Indians was Domingo de Soto. In the 
mid-sixteenth century, after Victoria retired, Domingo de Soto was the leading scholar of the School 
of Salamanca. He agreed with Victoria about community defense and self-defense. ANABEL S. 
BRETT, LIBERTY, RIGHT AND NATURE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LATER SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT 139–
40 (2003). 
 134. HANKE, supra note 132, at 113–22. 
 135. Arrigo Cavaglieri, Introduction, to PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO 
TRACTATUS [A Treatise on Military Matters and Warfare] 11a (Herbert C. Nutting, trans., William 
S. Hein 1995) (1563). 
 136. Id. at 13a. 
 137. Id. at 15a–16a. 
 138. See infra text accompanying notes Part IV.A.6. 
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credit he deserved for influencing Gentili’s own thinking.139 The modern 
view is that Belli was a leader in separating theology from law, and that 
he was “the first to attempt . . . to raise the treatment of international law 
to the dignity of an independent scientific discipline.”140
According to Belli, defensive war is lawful, for “Surely nature 
teaches us to oppose force with force, and arms with arms.”141 Belli’s 
citations for the principle were to a Roman law rule about personal 
defense, and to a Canon law (Catholic Church law) rule about warfare.142 
“And inasmuch as it is permissible to fight on one’s own behalf, much 
more may we do so to save the state, i.e. in defence of liberty and 
fatherland.”143 Personal and collective self-defense were conceptually 
identical. 
Belli argued that soldiers should, in most cases, be subject to the 
ordinary law applicable to everyone else.144 One of Belli’s proofs of his 
standard was the Roman law’s rule that “at night it is permissible to 
oppose a soldier who is breaking in, just as you would resist any other 
person, since no respect needs to be shown a soldier who has to be 
opposed with a weapon, as if he were a robber.”145
 
5.  Francisco Suárez 
 
Thirteen-year-old Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) enrolled at the 
University of Salamanca in 1561, which by then was well established as 
the leading university in Europe.146 At the age of 23, he was appointed to 
a chair in philosophy at the University of Segovia. During his career, he 
taught at Salamanca, in Rome, and at the University of Coimbra.147 
 139. Cavaglieri, supra note 135, at 18a–26a. 
 140. Id. at 26a (citing G. CHIALVO, IL PRECURSORE ITALIANO DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 
20–24 (1919)). 
 141. BELLI, supra note 135, at 61. 
 142. Id., (citing DIG. 1.1.3 (personal defense), and Decretum, 2.23.1.1. (warfare)).The cited 
sources are discussed infra Part V.D–G. 
 143. BELLI, supra note 135, at 62. 
 144. Id. at 214. 
 145. Id. (citing and paraphrasing Justinian’s Code, 3.23.1; the Code is discussed infra at Part 
V.D.). Another international law author from the same period, the Spaniard Balthazar Ayala, focused 
almost exclusively on narrowly military issues such as rules for discipline of soldiers, and treatment 
of deserters. He stated that a tyrant who had usurped the throne could lawfully be overthrown; but 
unlike most of the other international law authors, he stated that a tyrant who had acquired the 
sovereignty lawfully could never be overthrown, no matter how cruel his rule. 2 BALTHAZAR 
AYALA, THREE BOOKS ON THE LAWS OF WAR AND ON THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH WAR AND ON 
MILITARY DISCIPLINE 17 (John Pawley Bate trans., 1995) (1582). 
 146. James Scott Brown, Introduction to 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE 
WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, at S.J. 5a (Gwladys L. Williams ed., William S. Hein 1995). 
 147. Id. at 7a–8a. 
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Suárez wrote fourteen books on theological, metaphysical, and political 
subjects, and was widely recognized as one of the preeminent scholars of 
his age, and one of the founders of international law. 148
Self-defense is “the greatest of rights,” wrote Suárez. 149 It was a 
right which no government could abolish, because self-defense is part of 
natural law.150
The irrevocable right of self-defense has many important 
implications for civil liberty. A subject’s right to resist a manifestly 
unjust law, such as a bill of attainder, is based on the right of self-
defense.151
Similarly, as a last resort, an individual subject may kill a tyrant, 
because of the subject’s inherent right of self-defense, by “the authority 
of God, Who has granted to every man, through the natural law, the right 
to defend himself and his state from the violence inflicted by such a 
tyrant.”152
Unlike some modern scholars, Suárez did not make the mistake of 
assuming that “the state” was identical to “the government.” Rather, the 
state itself could exercise its right of “self-defence” to depose violently a 
tyrannical king, because of “natural law, which renders it licit to repel 
force with force.”153 The principle that “the state” had the right to use 
force to remove a tyrannical government was consistent with Suárez’s 
principle that a prince had just power only if the power were bestowed 
 148. TIERNEY, supra note 130, at 301. 
 149. Id. at 314. 
 150. Jurisdiction could not be reasonably applied to “do away with the right of self-defence—
springing from the law of nature—against a criminal charge, especially a charge that was so grave; 
for it would not be permissible that the Emperor should abolish those things which proceed from the 
natural law.” 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver, in 2 SUÁREZ, supra 
note 146, at 273 (quoting the Constitutions of Pope Clement, bk. 2, tit. 11, ch. 2). 
 151. Id. at 101. 
 152. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, DEFENSIO FIDEI CATHOLICAE ADVERSUS ANGLICANAE SECTAE 
ERRORES [DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH AGAINST THE ERRORS OF THE ANGLICAN SECT] 714 
(1613) [hereinafter A DEFENCE]. Suárez argued that General precepts of natural law all have implicit 
exceptions. For example, the natural law rule that a deposit should be returned to its owner did not 
apply when the owner meant to use it to harm the state. Likewise, “Thou shalt not kill” had an 
exception for self-defense. SUÁREZ, supra note 146, at 261; see also id. at 313–14. 
 153. A DEFENCE, supra note 152, at 718; see also FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, A Work on the Three 
Theological Virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity: Divided into Three Treatises to Correspond with 
the Number of the Virtues Themselves, in 2 SUÁREZ, supra note 146, at 854–55 [hereinafter A Work 
on the Three Theological Virtues] (the state is superior to the ruler, and has a natural right of self-
defense against a tyrant; the state also has the right to enforce the implicit term of its contract with a 
ruler—namely that the ruler act for the good of the public). Cf. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 80 (1828) (“state” is “A political body, or body politic; 
the whole body of people united under one government, whatever may be the form of 
government. . . . More usually the word signifies a political body governed by representatives. . . . In 
this sense, state has some times more immediate reference to government, sometimes to the people 
or community.”). The “repel force with force” principle is from Roman law, discussed infra text 
accompanying notes Part V.D. 
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by the people.154
Like the other founders of international law, Suárez paid particular 
attention to the laws of war. The legitimacy of state warfare is, according 
to Suárez, derivative of the personal right of self-defense, and the 
derivation shows why limits could be set on warfare.155 Armed self-
defense against a person who is trying violently to take one’s land is “not 
really aggression, but defence of one’s legal possession.”156 The same 
principle applies to national defense—along with the corollary (from 
Roman law) that the personal or national actions be “waged with a 
moderation of defence which is blameless” (that is, not grossly 
disproportionate to the attack).157
For the individual and for the state, defense against an aggressor is 
not only a right, but a duty (such as for a parent, who is obliged to defend 
his child).158
While Suárez was a Catholic, he was extremely influential on 
Protestant writers. The great British historian Lord Acton wrote that “the 
greater part of the political ideas” of John Milton and John Locke “may 
be found in the ponderous Latin of Jesuits who were subjects of the 
Spanish Crown . . . .” such as Suárez.159 Suárez was also a major 
influence on Grotius.160
 
6.  Alberico Gentili 
 
Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) was “perhaps the most important of 
the fore-runners of Grotius.”161 Gentili was an Italian lawyer who fled to 
Germany, and then England, after his family became Protestants. He was 
appointed Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, teaching Roman law.162
 154. Salmon, supra note 100, at 238 (citing 4 SUÁREZ, DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE § 
2, at 123 (1612)). 
 155. A Work on the Three Theological Virtues, supra note 153, at 804. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Decretals, Bk. V, tit. Xxxix, chap. Iii, Id. at 802–03.  (“Secondly, I hold that defensive 
war not only is permitted, but sometimes is even commanded. This first part of this proposition . . . 
holds true not only for public officials, but also for private individuals, since all laws allow the 
repelling of force with force. The reason supporting it is that the right of self-defence is natural and 
necessary. Whence the second part of our proposition is easily proved. For self-defence may 
sometimes be prescribed, at least in accordance with the order of charity. . . . The same is true of the 
defence of the state, especially if such defence is an official duty . . . .”). 
 159. JOHN DALBERG ACTON, THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 82 (1993). 
 160. Brown, supra note 146, at 18a–19a. 
 161. Coleman Phillipson, Introduction to ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 10a 
(William S. Hein 1995) (1598). 
 162. Id. at 12a–13a. 
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As the preeminent scholar of international law in England, he was 
frequently consulted on the leading controversies of his time. At the 
request of the English government, Gentili rendered a legal opinion on 
the Mendoza affair—in which Spain’s ambassador to England had been 
discovered to be participating in a plot to overthrow Queen Elizabeth. 
Gentili insisted on the principle of the inviolability of ambassadors; the 
English government acceded to his international law reasoning, and so 
the Spanish ambassador Mendoza was expelled rather than executed.163
Gentili was praised in the twentieth century as “the first great writer 
on modern international law, the first clearly to define its subject-matter, 
and to treat it in the way which is on the whole consonant to the 
conception and practice of our own time.”164 This was, in part, because 
“The theological basis of the subject, which was generally affirmed or 
assumed by his predecessors, was once for all undermined by Gentili, 
and a more acceptable foundation was substituted.”165 Unlike many of 
his predecessors and successors, Gentili did not found his system on 
natural law.166
Rather, Gentili’s approach was founded on “the basic axiom of 
human solidarity,” that “‘ubi societas ibi ius’ [Where there is society, 
there is law.] is as applicable to a group of peoples as it is to a group of 
individuals.”167 His greatest work was De Jure Belli libri tres (On the 
Law of War, Three Books).168
His views on self-defense were consistent with the mainstream of the 
other international law founders. He explained self-defense as an instinct 
of all living things, and a “natural” reason for taking up arms.169 This 
“most accepted of all rights” of “private individuals” is a right which 
allows a victim to defend himself even if he could safely retreat; private 
self-defense has the same intellectual basis as the right of states to violent 
self-defense: 
 
For to kill in self-defence is just, even though the one who 
kills may flee without danger and to save himself. . . . These 
 163. Id. at 13a. 
 164. Id. at 18a (emphasis in original). 
 165. Id. at 18a. Gentili was at the forefront of an intellectual movement which was replacing 
theology with jurisprudence as the “masterscience” of moral philosophy and inquiry. See DIEGO 
PANIZZA, POLITICAL THEORY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN GENTILI’S DE IURE BELLI: THE GREAT 
DEBATE BETWEEN ‘THEOLOGICAL’ AND ‘HUMANIST’ PERSPECTIVES FROM VITORIA TO GROTIUS 
(NYU Institute for International Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2005/15, 2005), available at 
http://www.iilj.org/events/documents/Panizza.pdf. 
 166. Phillipson, supra note 161, at 51a. 
 167. Id. at 23a. 
 168. Id. at 16a. 
 169. GENTILI, DE JURE, at 58–59 (bk. 1, ch. 13). 
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views have been admitted in the case of private individuals, 
and I consider them still more valid with regard to states . . . 
And it is a necessary right; for what can be done against 
violence, says Cicero, without resort to violence? This is the 
most generally accepted of all rights. All laws and all codes 
allow the repelling of force by force. There is one rule which 
endures forever, to maintain one’s safety by any and every 
means.170
 
Gentili pointed out that there is a unanimously-agreed duty of 
individuals to come to the defense of other innocents, even strangers. 
“That it is even lawful to kill another in defence of a stranger is a view 
approved by all the scholars.”171 From this duty he derived a state duty of 
humanitarian intervention to protect people who are being victimized by 
a tyrant, and to protect nations which are being victimized by 
aggressors.172 “And if these things are true in the case of private 
individuals, how much truer they will be of sovereigns . . . .”173
As a lawyer, Gentili used well-known truths about personal defense 
in order to make broader points about international law. In one case, for 
example, an English merchant ship reasonably feared that it was about to 
be attacked by an armed Tuscan ship. The English ship then fired the 
first shot, in anticipatory self-defense. Gentili argued that international 
maritime law allowed for anticipatory self-defense, as an extension of the 
universally accepted rule that allowed for anticipatory personal 
defense.174
 170. Id.  The Cicero quotation is from MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON INVENTION (De 
inventione) (84 BC) (bk. 2, ch. 22) (“invention” in the title is meant in the sense of “the construction 
of arguments”). For more on Cicero, see infra text accompanying notes 257, 353–58, 384. 
 171. GENTILI, supra note 169, at 69 (bk. 1, ch. 15). 
 172. Id. at 68–78 (bk. 1, chs. 15–16). 
 173. Id. at 70 (bk. 1, ch. 15). 
 174. ALBERICO GENTILI, Of an English Ship Which Fought with a Tuscan Ship and Was 
Captured, in HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS LIBRI DUO [PLEAS OF A SPANISH ADVOCATE, TWO 
BOOKS] 122–24 (Frank Frost Abbott trans., William S. Hein 1995) (1661). This book was a 
posthumously published collection of Gentili’s arguments on maritime law, compiled by his brother. 
In the English Ship case, Gentili was attempting to convince a court to reverse its decision that 
allowed the Tuscan to keep the captured English ship. The book does not specify which court was 
hearing the case, or whether Gentili’s plea was successful. Regarding personal defense, Gentili 
stated: 
“The defense of the Englishmen was proper, because they feared offense, and 
simply because the other man is making ready to attack me, I may lawfully 
take the offensive and slay him. Of course I do not have to wait till I am 
attacked; it is my duty to being myself.” This is said to be the more humane 
view, a view tested in according with facts in the courts, and “approved 
moreover by all the doctors.” “One should anticipate offense, that which is 
potential as well as that which is actual.” 
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B.  The Grotius Trinity 
 
1.  Hugo Grotius 
 
The Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was a child prodigy 
who enrolled at the University of Leiden when he was eleven years old. 
Hailed as “the miracle of Holland,” he wrote over fifty books, and “may 
well have been the best-read man of his generation in Europe.”175
His classic The Rights of War and Peace has “commonly been seen 
as the classic work in modern public international law, laying the 
foundation for a universal code of law.”176 It was “the first authoritative 
treatise upon the law of nations, as that term is now understood.” 177  “It 
was at once perceived to be a work of standard and permanent value, of 
the first authority upon the subject of which it treats.”178 Thus, “in about 
sixty years from the time of publication, it was universally established in 
Christendom as the true fountain-head of the European Law of 
Nations.”179 In short, “it would be hard to imagine any work more central 
to the intellectual world of the Enlightenment.”180
Three centuries later, when World War One was being settled, 
Grotius was still considered “the founder of modern civilized interstate 
relations.”181
During the sixteenth century, there were twenty-six editions of the 
original Latin text, as well as translations into French, English, and 
 
Id., at 123. (The internal quotes are cited to “Ias. l. ut vim n. 9” and “Alb. d. 14.” The first citation is 
Gentili’s idiosyncratic cite form for the Digest, 1.1.3. Arthur Williams, Index of Authors Cited by 
Gentili, in HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS LIBRI DUO, at 275. The other citation may be commentary on 
the Digest by Albericus (a/k/a Alberico de Rosate), of Bergamo, Italy. The Digest is discussed infra 
Part V.D.). 
 175. David B. Bederman, Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius’ 
De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1996). 
 176. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, inside jacket (Liberty Fund 2005) 
(reprint of 1737 English translation by John Morrice of the 1724 annotated French translation by 
Jean Barbeyrac) (1625), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt 
&staticfile=show.php?title=1877&Itemid=99999999. When the Carnegie Institution began a 
republication and translation series of the “leading classics of International Law,” the General Editor 
noted that “The masterpieces of Grotius will naturally be the central point in the series . . . .” James 
Brown Scott, Preface to GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, DE BELLO, DE REPRESALIIS ET DE DUELLO a2 
(Thomas Erskine Holland ed., 1995) (reprint of 1917 Carnegie edition) (1360). Hugo Grotius is the 
Latin form of the name; “Huig de Groot” is his Dutch name. 
 177. GEORGE B. DAVIS, THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2005) (1900). 
 178. Id. 
 179. 2 ROBERT WARD, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN 
EUROPE FROM THE TIME OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS TO THE AGE OF GROTIUS 374–75 (2005) 
(1795). 
 180. Richard Tuck, Introduction to 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at xi. 
 181. Id. 
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Dutch. The next century saw twenty Latin editions, and multiple editions 
in French, English, Dutch, German, Russian, and Italian.182
Writing in the middle of the Thirty Years War, Grotius was 
explicitly working to counter the tendency of the period towards 
unrestrained warfare, and warfare for spurious causes.183 “I observed 
throughout the Christian World a Licentiousness in regard to War, which 
even barbarous Nations ought to be ashamed of,” he stated in his 
introduction.184 As one historian explained: 
 
The actual conduct of warfare in the Middle Ages and even in 
later times was often marked by atrocious and barbaric 
cruelty. The belligerents were wont to assume that they were 
not subject to any restraint, whether of law or morality or 
humanity. They had recourse to every kind of available act, 
instrument, or device that might lead to the annihilation of the 
enemy. Accordingly, they burned down towns, devastated 
lands, destroyed sacred places, objects, and buildings and 
things of art; they put prisoners to the sword or mutilated 
them, massacred the non-combatant population—old, young, 
and feeble alike, ecclesiastics as well as laymen—and 
dishonoured women. There is no need to enlarge this sinister 
catalogue: let it suffice to say that belligerents made use of 
everything that diabolical ingenuity could devise and 
unrestrained ferocity actuate, of every proceeding that would 
create a state of terror.185
 
The purpose of The Rights of War and Peace was to civilize warfare, 
especially to protect non-combatants from attack. To do so, Grotius 
started with the right of personal defense: “Grotius grounded his theory 
of laws, or rights, in ‘the design [intentio] of the Creator’ as manifested 
in the constitution of the natural world. Two principles were uppermost: 
self-defense and self-preservation.”186
As Grotius observed, even human babies, like animals, have an 
instinct to defend themselves.187 Moreover, self-defense was essential to 
social harmony, for if people were prevented from using force against 
 182. Id. at x. 
 183. GEORGE BOWYER, COMMENTARIES ON UNIVERSAL PUBLIC LAW 6; DAVIS, supra note 
177, at 16–17. 
 184. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, ¶ 29, at 106. 
 185. Phillipson, supra note 161, at 40a. 
 186. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at inside jacket. 
 187. Id. at 183–84 (bk. 1, ch. 2, § 1.3). 
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others who were attempting to take property by force, then “human 
Society and Commerce would necessarily be dissolved.”188
After listing numerous examples from Roman law and the Bible in 
which personal self-defense and just war were approved, Grotius 
declared that “[b]y the Law of Nature then, which may also be called the 
Law of Nations,” some forms of national warfare were lawful, as was 
personal warfare in self-defense. The rationale for both was succinctly 
expressed in the Roman maxim: “[I]t is allowed to Repel Force by 
Force.”189 Examples of personal and national use of force were woven 
together seamlessly, for the same moral principles applied to both. 
Like Giovanni da Legnano, Grotius classified “Private War” (which 
was justifiable individual self-defense) and “Public War” (which was 
justifiable government-led collective self-defense) as two types of the 
same thing.190 Regarding personal self-defense: 
 
We have before observed, that if a Man is assaulted in such a 
Manner, that his Life shall appear in inevitable Danger, he 
may not only make War upon, but very justly destroy the 
Aggressor; and from this Instance which every one must allow 
us, it appears that such a private War may be just and lawful. 
It is to be observed, that this Right of Self-Defence, arises 
directly and immediately from the Care of our own 
Preservation, which Nature recommends to every one . . . .191
 
Relying on the Scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas, Grotius 
explained that defensive violence is based on the intention of self-
preservation, not the purpose of killing another.192
Self-defense is also appropriate not just to preserve life, but also to 
prevent the loss of a limb or member, rape,193 and robbery: “I may shoot 
that Man who is making off with my Effects, if there’s no other Method 
of my recovering them.”194 To this discussion, Jean Barbeyrac—
Grotius’s most influential translator and annotator195—added the 
 188. Id. at 184–85 (bk. 1, ch. 2, § 1.3) (quoting TULLY, ON DUTIES [DE OFFICIIS], bk. 3, ch. 5 
(44 BC) (“Tully” is a pen name for Marcus Tullius Cicero.). For more on Cicero, see infra text 
accompanying notes  257, 353–58, 384. 
 189. Id. at 185–89 (bk. 1, ch. 2, §§ 2–4) (quoting LIVY (Titus Livius), AB URBE CONDITA [A 
HISTORY OF ROME] bk. 42, ch. 41). 
 190. Id. at 240 (bk. 1, ch. 3, § 1). 
 191. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 397. 
 192. Id. at 398. For Aquinas, see infra text at notes Part V.G. 
 193. Id. at  401–02. 
 194. Id. at 408. 
 195. See infra text accompanying notes 220–22. 
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footnote: “In Reality, the Care of defending one’s Life is a Thing to 
which we are obliged, not a bare Permission.”196
“What we have hitherto said, concerning the Right of defending our 
Persons and Estates, principally regards private Wars; but we may 
likewise apply it to publick Wars, with some Difference,” Grotius 
explicated.197 Grotius then noted various differences; for example, 
personal wars (that is, individual violence) are only for the purpose of 
self-defense, whereas public wars (those undertaken by a nation) could 
have the additional purposes “of revenging and punishing Injuries.”198
Gentili had argued that a nation could attack another nation if the 
former feared the growing power of the latter.199 Grotius called Gentili’s 
doctrine “abhorrent to every principle of equity.”200 Grotius’s counter-
argument was the national self-defense restrictions which come directly 
from the rules of personal self-defense.201 “In other words, Grotius 
extends to public war the basic criteria laid down with regards to 
individual self-defence, which, in emphasizing the classical requirement 
of ‘immediacy’ and ‘certainty’ . . . .”202
Grotius also wrote that victorious warriors must not abuse the bodies 
of the dead.203 As Barbeyrac elaborated, there is no legitimate purpose in 
mutilating the dead, because “this is of no Use either for our Defence, the 
Support of our Rights, or in Word for any lawful End of War.”204
While Grotius approved only in rare circumstances of a people 
carrying out a revolution against an oppressive government, he did argue 
that other nations have a right and a moral obligation to invade and 
liberate nations from domestic tyranny.205
Several years before writing his masterpiece, Grotius wrote The Free 
Sea (Mare Librum), which was a foundational book of maritime law, and 
hence of international law itself.206 While setting forth general principles 
 196. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 403 n.3. Barbeyrac also cited his own discussion in note 5 
of his annotated edition of Pufendorf, bk. 2, ch, 5, § 2, and also Pufendorf’s analysis in § 14 of that 
chapter. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (The Lawbook Exchange 
2005) (reprint of 1726 London edition of the 1706–07 Barbeyrac French translation and annotation, 
with English translation by Mr. Carew) (1672). 
 197. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 416. 
 198. Id. 
 199. PANIZZA, supra note 165, at 20. 
 200. Id. at 25. 
 201. Id. at 26. 
 202. Id. 
 203. 3 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 1312. 
 204. Id. at 1312 n.3. 
 205. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 356–72; 2 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 1159–62. 
Barbeyrac’s footnotes in these sections, and elsewhere in the book, argued for a much broader right 
of revolution. E.g., 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 343 n.4 (Barbeyrac note). 
 206. David Armitage, Introduction to HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA xii (David Armitage ed., 
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of international law, The Free Sea was specifically written to address the 
1603 controversy involving a Dutch captain who seized a Portuguese 
vessel in the Straits of Singapore.207 As in The Rights of War and Peace, 
Grotius derived the principles of international law from the essential 
natural laws of self-defense and self-preservation.208
In The Free Sea, he also explained that natural law is immutable, and 
cannot be overturned by governments.209 Suárez had made the same 
point explicitly,210 and the principle is implicit in most of the other 
classical founders of international law. Accordingly, if a government 
purports to enact a law abolishing the right of self-defense (or 
constricting the right so that it becomes a practical nullity), that law 
should be considered void ab initio—at least according to the 
foundational principles of international human rights law. 
Below, we will address whether a right to self-defense implies a right 
to arms which are necessary for self-defense.211
Grotius had begun On the Rights of War and Peace during the first 
decade of the Thirty Years War, which continued to ravage Europe, 
especially Germany, until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Among the 
terms of the Peace was Spanish recognition of Dutch independence, thus 
ending a series of wars which had raged, intermittently, in the Low 
Countries for eight decades.212 These wars had been fought with an awful 
ferocity, and non-combatants suffered terribly. 
Grotius’s biographer Hamilton Vreeland wrote that the 1648: 
 
[P]eace embodied principles which Grotius had striven to 
expound, such as the independence and equality of sovereign 
states, and was founded upon the equitable and merciful 
doctrines which he had labored to impart . . . . The old order 
had changed, and the new which came in was largely the work 
of Hugo Grotius.213
Richard Hakluyt trans., 2004) (1609). 
 207. Id. at xii–xiii. 
 208. Id. at xiii. See also, HUGO GROTIUS, Defense of Chapter V of the Mare Liberum, in THE 
FREE SEA, supra note 206, at 77, 99 (first published approximately 1615 as a response to a critique 
by William Welwood) (“The freedom of blameless defense proceeds from the law of nature, yet that 
this is licit has been handed down in rescripts by the emperors.”). 
 209. GROTIUS, supra note 206, at 6, 43. See also id. at 38 (“the Pope hath no authority to do 
these things which are contrary to the law of nature.”). 
 210. See supra text accompanying note Part IV.A.5. 
 211. See infra text accompanying notes Part VIII. 
 212. Grotius had earlier noted how the Netherlands were preserving their new-found freedom 
from Spanish domination: “liberty scarce gotten but defended by taking arms.” GROTIUS, THE FREE 
SEA, supra note 206, at 8. 
 213. HAMILTON VREELAND, HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE MODERN SCIENCE OF 
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According to the international law historian Henry Wheaton, in the 
second part of the seventeenth century: 
 
[T]he influence of the writings of the publicists, including 
Grotius and his successors, was perceptibly felt in the councils 
and conduct of nations. The diplomacy . . . state papers are 
filled with appeals, not merely to reasons of policy, but to the 
principles of right, of justice, and equity; to the authority of 
the oracles of public law; to those general rules and principles 
by which the rights of the weak are protected against the 
invasions of superior force by the union of all who are 
interested in the common danger.214
 
The international law intellectuals had changed the world of action. 
The intellectuals had demonstrated how to address serious questions of 
war and foreign policy by logically reasoning from basic principles of 
justice—starting with “the greatest of all rights,”215 the right of self-
defense. Now, the generals, admirals, and diplomats were doing the 
same. The result could be seen, inter alia, in the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701–1714): 
 
[W]hen the contending armies crossed and recrossed parts of 
the soil on which the Thirty Years’ War had been waged, 
Marlborough and Prince Eugene, and other commanders, 
exhibited in their conduct a sharp contrast with Wallenstein 
and Tilly, who had devastated those fields seventy years 
before. Destruction of property by fire and of peoples by 
massacre was practically abandoned; governments paid the 
costs of war, not the captured individuals; and prisoners were 
treated with justice and mercy. Grotius’ influence was 
becoming felt, and warfare was growing less cruel.216 
 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (Fred B. Rothman 1999) (1917). 
 214. HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 79–80 
(William S. Hein 1982) (1845). 
 215. See Suarez discussion, supra Part IV.A.5, 2d para. 
 216. VREELAND, supra note 213. Gustavus Adolphus, the commander of the Swedish forces 
during the Thirty Years War, had always carried a copy of On the Rights of War and Peace. 
WHEATON, supra note 214, at 55. Perhaps the treatise moderated his conduct. 
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2.  Samuel Pufendorf 
 
The Swedish scholar Samuel Pufendorf was the first person ever 
appointed as a Professor of the Law of Nations—a position that was 
created at the University of Heidelberg for Pufendorf  to teach Grotius’s 
text.217 Pufendorf also served as a counselor to the King of Sweden and 
the King of Prussia. In 1674 his eight volume magnum opus was 
published: Of the Law of Nature and Nations.218 It was instantly 
recognized as a work of tremendous importance, and was published in 
many editions all over Europe. “[T]he two works [Grotius and 
Pufendorf] together quickly became the equivalent of an encyclopedia of 
moral and political thought for Enlightenment Europe.”219
Pufendorf advanced the theories of Grotius, while also taking into 
account subsequent philosophers such as John Locke and Thomas 
Hobbes. Pufendorf was not the first to argue that international law 
applied beyond the relations of Christian nations with each other, but his 
over-riding concern for the common human community made the theme 
especially important in his book. Like Grotius, Pufendorf was greatly 
interested in restraining warfare, but Pufendorf painted on a broader 
canvas; as he looked for ways to make the global community live 
together more peaceably, he also looked at how individuals could live 
together successfully in society. Repeatedly he argued that the right, 
duty, and practice of self-defense—at the personal level and at the 
national level—are essential for the preservation of society, both locally 
and globally. 
Pufendorf’s treatise grew even more influential after the 1706–07 
publication of a French translation by the French lawyer Jean Barbeyrac 
(1674–1744), which was supplemented by Barbeyrac’s own copious 
notes and commentary. Barbeyrac, who was a Professor of Law at 
Groningen University, in the Netherlands, and a Member of the Royal 
Academy of Sciences in Berlin, also produced an annotated French 
 217. Jean-Jacques Barbeyrac, The Life of Hugo Grotius, in 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF 
WAR AND PEACE, supra note 176, at 69. 
 218. PUFENDORF, supra note 196. 
 219. Tuck, supra note 180, at xi. John Locke recommended that, after mastering Latin, a 
young person should read Cicero’s Offices, then Pufendorf’s Officio Hominis & Civis (an abridged 
version of Of the Law of Nature and Nations), and then the multi-volume treatises of Grotius or 
Pufendorf, with the latter being “perhaps . . . the better of the two.” Thereby, the young person 
would be “instructed in the natural rights of men, and the original and foundations of society, and the 
duties resulting from thence.” JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION, § 186 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1922) (1692), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ mod/1692locke-
education.html. [reprinted in the series English philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (c. 1910) Harvard classics, no. 38]. 
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version of Grotius in 1724.220 Grotius and Pufendorf had already been 
translated into many languages in dozens of editions, but the Barbeyrac 
editions themselves were soon also translated all over Europe and 
became the most popular editions. 
Grotius and Pufendorf, as translated and annotated by Barbeyrac, 
remained the preeminent authorities on international law for centuries 
afterward. In 1854, the English legal scholar George Bowyer wrote that 
Barbeyrac’s translations “make the two works together one Corpus of the 
Law of Nations which has not been equaled in extent, learning, richness 
of illustration, and acumen.”221 Barbeyrac was in complete accord with 
Pufendorf and Grotius about the fundamental human right of self-
defense, and his annotated versions offered extensive additional support 
for that right.222
Pufendorf followed Hobbes’s theory that states are imbued with the 
same qualities as are individual persons and are governed by the same 
precepts of natural law. “Law of nature” was the term used when 
referring to individuals, and this same law, when applied to states, was 
called the “law of nations.”223
In contrast to the pessimistic spirit of Hobbes, Pufendorf saw that 
humans had a natural inclination towards peaceful co-operation with 
each other: “Tis true, Man was created for the maintaining of Peace with 
his Fellows; and all the Laws of Nature, which bear a Regard to other 
Men, do primarily tend towards the Constitution and Preservation of this 
universal safety and Quiet.”224 The advocates of the right of self-defense 
are sometimes caricatured as social isolationists who believe only in the 
law of the jungle, and who believe in nothing greater than atomistic 
individualism. Pufendorf was just the opposite. Like Grotius, he affirmed 
the right of self-defense because it is a sine qua non for civilization. 
Self-defense is an essential foundation of society, for if people did 
not defend themselves, then it would be impossible for people to live 
together in a society. Not to use forceful defense when necessary would 
 220. Tuck, supra note 180, at x. 
 221. BOWYER, supra note 183, at iv. For biographical information on Bowyer, see New Advent 
Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Sir George Bowyer,” http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02724c.htm. 
 222. For example, Barbeyrac wrote a long introduction to Pufendorf in which he argued that 
Pufendorf’s treatise was far superior to much of the moral philosophy from previous times. While 
Barbeyrac praised Jesus and Confucius, he carefully dissected the numerous inconsistencies and 
absurdities (as Barbeyrac saw them) of some early Christian writers (such as Tertullian) who had 
been pacifists. Jean Barbeyrac, “An Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality,” in 
PUFENDORF, supra note 196, § 9 19–25. 
 223. Id. at 149–50 (bk. 2, ch. 3, § 23); THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN (DE HOMINE AND 
DE CIVE), 275 (Berand Gert ed., Charles T. Wood, T.S.K. Scott-Craig & Bergnard Gert trans., 
Hackett 1991) (De Cive 1647); WHEATON, supra note 214, at 92–93. 
 224. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 183 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 1). 
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make “honest Men” into “a ready Prey to Villains.”225 “So that, upon the 
whole to banish Self-defence though pursued by Force, would be so far 
from promoting the Peace, that it would rather contribute to the Ruin and 
Destruction of Mankind.”226
Pufendorf denied “that the Law of Nature, which was instituted for a 
Man’s Security in the World, should favor so absurd a Peace as must 
necessarily cause his present Destruction, and would in fine produce any 
Thing sooner than Sociable life.”227
Pufendorf explained that there is much broader latitude for self-
defense in a state of nature than in civil society; preemptive self-defense 
is disfavored in the latter.228 However, Pufendorf continued, civil society 
does not forbid imminent preemption in circumstances in which the 
victim has no opportunity to warn the authorities first: “For Example, if a 
Man is making towards me with a naked Sword and with full 
Signification of his intentions toward me, and I at the same time have a 
Gun in my Hand, I may fairly discharge it at him whilst he is at a 
distance . . . .”229 Similarly, a man armed with a long gun may shoot an 
attacker who was carrying a pistol, even though the attacker is not yet 
within range to use his pistol.230
Making the same point as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who in 
1921 would write “detached reflection is not required and cannot be 
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife,”231 Pufendorf wrote that 
“it is scarce possible that a Man under so terrible Apprehension should 
be so exact in considering and discovering all Ways of Escape, as he who 
being set out of the danger can sedately deliberate on the Case.”232 Thus, 
 225. Id. at 184 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 1). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. Likewise: 
 
But what Possibility is there of my living at Peace with him who hurts and 
injures me, since Nature has implanted in every Man’s Breast so tender a 
concern for himself, and for what he possesses, that he cannot but apply all 
Means to resist and repel him, who either respect attempts to wrong him. 
 
Id. at 214 (bk. 3, ch. 1, § 1). 
 228. Id. at 189–90 (bk. 2, ch. 5, §§ 6–7). As a general rule, anticipatory self-defense is always 
allowed in a state of nature; in a civil society, it is allowed only if the potential victim first informs 
the government authorities of the danger, and the authorities then refuse to take action to protect the 
victim. Id. 
 229. Id. at 191 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 8). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). For more on Brown, see David B. 
Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How the Supreme Court Confronted a Hanging Judge in the 
Nineteenth Century, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 294 (2000). 
 232. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 191 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 9). 
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while a person should safely retreat rather than use deadly force, 
Pufendorf recognized that safe retreat is usually impossible.233 Nor is 
there any requirement that a defender use arms which are not more 
powerful than the arms of the aggressor.234
Self-defense, using lethal force if necessary, is permissible against a 
non-deadly aggressor who would maim the victim, or who would inflict 
other less-than-lethal injuries.235 Lethal force in self-defense is also 
permissible to prevent rape236 or assault.237 It is also permitted to prevent 
robbery: “[I]t is clearly evidence that the Security and Peace of Society 
and of Mankind could hardly subsist, if a Liberty were not granted to 
repel by the most violent Courses, those who come to pillage our 
Goods . . . .”238
What if one person attacks another’s honor—such as by boxing his 
ears? Pufendorf acknowledged that in a state of nature there is a limitless 
right to redress any attack, but he insisted that in a civil society, the 
proper recourse in case of an insult or an attack on honor is to be found 
in resort to the courts, not in deadly force.239 It should be remembered 
that Pufendorf was writing at a time when the educated gentlemen of 
 233. Id. at 193–94 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 13). 
 234. Id. at 191 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 9). 
 
As if the Aggressors were so generous, as constantly to give notice to the 
other Party of their Design, and of the Arms they purpos’d  to make use of; 
that they might have the Leisure to furnish themselves in like manner for the 
Combat. Or if these Rencounters  we were to act on our Defence by the strict 
Rules of the common Sword Plays and Tryals of Skill, where the Champions 
and their Weapons are nicely match’d  and measur’d for our better Diversion. 
 
Id. 
 235. Id. at 192 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 10). 
 
For what an age of Torments should I undergo, if another Man were allow’d 
perpetually to lay upon me only with moderate Blows, whose Malice I could 
not otherwise stop or repel, than by compassing his Death. Or if a Neighbour 
were continually to infest me with Incursions and Ravages upon my Lands 
and Possessions, whilst I could not lawfully kill him, in my Attempts to beat 
him off? For since the chief Aim of every human Socialness is the Safety of 
every Person, we ought not to fansy in it such Laws, as would make every 
good and honest Man of necessity miserable, as often as any wicked Varlet 
should please to violate the Law of Nature against him. And it would be 
highly absurd to establish Society amongst Men on so destructive a Bottom as 
the Necessity of enduring Wrongs. 
 
Id. at 186 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 11). 
 236. Id. at 192 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 11). 
 237. Id. at 193–94 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 13). 
 238. Id. at 198 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 16); see also id. at 186 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 3). 
 239. Id. at 192–94 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 12). 
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Europe often killed each other in duels because one man had insulted 
another’s honor. Pufendorf’s strict rule denying that deadly force could 
be used in defense of honor was one aspect of his broader view that self-
defense was properly made for the repose, safety, and sociability of 
society. 
Pufendorf rejected the view that self-defense is a form of punishing 
criminals, and that the prerogative of punishment belongs exclusively to 
the state. 240 Pufendorf agreed that genuine punishment—for retribution, 
after a crime had been completed—was, in a civil society, exclusively a 
state function.241 “But Defence is a thing of more ancient date than any 
Civil Command . . . .” and accordingly, no state could legitimately forbid 
self-defense.242
The chapter “Of the Right of War” began with a detailed restatement 
of the natural right of personal self-defense.243 Then, following the 
methodology of the other classical international law scholars, Pufendorf  
extrapolated from the fundamental principles of self-defense the broader 
rules of national warfare, including Just Cause, prohibitions on attacks on 
non-combatants, prohibitions on the execution of prisoners, prohibition 
on wanton destruction of property, limitations on what spoils might be 
taken in war, and similar humanitarian restrictions.244
Pufendorf had argued that a victim has a right to defend himself 
against an aggressor even if the aggressor might not have a fully-formed 
malicious intent (such as if the aggressor were insane).245 Barbeyrac 
agreed, and applied the example specifically to a prince, who through 
self-indulgence in his own violent fits of anger, or through excessive 
drink, formed a transient, but passionate, determination to take a 
subject’s life. Barbeyrac held that “we have as much Right to defend 
ourselves against him, as if he acted in cold Blood.” 246  He suggested 
that the behavior of future rulers would be improved if subjects did not 
meekly submit to a ruler’s murderous fits of temper.247
More generally, Pufendorf conceded the right of resisting a tyrant as 
another application of the right of self-defense. If the ruler makes himself 
into a manifest danger to the people, then “a People may defend 
 240. Id. at 190 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 7). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 198 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 16) (also noting that a state may regulate the boundaries of self-
defense). 
 243. Id. at 832–33 (bk. 8, ch. 6, §§ 1–2). 
 244. Id. at 833–48 (bk. 8, ch. 6). 
 245. Id. at 187–88 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 5). 
 246. Id. at 187–88 n.1 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 5). 
 247. Id. 
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themselves against the unjust Violence of the Prince.”248 Pufendorf 
announced his agreement with Grotius that it is absurd to claim that 
because subjects cannot have courtroom jurisdiction over a sovereign, 
subjects are therefore forbidden to use force to overthrow a tyrant. “As if 
to defend one’s Life against an injurious Assailant were to proceed 
against him in a judicial manner!” scoffed Pufendorf.249
Pufendorf acknowledged the argument that, in a state, it might be 
illegal for anyone to call “that the Subjects have to take up Arms against 
the chief Magistrate; since no Mortal can pretend to have a Jurisdiction” 
over a sovereign.250 Pufendorf denied that self-defense—including 
collective self-defense against barbarous domestic tyranny—is dependent 
on either jurisdiction or a lawful call: “As if Defence were the Effect of 
Jurisdiction! Or, as if he who sets himself to keep off an unjust Violence, 
which threatens his Life, has any more need of a particular Call, than he 
who is about to fence against Hunger and Thirst with Meat and 
Drink!”251
Pufendorf repeated with approval Grotius’s analysis that a people 
would never enter into a social compact if the price were to surrender 
their right of resisting an unjust and violent government. It would be 
better to suffer the “Fighting and Contention” of a state of nature than to 
face “certain Death” because they had given up the right to “oppose by 
Arms the unjust Violence of their Superiors.”252
Barbeyrac stated that if a government attempts to hinder people from 
the peaceful exercise of religion according to personal conscience, then 
“the People have as natural and unquestionable a Right to defend the 
Religion by Force of Arms . . . as to defend their Lives, their Estates, and 
Liberties . . . .”253
Likewise, at the conclusion of Pufendorf’s chapter on self-defense, 
Barbeyrac included a long note on a subject which he chided Pufendorf 
for omitting: John Locke’s theory of the right to resistance against a 
government which usurps powers which had never been granted by the 
people—a theory with which Barbeyrac plainly agreed.254
Barbeyrac quoted at length, and with great approval, John Locke’s 
explication that a tyrant is in a state of war with the people.255 The point 
 248. Id. at 721–22 (bk.7, ch. 8, § 6). 
 249. Id. at 723 (bk. 7, ch. 8, § 7). 
 250. Id. (italics omitted). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 719 n.2 (bk. 7, ch. 8, § 5). 
 254. Id. at 201 n.2 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 19). 
 255. Id. at 720–21 n.1 (bk. 7, ch. 8, § 5) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT § 210 (1690)). 
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is in accord with Giovanni da Legnano’s observation that warfare is 
warfare, regardless of the number of people involved.256 It also echoes 
the point made by Cicero, St. Augustine, and Philo of Alexandria that 
robbery is robbery, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a small gang 
leader with a few followers or a tyrant with a standing army.257
Barbeyrac’s humanitarian vision is squarely opposed to the 
apologists for state violence (eighteenth century, and twenty-first 
century) who assert that governments have an inherent right to use 
domestic violence and an exemption from the rules which constrain 
individual violence. The American revolutionaries considered Barbeyrac, 
Pufendorf, and Grotius to be part of the seamless fabric of humanitarian 
philosophy that justified violent resistance to Great Britain as legitimate 
self-defense against the British government’s efforts to destroy the 
orderly peace of free and civil society.258
 256. See LEGNANO supra note 70, pt. IV.A.1, 2d para. 
 257. The preeminent Christian theologian St. Augustine of Hippo asked: “If justice be taken 
away, what are governments but great bands of robbers?” ST. AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY 
OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS (Henry Bettenson trans., Penguin Books 1984) (translation of 1459 
edition) (early fifth century) (bk. 4, ch. 4). To illustrate the point, Augustine used a story attributed to 
Cicero: 
 
Indeed, that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great 
by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what 
he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold 
pride, “What thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with 
a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet art 
styled emperor.” 
 
Id. See also CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 67 (James E.G. Zetzel ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (54–51 BC) (bk. 3, para. 24a) (final sentence of the story; the story 
appears in a section of Commonwealth from which several pages of the original text have been lost). 
Philo of Alexandria, the leading Jewish legal scholar of the first century BC, agreed with the 
Romans that all forms of theft are merely variations on a single type of attack on society: an assault 
on the right of ownership of private property. Thus, a petty thief was no different in principle from a 
tyrant who stole the resources of his nation, or a nation which plundered another nation. See EDWIN 
R. GOODENOUGH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE JEWISH COURTS OF EGYPT: LEGAL ADMINISTRATION 
BY THE JEWS UNDER THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE AS DESCRIBED BY PHILO JUDAEUS 230–31 (2002). 
Cf. Kathleen A. Parrow, From Defense to Resistance, 83 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN 
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 18 (pt. 6, 1993) (citing HIPPOLYTE PISSARD, LE CLAMER DE HARO DANS 
LE DROIT NORMAND 118–19 (1911) (the Norman cry of haro, used to call out citizens to pursue a 
thief, was usable against magistrates who flagrantly abused their power or exceeded their 
jurisdiction; Norman jurists regarded such government criminals as larrons [robbers]). 
 258. To take but one example, consider “Novanglus,” a series of 1775 newspaper essays in 
which John Adams set forth the most sophisticated legal and philosophical arguments for the 
colonists’ right of resistance. In essay number six, Adams justified the Boston Tea Party and similar 
violent acts of resistance. In the third paragraph of the essay, he reminded readers: “Grotius B. 1, c. 
3, § 1, observes, ‘that some sort of private war may be lawfully waged. It is not repugnant to the law 
of nature, for any one to repel injuries by force.’” Several paragraphs later, Adams cited Grotius for 
the point that it was not seditious to resist a ruler who was assuming powers which had never been 
granted to him: 
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The same course is justly used against a legal magistrate who takes upon him 
to exercise a power which the law does not give; for in that respect he is a 
private man,—“Quia,” as Grotius says, “eatenus non habet imperium,” 
[Because he does not have the authority to that extent]— and may be 
restrained as well as any other; because he is not set up to do what he lists, but 
what the law appoints for the good of the people; and as he has no other power 
than what the law allows, so the same law limits and directs the exercise of 
that which he has. 
 
Then, Adams quoted verbatim a massive footnote by Barbeyrac, in which Barbeyrac had woven 
together Grotius, Pufendorf, Jean LeClerc (a liberal Swiss Protestant philosopher and theologian), 
Locke, and Algernon Sidney (a seventeenth-century British advocate of resistance to tyranny), to 
show that revolution against tyranny was a way to restore civil society, to show that resistance was 
justified before the tyranny become omnipotent, and to reassure the public that resistance would not 
lead to mob rule: 
 
When we speak of a tyrant that may lawfully be dethroned by the 
people, we do not mean by the word people, the vile populace or rabble of the 
country, nor the cabal of a small number of factious persons, but the greater 
and more judicious part of the subjects, of all ranks. Besides, the tyranny must 
be so notorious, and evidently clear, as to leave nobody any room to doubt of 
it, &c. Now, a prince may easily avoid making himself so universally 
suspected and odious to his subjects; for, as Mr. Locke says in his Treatise of 
Civil Government, c. 18, § 209,—‘It is as impossible for a governor, if he 
really means the good of the people, and the preservation of them and the laws 
together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family not 
to let his children see he loves and takes care of them.’ And therefore the 
general insurrection of a whole nation does not deserve the name of a 
rebellion. We may see what Mr. Sidney says upon this subject in his 
Discourse concerning Government:—‘Neither are subjects bound to stay till 
the prince has entirely finished the chains which he is preparing for them, and 
put it out of their power to oppose. It is sufficient that all the advances which 
he makes are manifestly tending to their oppression, that he is marching 
boldly on to the ruin of the State.’ In such a case, says Mr. Locke, admirably 
well,—‘How can a man any more hinder himself from believing, in his own 
mind, which way things are going, or from casting about to save himself, than 
he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in was carrying him 
and the rest of his company to Algiers, when he found him always steering 
that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and 
provisions, did often force him to turn his course another way for some time, 
which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the winds, weather, and other 
circumstances would let him?’ This chiefly takes place with respect to kings, 
whose power is limited by fundamental laws. 
“If it is objected that the people, being ignorant and always discontented, 
to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and the uncertain 
humor of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin; the same author will 
answer you, that ‘on the contrary, people are not so easily got out of their old 
forms as some are apt to suggest. England, for instance, notwithstanding the 
many revolutions that have been seen in that kingdom, has always kept to its 
old legislative of king, lords, and commons; and whatever provocations have 
made the crown to be taken from some of their princes’ heads, they never 
carried the people so far as to place it in another line.’ But it will be said, this 
hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. ‘No more,’ says Mr. Locke, 
‘than any other hypothesis. For when the people are made miserable, and find 
themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors 
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As for humanitarian intervention in other nations, Pufendorf 
recognized that it was often a pretext for aggression. He favored 
as you will for sons of Jupiter; let them be sacred and divine, descended or 
authorized from heaven; give them out for whom or what you please, the same 
will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be 
ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon 
them. 2. Such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in 
public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient 
laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people without 
mutiny and murmur. 3. This power in the people of providing for their safety 
anew by a legislative, when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust 
by invading their property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the 
probablest means to hinder it; for rebellion being an opposition, not to 
persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of 
the government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by 
force justify the violation of them, are truly and properly rebels. For when 
men, by entering into society and civil government, have excluded force, and 
introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity, among 
themselves; those who set up force again, in opposition to the laws, do 
rebellare, that is, do bring back again the state of war, and are properly, 
rebels,’ as the author shows. In the last place, he demonstrates that there are 
also greater inconveniences in allowing all to those that govern, than in 
granting something to the people. But it will be said, that ill affected and 
factious men may spread among the people, and make them believe that the 
prince or legislative act contrary to their trust, when they only make use of 
their due prerogative. To this Mr. Locke answers, that the people, however, is 
to judge of all that; because nobody can better judge whether his trustee or 
deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, than he who 
deputed him. ‘He might make the like query,’ (says Mr. Le Clerc, from whom 
this extract is taken) ‘and ask, whether the people being oppressed by an 
authority which they set up, but for their own good, it is just that those who 
are vested with this authority, and of which they are complaining, should 
themselves be judges of the complaints made against them. The greatest 
flatterers of kings dare not say, that the people are obliged to suffer absolutely 
all their humors, how irregular soever they be; and therefore must confess, 
that when no regard is had to their complaints, the very foundations of society 
are destroyed; the prince and people are in a state of war with each other, like 
two independent states, that are doing themselves justice, and acknowledge no 
person upon earth, who, in a sovereign manner, can determine the disputes 
between them. 
 
After the massive quotation from Barbeyrac, Adams made a direct appeal to authority: 
 
If there is any thing in these quotations, which is applicable to the destruction 
of the tea, or any other branch of our subject, it is not my fault; I did not make 
it. Surely Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Locke, Sidney, and Le Clerc, are 
writers of sufficient weight to put in the scale against the mercenary scribblers 
in New York and Boston [that is, the newspaper essayists to whom Adams 
was responding] . . . .” 
 
John Adams, Novanglus, essay 6, 204–06, reprinted in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN 
ADAMS (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php? 
option=com_staticxt& staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=592&Itemid=27 (quoting PUFENDORF, supra 
note 196, at 720 n.1 (bk. 7, ch 8, § 6)). 
  
90 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 22 
 
humanitarian intervention if, and only if, the subjects of the country 
themselves had the right to “take Arms to repress the insupportable 
Tyranny and Cruelties of their own Governors.”259
 
3.  Emmerich de Vattel 
 
Along with Of the Law of Nature and Nations by Pufendorf, The 
Law of Nations, by the Swiss scholar Emmerich de Vattel, was 
considered one of the two great books founded on the work of Grotius.260 
Vattel (1714–1767) was notably influential on the American founders, 
among others.261
The full title of Vattel’s book stated the connection between natural 
and international law: The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of 
Nature, applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns.262
Vattel agreed with other scholars that the right of personal self-
defense is the foundation of the national right to engage in defensive 
war.263 Self-defense is both a right and a duty: “Self-preservation is not 
only a natural right, but an obligation imposed by nature, and no man can 
entirely and absolutely renounce it.”264
The right of self-defense applies whenever the government does not 
protect an individual, and it includes a right to defend oneself against 
rape or robbery, not merely against attempted homicide: 
 
[O]n all these occasions where the public authority cannot 
lend us its assistance, we resume our original and natural right 
of self-defence. Thus a traveler may, without hesitation, kill 
the robber who attacks him on the highway; because it would, 
at that moment, be in vain for him to implore the protection of 
the laws and of the magistrate. Thus a chaste virgin would be 
praised for taking away the life of a brutal ravisher who 
 259. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 844 (bk. 8, ch. 6, § 14). 
 260. WARD, supra note 179, at 377. 
 261. Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, s.v. “International Law,” 
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761571627/ Internationl_Law.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2007). 
 262. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS [Droit des gens; ou, 
Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains] 
(The Lawbook Exchange 2005) (Joseph Chitty trans., 1854) (1758), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel.htm. 
 263. Id. at 211 (bk. 2, ch. 5, §§ 66–67). 
 264. Id. at 79 (bk. 1, ch. 4, § 54). Here Vattel disagreed with Juan de Mariana, who had 
suggested that an individual could choose not to protect himself, in the spirit of charity. See 
MARIANA, supra note 100, at IV.A.3, para. 4. 
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attempted to force her to his desires.265
 
Vattel wrote that the right of revolution against tyranny is also an 
extension of the right of self-defense; like an ordinary criminal, a tyrant 
“is no better than a public enemy against whom the nation may and 
ought to defend itself.”266
Vattel agreed with the consensus of Grotius, Pufendorf, and the 
Spanish humanitarians, that there is a right and duty of humanitarian 
intervention. Vattel formulated the duty in terms of self-defense: When a 
prince’s tyranny gives “his subjects a legal right to resist him . . . in their 
own defence,” then every other nation should legitimately come to the 
aid of the people, “for, when a people, from good reasons take up arms 
against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist 
brave men in the defence of their liberties.”267 “As to those monsters 
who, under the title of sovereigns, render themselves the scourges and 
horror of the human race, they are savage beasts, whom every brave man 
may justly exterminate from the face of the earth.”268
 265. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 142 (bk. 1, ch. 13, § 176). Also: “A subject may repel the 
violence of a fellow-citizen when the magistrate’s assistance is not at hand; and with much greater 
reason may he defend himself against the unexpected attacks of foreigners.” Id. at 399 (bk. 3, ch. 15, 
§ 223). In order to prevent dueling, Vattel urged enforcement of the custom that only military men 
and nobles should be allowed to wear swords in public. Id. at 141 (bk. 1, ch. 13, § 176). 
 266. Id. at 18; see also id. at 75 (bk. 1, ch. 4, § 54) (a prince who kills innocent persons “is no 
longer to be considered in any other light than that of an unjust and outrageous enemy, against whom 
his people are allowed to defend themselves.”). Joseph Chitty (1828–1899), besides being an English 
translator of Vattel, was a prominent English judge and author of legal treatises. Chitty’s annotation 
of Vattel quoted with approval Grotius’s statement that if a sovereign violated the laws of the 
country, the people were absolved of their oath of allegiance. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 73, n.* 
(bk. 1, ch. 4, § 46), quoting HUGO GROTIUS, 2 ANNALS OF THE NETHERLANDS (1797) (“past 
generations” had “made effectual use of arms” to redress the abuses of sovereigns such as John II, 
who was King of Aragon and Navarre). 
 267. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 216 (bk. 2, ch, 4, § 56). United States Senator Henry Clay, in 
his famous oration “The Emancipation of South America,” cited Vattel as authority for American 
support for the South American wars of national liberation against Spanish colonialism: 
 
I maintain that an oppressed people are authorized, whenever they can, to rise 
and break their fetters. This was the great principle of the English Revolution. 
It was the great principle of our own. Vattel, if authority were wanting, 
expressly supports this right. We must pass sentence of condemnation upon 
the founders of our liberty, say that you were rebels, traitors, and that we are 
at this moment legislating without competent powers, before we can condemn 
the cause of Spanish America. . . . Spanish America for centuries has been 
doomed to the practical effects of an odious tyranny. If we were justified, she 
is more than justified. 
 
Henry Clay, The Emancipation of South America, in 4 THE WORLD’S FAMOUS ORATIONS 82–83 
(1906). 
 268. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 156 (bk. 2, ch. 4, § 56). Vattel noted that “All antiquity has 
praised Hercules for delivering the world from an Antaeus, a Busiris, and a Diomede.” Id. Diomedes 
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The personal right of self-defense also showed why a protectorate 
may renounce its allegiance to a sovereign which fails to provide 
protection. When Austria failed in its obligation to protect Lucerne, 
Austria lost its sovereignty over Lucerne, and so Lucerne allied with the 
Swiss cantons. Austria complained to the Holy Roman Emperor, but the 
people of Lucerne retorted “that they had used the natural right common 
to all men, by which every one is permitted to endeavor to procure his 
own safety when he is abandoned by those who are obliged to grant him 
assistance.”269
Vattel pointed out that the town of Zug had been attacked and the 
duke of Austria had refused to defend it. (He was busy hunting with 
hawks and would not be interrupted.) Zurich too had been attacked, and 
the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV had failed to protect it. Vattel 
concluded that both Zug and Zurich were justified in asserting their 
natural right to self-protection and in joining the Swiss confederation. 270 
Similar reasoning justified the decision of other Swiss cantons to 
separate themselves from the Austrians, who never protected them.271
 
 
 
 
 
was a king who fed human beings to his four carnivorous horses. Antaeus was a giant in Libya who 
challenged travelers to a wrestling match, always defeated them, and then killed them. The story of 
Hercules and Busiris is this: 
 
After Libya he [Hercules] traversed Egypt. That country was then ruled by 
Busiris, a son of Poseidon by Lysianassa, daughter of Epaphus. This Busiris 
used to sacrifice strangers on an altar of Zeus in accordance with a certain 
oracle. For Egypt was visited with dearth for nine years, and Phrasius, a 
learned seer who had come from Cyprus, said that the dearth would cease if 
they slaughtered a stranger man in honour of Zeus every year. Busiris began 
by slaughtering the seer himself and continued to slaughter the strangers who 
landed. So Hercules also was seized and haled to the altars, but he burst his 
bonds and slew both Busiris and his son Amphidamus. 
 
APOLLODORUS, § 2.5.11, at 223–27 (James G. Frazer trans., 1921), available at 
http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_herc_lab11.htm. The original source is Bibliotheke, an 
ancient collection of Greek myths. It was originally attributed to the second-century BC Greek writer 
Appolodorus, but scholars now recognize that the book was composed much later. “Pseudo-
Appolodorus” is sometimes designated as the author. The characters from the Hercules myth are 
fictional, of course, as Vattel knew. But can it be disputed that there are monstrous rulers in the 
modern world, at least as wicked and bloodthirsty as Busiris, Antaeus, and Diomedes? Those ancient 
rulers killed innocents one at a time, but never perpetrated genocide. 
 269. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 153 (bk. 1, ch. 16, § 196). 
 270. Id. at 96–97 (bk. 1, ch. 17, § 202). 
 271. Id. 
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C.  Some Post-Grotius Scholars 
 
1.  Johann Textor 
 
Johann Wolfgang Textor, the great-great-grandfather of Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe, was a law professor, judge, and legal advisor to 
governments in Germany in the late seventeenth century.272
More than most of the other scholars discussed in this Part, Textor 
was a legal positivist. Textor was an especially outstanding scholar of 
Roman law. (As will be detailed infra, Roman law was the foundation of 
much of the law in Europe at the time.273) Textor was intimately familiar 
not only with the multi-volume treatises which had been produced during 
the reign of the Emperor Justinian but also with many commentaries (or 
“glosses”) which had been written in the margins of various editions of 
the treatises, beginning with the Western rediscovery of Roman law in 
the eleventh century. 
Textor’s book Synopsis of the Law of Nations included a full chapter 
“On Self-defense against Violence.”274 He wrote that use of deadly force 
in self-defense is lawful against a deadly attack, rape, or mayhem.275  For 
defense against lesser assaults, and for defense of property, self-defense 
is also permissible, but deadly force is not, unless the circumstances of 
the crime create the risk of death.276 As Textor demonstrated, there were 
many Roman law and Canon law commentators on each side of the 
various questions and subquestions involving deadly force against lesser 
assaults and property crimes.277
 
2.  Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui 
 
Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694–1748) was Professor of Natural Law 
at the Academy of Geneva.278 His treatise The Principles of Natural and 
Politic Law was translated into six languages (besides the original 
French) in sixty editions.279
 272. Ludwig von Bar, Introduction to JOHANN WOLFGANG TEXTOR, SYNOPSUS JURIS 
GENTIUM (Synopsis of the Law of Nations) (Ludwig von Bar ed., John Pawley Bate trans., William 
S. Hein 1995) (1680) [hereinafter TEXTOR]. 
 273. See infra Parts V.D and V.G. 
 274. TEXTOR, supra note 272, at 34–46. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Petter Korkman, Introduction to JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW ix (Petter Korkman ed., Liberty Fund 2006) (1747) (Principes du droit 
naturel first published in 1747 and Principes du droit politique first published in 1751). 
 279. Id. at x. 
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His vision of constitutionalism had a major influence on the 
American Founders; for example, Burlamaqui’s understanding of checks 
and balances was much more sophisticated and practical than that of 
Montesquieu, in part because Burlamaqui’s theory contained the seed of 
judicial review. He was frequently quoted or paraphrased, sometimes 
with attribution and sometimes not, in political sermons during the pre-
revolutionary era.280
He was the first philosopher to articulate the quest for happiness as a 
natural human right, a principle that Thomas Jefferson later restated in 
the Declaration of Independence.281 When Burlamaqui affirmed the right 
of pursuing happiness, he stated the right as intimately connected to the 
right to arms: all men have a “right of endeavoring to provide for their 
safety and happiness, and of employing force and arms against those who 
declare themselves their enemies.”282
The same principle that legitimates self-defense also provides the 
appropriate boundaries: “necessity can authorise us to have recourse to 
force against an unjust aggressor, so this same necessity should be the 
rule and measure of the harm we do him . . . .”283
National self-defense is simply an extension, with appropriate 
modifications, of the right and duty of personal self-defense.284 
Defensive war, both personal and national, is essential to the preservation 
of peaceful society; “otherwise the human species would become the 
victims of robbery and licentiousness: for the right of making war is, 
properly speaking, the most powerful means of maintaining peace.”285
The right to collective self-defense against tyranny (a criminal 
government) is an application of the individual right of self-defense 
against a lone criminal: “when the people are reduced to the last 
extremity, there is no difference between tyranny and robbery. The one 
gives no more right than the other, and we may lawfully oppose force to 
 280. RAY FORREST HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI: A LIBERAL TRADITION IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1937) [hereinafter BURLAMAQUI]. 
 281. Id. at 16–17, 119–24. 
 282. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 280, at 446 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 5). 
 283. Id. at 157 (bk. 1, pt. 2, ch. 4, § 16). 
 284. [W]ar is nevertheless permitted in certain circumstances, and sometimes 
necessary both for individuals and nations. This we have sufficiently 
shewn . . . by establishing the rights which nature has invested mankind for 
their own preservation. The principles of this kind, which we have established 
with respect to particulars, equally, and for stronger reasons, are applicable to 
nations. . . . The law of God no less enjoins a whole nation to take care of their 
preservation, than it does private men. 
 
Id. at 447 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 1, §§ 10–11). 
 285. Id. at 448 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 11). 
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violence.”286 Thus, people have a right “to rise in arms” against “extreme 
abuse of sovereignty,” such as tyranny.287
Burlamaqui agreed with the Englishman Algernon Sidney that 
subjects are “not obliged to wait till the prince has entirely riveted their 
chains, and till he has put it out of their power to resist him.” 288 Rather, 
they may initiate an armed revolt “when they find that all his [the 
prince’s] actions manifestly tend to oppress them, and that he is 
marching boldly on to the ruin of the state.”289
Burlamaqui acknowledged that if the people have the power to 
revolt, they might misuse it, but the risk would be much less than the risk 
of allowing tyranny to flourish: “In fine, though the subjects might abuse 
the liberty which we grant them, yet less inconveniency would arise from 
this, than from allowing all to the sovereign, so as to let a whole nation 
perish, rather than grant it the power of checking the iniquity of its 
governors.”290
Similarly, the fact that “every one has a natural right to take care of 
his preservation by all possible means” suggests that if “the state can no 
longer defend and protect the subjects, they . . . resume their original 
right of taking care of themselves, independently of the state, in the 
manner they think most proper.”291 Thus, whenever a state fails to protect 
one of its subjects from criminal attack, the subject has a right of self-
defense. 
In an international law application, the same principle proves that a 
sovereign has no authority to “oblige one of his towns or provinces to 
submit to another government.” 292 Rather, the sovereign may, at most, 
withdraw his protection from the town or province, in which case the 
people of the town or province have a complete right of self-defense, and 
of independence if they can prevail in their self-defense.293
Burlamaqui, like Vattel, supported a broad rule of humanitarian 
intervention to liberate the tyrannized people of another nation—
provided that “the tyranny is risen to such a height, that the subjects 
themselves may lawfully take up arms, to shake off the yoke of the 
tyrant.”294 This principle is an extension of personal assistance in self-
defense, for “[e]very man, as such, has a right to claim the assistance of 
 286. Id. at 373 (bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 6, § 22). 
 287. Id. at 372 (bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 6, §§ 16–17). 
 288. Id. at 373 (bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 6, § 30). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 378 (bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 6, § 38). 
 291. Id. at 443 (bk. 2, pt. 3, ch. 5, § 55). 
 292. Id. at 442. 
 293. Id. at 442–43 (bk. 2, pt. 3, ch. 5, § 42). 
 294. Id. at 465 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 47). 
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other men when he is really in necessity.”295
Burlamaqui acknowledged that the principle of humanitarian 
intervention is often misused. Nevertheless, the misuse of a good 
principle does not mean that the principle should be eliminated, any more 
than the misuse of weapons means that weapons should be prohibited: 
“the bad use of a thing, does not hinder it from being just. Pirates 
navigate the seas, and robbers wear swords, as well as other people.”296
 
3.  George Frederick von Martens 
 
The late eighteenth century marked the end of the classical period of 
international law. One of the last of the founding treatises was written by 
the University of Göttingen professor George Frederick von Martens: 
Summary of the Law of Nations Founded on the Treaties and Customs of 
the Modern Nations of Europe.297 He acknowledged that some 
uncivilized nations did not follow the norms of international law, but he 
argued that the nations of Europe did, and so he confined his treatise to 
what Europeans did. 
The principles of Grotius, Pufendorf, and the other founding giants 
were so well established that Martens could simply state, as an obvious 
truth, “our right to wound and kill being founded on self-defense,” it is 
impermissible in warfare to target non-combatants.298
 
 
 
 295. Id. at 466 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 49). 
 296. Id. § 50. He made a related point about firearms in order to illustrate his point that action 
can only be imputed to a person based on his knowledge of foreseeable consequences: 
 
A gunsmith sells arms to a man who has the appearance of a sensible, sedate 
person, and does not seem to have any bad design. And yet this man goes 
instantly to make an unjust attack on another person, and kills him. Here the 
gunsmith is not at all chargeable, having done nothing but what he had a right 
to do; and besides, he neither could nor ought to have foreseen what 
happened. 
 
Id. at 208 (bk. 1, pt. 2, ch. 10, § 5).  In contrast, if a careless person left a pair of loaded pistols on a 
table in a public place, he would be chargeable if a child found the pistols and accidentally injured 
himself. Id. Barbeyrac had made a similar argument in favor of liability for the pistol owner. 
PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 46 n.2 (bk. 1, ch. 5, § 3). 
 297. E.g. MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND 
CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 89, n.† (William Cobbett trans., Fred B. Rothman 
1986) (reprint of 1795 English translation) (1788) (“The roman law ought to be considered as the 
subsidiary law in Germany, Switzerland, Holland, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Polon, and in some 
of the tribunals in Great Britain.”). 
 298. MARTENS, supra note 297, at 282 (bk. 8, ch. 3, § 4). 
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4.  George Bowyer 
 
Englishman George Bowyer was the author of four legal treatises in 
the mid-nineteenth century. His work was so highly regarded that the 
University of Oxford awarded him its greatest honor, naming him a 
Doctor of Civil Law (a title usually reserved for heads of state and the 
Chancellor of the University).299 In his 1854 Commentaries on Universal 
Public Law, he aimed to describe the shared elements of public law “of 
human society in general throughout the world, including the foundations 
of International Law.”300
Bowyer cited and agreed with Grotius’s theory of self-defense. 
 
For a chief object of society is that each person may enjoy 
peaceably all that belongs to him, with the assistance of the 
power of his whole body. Therefore the law of society cannot 
justly prevent a man from defending and enforcing his own 
rights, unless society will undertake that task for him.301
 
Thus, 
 
Every man has a right to defend himself or his property, or 
even to defend others, where there is not time or opportunity 
to call in aid the civil power. The reason is obvious; for if it 
were not so, men would find themselves in a worse condition 
in those cases, under civil government, than they would be in 
if they were living in a mere natural society without any civil 
government.302
 
Not all nineteenth century legal scholars followed Bowyer’s practice 
of reminding readers of first principles. By the nineteenth century, a 
large edifice of international law had been built on the foundation of 
Grotius and the other classical authors. Just as people who work on the 
sixty-fifth story of a skyscraper may not spend much time thinking about 
the building’s foundation, many of the international law scholars of the 
nineteenth (and twentieth century) tended to concentrate on elaborating 
the details and applications of particular subjects—such as maritime 
rights, or the extent of ambassadorial immunities—without discussion of 
first principles. The first principles, like the foundation of a skyscraper, 
 299. BOOTHMAN, supra note 221. 
 300. BOWYER, supra note 183, at 12. 
 301. Id. at 232. 
 302. Id. at 233. 
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were still there of course, for the whole edifice would collapse without 
them. 
 
5.  George B. Davis 
 
As of the early twentieth century, the direct connection between the 
national right of self-defense and the individual right continued to be an 
obvious element of international law. George B. Davis was West Point’s 
most renowned Professor of Law. In his 1901 treatise The Elements of 
International Law, George B. Davis explained that the “Right of Self-
Preservation” is “called in being whenever the corporate existence of a 
state is menaced, and corresponds to the individual right of self-
defence.”303
 
D.  Conclusion: Burning Down the House 
 
Frey’s attempt to deny the existence of a human right to self-defense 
has terrifying implications, which run far beyond her narrow effort to 
assist international gun prohibition. If Frey is right—that there is no 
human right to self-defense—then Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Victoria, 
and all the rest of the humanitarian founders of international law are 
wrong. 
And these humanitarians would not be wrong about an incidental 
matter (such as whether consuls have the same rights as ambassadors); 
they would be wrong in the very foundation of their humanitarian 
principles. The personal right of self-defense is the foundation of the 
humanitarian edifice built by the classic authors. The personal right to 
self-defense is why the Indians had a right to resist Spanish pillaging. It 
is why prisoners of war must be treated humanely, why armies must not 
target non-combatants, and why aggressive war is unjust. 
If Frey is correct that self-defense is not a fundamental human right, 
then the structure of more than five centuries of humanitarian 
international law collapses. All the generals, admirals, and diplomats 
who restrained the conduct of their militaries because they believed in 
the international law taught by Grotius and the rest were fools, because 
Grotius and his fellows were concocting international law on the basis of 
a human right that does not really exist; they were as misguided as the 
chemists who believed in phlogiston.304
 303. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 74. 
 304. Phlogiston was, in the theory of some seventeenth and eighteenth century chemists, an 
odorless, colorless, weightless substance which was released during combustion. The phlogiston 
theory was disproved by Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, who showed that combustion requires oxygen; 
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Justice Felix Frankfurter decried the short-sighted advocates of 
repressive law enforcement who would “burn the house to roast the 
pig.”305 Frey’s target is gun ownership, but in order to get at gun owners, 
she is promoting a radical theory which tends towards the destruction of 
humanitarian international law itself. 
In modern international law, there is a continuing controversy over 
natural law versus positivism. As detailed supra, the positivist tradition 
and the natural law position both have historically recognized the right of 
personal self-defense.306 Johannes Textor was an international law 
positivist avant la lettre, and also a firm defender of self-defense. Later 
scholars have argued about the degree to which Grotius, Pufendorf, et al., 
used natural or positive law. 
Frey’s position is premised on an extremist version of positivism: 
that humans have no rights other than the rights which governments 
grant them via international human rights treaties or other positive 
enactments. (Although, even if one accepts the view that rights are only 
created by positive law, Frey has failed to inform the Human Rights 
Council about many positive laws of the right of self-defense, as 
discussed in Part V and Part VI.) The positivist-only view is contrary to 
the essential nature of human rights—which is that all humans have 
certain fundamental rights, regardless of whether those rights have been 
codified in a national code or international treaty. If all the human rights 
treaties in the world were repealed tomorrow, could a person still assert 
that she has a right to freedom of religion, a right not to be raped, a right 
to criticize the government? We think that the answer is clearly “yes”—
that these rights have always been inherent; the human rights treaties of 
the twentieth century recognized these rights, but did not create them.307
There are some modern scholars, such as Yoram Dinstein of Israel, 
who insist that natural law is anachronistic because it came from an 
“ecclesiastical” era.308 Of the many authors we have surveyed, some of 
once combustion was understood to be a form of oxidation, the evidence supporting the phlogiston 
theory disappeared. 
 305. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (rejecting the notion that literature for 
adults should be censored in order to protect children from seeing inappropriate materials). 
 306. See supra Part IV.A–C. 
 307. The United States Supreme Court has noted that the right to arms, like the right to 
peaceably assemble, is not created by positive law, but rather derives “‘from those laws whose 
authority is acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world.’ It is found wherever civilization 
exists.” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 
211 (1824)). The “civilized man” quote comes from the Court’s discussion of the right to assemble; 
the right to arms discussion follows immediately, and adopts the same reasoning as the right to 
assembly analysis. For a more detailed discussion of Cruikshank, see David B. Kopel, The Supreme 
Court’s Thirty-five Other Second Amendment Cases, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 177 (1999). 
 308. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 179–80. Although Dinstein’s credentials as an international 
law scholar are indisputable, his knowledge of the ecclesiastical theory and practice is weak. For 
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the important Spanish predecessors of Grotius were indeed ecclesiastics. 
Today, there are some people who, writing from a religious foundation, 
believe that natural law is a bulwark of human liberty.309 But it is much 
too glib to dismiss natural rights theory as religiously based. In this Part, 
almost none of the arguments—including the arguments made by 
ordained members of religious orders—depend on any proof deriving 
directly from revealed religion. Rather, the arguments often used Bible 
stories—as they used stories from ancient Greece and Rome—to 
illustrate or reinforce their points 
Moreover, one hardly needs to believe in natural law to recognize 
self-defense as a fundamental right. When we examine the sources of 
international law, we will not expect to find that all the great founders of 
example, he claims that before the Roman Emperor Constantine made Christianity the state religion 
(in 312 AD), Christians were entirely pacifist. Dinstein further claims that the theoretical 
justification for Christians serving in the Roman armies was invented by Augustine, in his fifth-
century book The City of God. Id. at 64. While Augustine elaborated “Just War” principles with 
great sophistication, he was far from the first Christian apologist to justify Christian service in the 
Roman army. See, e.g., CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, PAEDAGOGUS, (The Instructor), bk. 2, ch. 12; bk. 
3, ch. 12, para. 7, (G.W. Butterworth trans., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1919) (Clement of Alexandria lived 
between 150–215 AD); available at www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-02/anf02-52.htm#P3288_976824 
(Christian men should wear shoes only when they serve in the military, and Christian soldiers should 
not extort money from civilians); EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA, THE PROOF OF THE GOSPEL 
(Demonstratio Evangelica) 48–50 (bk. 1, ch. 8) (W.J. Ferrar ed. & trans., 2001) (One way to be a 
Christian is to adopt a religious vocation, such as becoming a monk. The other way, “more humble, 
more human, permits men to join in pure nuptials and to produce children, to undertake government, 
to give orders to soldiers fighting for right.”) (Eusebius of Caesarea lived approx. 260 to 339 AD); 
ST. ATHANASIUS, Letter to Amun, Letter 48, available at www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-04/Npnf2-
04-102.htm#P9806_3501911 (written before 354 AD) (“[I]n war it is lawful and praiseworthy to 
destroy the enemy; accordingly not only are they who have distinguished themselves in the field 
held worthy of great honours, but monuments are put up proclaiming their achievements.”); ST. 
AMBROSE, THE DUTIES OF THE CLERGY, bk. 1, ch. 28–29 (Christians should fight wars to give 
people freedom, as Moses did, and not for selfish purposes; Christian armies should fight fairly, and 
should not be excessively hard to vanquished enemies who did not fight with brutality.) (St. 
Ambrose lived from 339 to 397 AD, and this piece was written approximately 391 AD). The notion 
that the pre-Constantine Christians were all pacifists who would not serve in the army is contradicted 
by numerous other sources, starting with the New Testament. See, e.g., Acts 13:6–12 (Sergius 
Paulus, the deputy military governor of Cyprus, becomes a Christian, without abandoning his post.); 
Acts 10; 11:1–18 (A centurion—that is, a Roman army unit commander—and an enlisted man 
become Christians.); Timothy S. Miller, Introduction to PEACE AND WAR IN BYZANTIUM 9 
(Timothy S. Miller & John Nesbitt eds., 1995) (Sometime between 193 and 235 AD, a Christian 
church was built in the large Roman military camp at Dura Europos, in Syria. The existence of the 
camp shows that, at least in Syria, there were a large number of Christians in the army, and that the 
military leadership not only tolerated them, but tried to accommodate their religious needs.); ADOLF 
HARNACK, MILITIA CHRISTI: THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND THE MILITARY IN THE FIRST THREE 
CENTURIES 94–95 (David McInnes Gracie trans., 1981) (Before the Emperor Diocletian began the 
final, most severe persecution of Christians, the Roman military had come to an accommodation 
with its many Christian soldiers: the soldiers would attend the army’s numerous pagan rites, but they 
would be allowed to make the sign of the cross, which would protect them from demons). 
 309. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, The Universal Common Good and the Authority of 
International Law, 9 LOGOS 28 (2006) (discussing natural law theory of international relations of 
Pope John Paul II). 
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international law were unanimous in their epistemology, or that all their 
sensibilities are congruent with our own. Wherever one thinks rights 
come from, it is quite significant that there is unanimity of opinion 
among the founders of international law: personal self-defense is a 
fundamental human right, essential to the foundation of international law 
and order. If one agrees with the opening paragraphs of the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence, that it is “self-evident” that all men 
inherently have inalienable human rights, then one agrees with the 
general principles of Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and the rest. 
On the other hand, if one takes Dinstein’s position that “law” is 
solely a creation of governments and of bodies created by governments, 
then consider what the governments of the world have created in their 
constitutions, in their most fundamental statements of the structure of the 
legal order. The constitutions of at least sixteen nations explicitly affirm 
that human rights are inherent (or “natural” or created by God); they 
affirm human rights are recognized by governments, but not created by 
governments.310 And so does the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,311 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,312 and the main human rights treaty of the Western 
Hemisphere—the American Convention on Human Rights.313 Thirty-five 
 310. See THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN art. 23 (“Life is a gift of God and a natural 
right of human beings.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA art. 4 (“The 
Constitution recognizes the intangibility of the human dignity and guarantees the person’s inviolable 
and imprescriptible rights . . . .”); AZERBAIJAN CONSTITUTION art. 24 (“Everyone . . . possess 
inviolable and inalienable rights and liberties.”); CONSTITUTION OF BELIZE pmbl., § a (recognizing 
“inalienable rights with which all members of the human family are endowed by their 
Creator . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 41 (“Individual freedom is a 
natural right not subject to violation . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA art. 10 (“Human rights and freedoms, emanating from the nature of mankind, 
are inviolable and inalienable.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA art. 11 (“All 
persons . . . have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA art. 18 (“The rights and freedoms of individuals shall be inborn.”); 
CONSTITUTION art. 11 (“The State guarantees the natural rights of the individual . . . .”); 
CONSTITUCION POLITICA art. 4 (Para.) (“The right to the life is inherent to the human person.”); 
CONSTITUTION OF SAINT LUCIA Part II, sched. III, b (“[A]ll persons have been endowed equally by 
God with inalienable rights . . . .”); SAUDI ARABIA CONSTITUTION art. 26 (“The state protects human 
rights in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah.”); SPAIN CONSTITUTION art. 10 (“[I]nviolable rights 
which are inherent . . . .”); SYRIA CONSTITUTION art. 25 (“Freedom is a sacred right.”); THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO pmbl. (“[T]he equal and inalienable 
rights with which all members of the human family are endowed by their Creator . . . .”); THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY art. 12 (“Everyone possesses inherent fundamental 
rights . . . .”). 
 311. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (recognizing “the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”). 
 312. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (same language as Universal Declaration). 
 313. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, pmbl., Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“[T]he essential rights of man are not derived from 
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American state constitutions, too, affirm that human rights are inherent, 
natural, or otherwise not the mere creation of positive law; quite often, 
the affirmations of inherent rights include the enumeration of self-
defense.314
one’s being a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human 
personality . . . .”); see also Judicial Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, advisory 
opinion OC-18/03 Ser. A, no. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003) (“All persons have attributes inherent to their 
human dignity that may not be disregarded and which are, consequently, superior to the power of the 
State, whatever its political structure.”). 
 314. ALA. CONST. § 1 (describing the equality and rights of men and their “inalienable 
rights . . . life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”); ALASKA CONST. art. 1 (“[A]ll persons have a 
natural right to life, liberty . . . .”); ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (“All men . . . have certain inherent and 
inalienable rights; amongst which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . .”); CAL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending 
life and liberty . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (“All persons have certain natural, essential and 
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties . . . .”); DEL. CONST. pmbl. (“Through Divine goodness, all people have by nature the 
rights . . . of enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . .”); FLA. CONST. art 1, § 2 (“All natural 
persons . . . have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and 
liberty . . . .”); HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“All persons are free by nature and are equal in their 
inherent and inalienable rights. Among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty . . . .”); IDAHO 
CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inalienable rights, among which are enjoying and 
defending life and liberty . . . .”); ILL. CONST. art. 1m, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent and 
inalienable rights among which are life . . . .”); IND. CONST. § 1 (“all people are . . . endowed . . . 
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty . . . .”); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 1 
(“All men and women . . . have . . . inalienable rights . . . of enjoying and defending life . . . .”); KAN. 
CONST. § 1, Bill of Rights. (“All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights, among 
which are life, liberty . . . .”); KY. CONST. § 1, Bill of Rights (“All men are, by nature, free and 
equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: The right of 
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . .”); ME. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have 
certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending 
life . . . .”); MASS. CONST. art. 1 (“All men . . . have certain natural, essential, and unalienable 
rights . . . enjoying and defending their lives . . . .”); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“all persons have a 
natural right to life . . . .”); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (“All persons . . . have certain inalienable 
rights . . . and the rights of . . . defending their lives . . . .”); NEB. CONST. art 1, (“All persons have 
certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life . . . and the right to keep and bear arms 
for security or defense of self, family, home, and others . . . .”); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“all 
persons . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are 
life . . . .”); N.H CONST., Bill of Rights, art 2. (“All men have certain inalienable rights among which 
are those of . . . defending life . . . .”); N.J.  CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All persons . . . have certain natural 
and unalienable rights, among which are those of . . . defending life . . . .”); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 4 
(“All persons . . . have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights 
of . . . defending life . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“all persons . . . are endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art 1, § 1 (“All 
individuals . . . have certain inalienable rights . . . defending life . . . to keep and bear arms for the 
defense of their person, family, property, and the state . . . .”); OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men are, 
by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of 
enjoying and defending life . . . .”); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (“ All persons have the inherent right to 
life . . . .”); PA. CONST., § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent and indefeasible rights . . . defending 
life . . . .”); S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent rights. . .defending 
life . . . .”); UTAH  CONST., art. 1, § 1 (“All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties . . . .”); VT. CONST. art. 1 (“That all persons . . . have certain natural, 
inherent, and unalienable rights, amongst which [is] . . . defending life . . . .”); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 
(“That all men . . . have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they 
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life . . . .”); 
  
43] THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE 103 
 
Thus, the principle of inherent human rights would be, in a sense, a 
widespread enactment of positive law. The positive law would be 
supported by the consensus of the great jurists of international law. 
The status of self-defense in international law does not depend on 
precisely how an individual resolves the natural law versus positive law 
debate. Either the unanimous consensus of the founding scholars reflects 
natural law, or it reflects positive law as articulated unanimously by the 
experts themselves. 315 In any case, it is apparent that self-defense forms 
the intellectual foundation of international law. 
The reader may wonder how Frey, acting as a Special Rapporteur, 
could fail to inform the Human Rights Council about the overwhelming 
consensus of the founding scholars of international law. Perhaps an 
international law professor might not know about Giovanni da Legnano, 
but it is inconceivable that an international law professor would not 
know about Grotius and Pufendorf. The answer may be found in 
Professor Frey’s artfully-worded statement that “[n]o international 
human right of self-defence is expressly set forth in the primary sources 
of international law: treaties, customary law, or general principles.”316 
The statute of the International Court of Justice describes “the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”317 Thus, by 
referring only to “primary” sources, Frey evades the responsibility of a 
conscientious Special Rapporteur to inform the Human Rights Council 
about each of the four sources of international law. Yet Frey is not 
consistent, for she is actually quite liberal about using quotes and 
W.VA. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent rights . . . the enjoyment of life . . . .”); 
WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have certain inherent rights; among these are life . . . .”); 
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“In their inherent right to life . . . .”). 
 315. More eloquently: 
 
There are two ways of investigating the law of nature: . . . either by arguing 
from the nature and circumstances of mankind, or by observing what has 
generally been approved by all nations. The former is the more certain of the 
two: but the latter will lead us, if not with the same certainly, yet with a high 
degree of probability to the knowledge of this law. For such a universal 
approbation must arise from some universal principle; and the principle can be 
nothing else than the common sense of mankind. Since, therefore, the general 
law of nature may be investigated in this manner, the same law as it is applied 
particularly to nations as moral agents, and hence called the law of nations, 
may be investigated in the same manner. 
 
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE 
SCIENCE 39–40 (The Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1836) (quoting Grotius). 
 316. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 21. 
 317. Stat. of the Int’l Ct. of Just., art. 38, § 1(d). 
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citations from scholars to buttress her other points.318 So, in short, she 
informs the Human Rights Council about the opinions of scholars who 
support some tangential aspects of her theories, but fails to inform the 
Human Rights Council of the opinions of the most influential 
international law scholars of all time regarding the primary subject of her 
report. 
In any case, Frey’s claim about the “primary” sources of 
international law is also quite wrong, as will be detailed in the next two 
Parts. Frey engages in some other verbal obfuscation in order to avoid 
informing the Human Rights Council about what the sources of 
international law really say. 
 
V.  HISTORICAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
Major legal systems are a source of international law, especially 
when there is consensus among the systems. The statute of the 
International Court of Justice tells the court to apply “the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”319 Frey acknowledges 
that these “general principles” are a “primary” source of international 
law.320 While Part VI will discuss contemporary law, this Part examines 
the historical practices of civilized nations and the influence of those 
practices on the evolution of international law. These historical sources 
are important because “modern international law—making all proper 
allowance for its greater comprehensiveness, more solid basis, and more 
determinate character—is by no means a new creation, but partly a 
reassertion and refinement of ancient doctrines, partly a restoration or 
continuation or adaptation of ancient customs and institutions.”321
 
A.  Greek Law 
 
It is often said that Western Civilization was built on the foundations 
of Athens and Jerusalem, on the synergy of ancient Greece and ancient 
Israel which produced Christianity.322 So let us begin with Athens. 
The best source of ancient Athenian law on self-defense is the speech 
of Demosthenes, “Against Aristocrates.” Aristocrates had convinced the 
Athenian Senate to enact a decree for the protection of the mercenary 
leader Charidemus. The laws provided for automatic punishment of 
 318. See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 15, 19, 21. 
 319. Stat. of the Int’l Ct. of Just., art 38, § 1(c). 
 320. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 21. 
 321. Phillipson, supra note 161, at 12a. 
 322. See, e.g., LEO STRAUSS, STUDIES IN PLATONIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 171 (1983). 
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anyone who killed Charidemus. The decree failed to win the approval of 
the Assembly, and did not go into effect.323
An opponent of Aristocrates brought a case in the law courts, where 
Demosthenes presented an argument that the decree had been repugnant 
to the legal principles of Athens. For example, the decree provided for 
automatic punishment, rather than the due process of a trial with fact-
finding. Similarly, the decree had no exception for a killing in self-
defense, even though Athenian law clearly provided for self-defense.324
Demosthenes cited the Athenian statute: “If any man while violently 
and illegally seizing another shall be slain straightway in self-defence, 
there shall be no penalty for his death.”325 Pufendorf quoted this passage 
with approval.326 (Pufendorf also cited Plato’s Laws, which repeatedly 
justify self-defense, although today we do not know if Plato’s particular 
ideas were actually followed as law.)327
Demosthenes explained that “straightway” meant that the victim had 
slain the aggressor in immediate self-defense, rather than after “long 
premeditation.” 328 The words “in self-defense” made it clear that the law 
was “giving indulgence to the actual sufferer, and to no other man.”329
In Part VI, we will examine Frey’s astonishing theory that there is no 
self-defense right because all self-defense is an excuse, rather than 
justification.330 The Greeks did not agree. Demosthenes explained, “there 
is such a thing as justifiable homicide,” for some kinds of homicide can 
“be accounted righteous.”331
 
 
 323. J.H. Vince, Introduction to “Against Aristocrates” in 3 DEMOSTHENES, ORATIONS 212–
13 (1935) (originally delivered in 352 BC) [hereinafter DEMOSTHENES]. 
 324. Id. 
 325. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 323, § 69, at 253. 
 326. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, bk. 2, ch. 5, § 16, n.(t), at 198. Pufendorf wrote his own 
footnotes, which used letters as footnote markers. The Barbeyrac footnotes are indicated by 
numerals. 
 327. PLATO, LAWS, bk. 9, at 216 (Benjamin Jowett trans.), available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/ etext99/plaws11.txt (“If a brother kill a brother in self-defence 
during a civil broil, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or a stranger a stranger, let them be free 
from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in battle. But if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a 
parricide. A man is justified in taking the life of a burglar, of a footpad, of a violator of women or 
youth; and he may take the life of another with impunity in defence of father, mother, brother, wife, 
or other relations.” (emphasis added)). 
 328. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 323, § 60, at 253. 
 329. Id. 
 330. See infra Part VI.F.4 notes and accompanying text. 
 331. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 323, § 74, at 265. Athenian law presumed that the citizen 
militia would possess their own arms, which they would use when called to military service. Arms-
carrying was allowed in the countryside, but not in the city unless there was a particular need. 
XENOPHON, HELLENICA, bk. 1. 
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B.  Jewish Law 
 
Jewish law, as expressed in the Jewish Bible (what Christians call 
“the Old Testament”), became part of Christianity, and the Jewish texts 
on self-defense and defense of others were frequently cited by Christian 
writers. Jewish law is also important in its own right as an early form of 
transnational law. After Judea was conquered by Babylon in 587 BC, 
some of the Jewish community was forcibly transported to Babylon, 
while some remained behind in Judea (part of modern-day Israel). Later, 
a thriving Jewish community developed in Alexandria, Egypt. Following 
an unsuccessful war of national independence against the Roman Empire 
in 70 AD, many (although not all) of the Jews in Israel were dispersed 
throughout the Empire. In the subsequent centuries, Jews lived all over 
Europe and the Middle East, often in segregated, self-governing 
communities. These communities regulated their internal affairs 
according to Jewish law and used it in their dealings with Jewish 
communities in other nations. 
Jewish law explicitly authorized personal and family self-defense 
against criminal attack. The book of Exodus absolved a homeowner who 
killed a burglar at night: “If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten 
that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him.”332 The Modern 
Language Bible renders the verse: “When a burglar is caught breaking in, 
and is fatally beaten, there shall be no charge of manslaughter.”333
Under the Mosaic Law, the nearest relative of a person who was 
murdered was obliged to kill the murderer, providing blood restitution 
for the death of the innocent. However, when a nocturnal burglar was 
killed in the act, there was no wrongdoing. Thus, his relatives had no 
right of restitution against the homeowner.334 That no restitution was 
allowed suggests that, in modern terms, the killing of the home invader 
would be in the category of justification, rather than excuse (contrary to 
Frey’s theory that self-defense is not a justification, but is instead an 
 332. Exodus 22:2. For more extensive analysis of Jewish law, see, e.g., David B. Kopel, The 
Torah and Self-Defense, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 17 (2004). The next verse stated that “If the sun be 
risen upon him, there shall be blood shed for him.” Exodus 22:3. Jewish legal scholars interpreted 
the “sun” language metaphorically: if the circumstances indicated that the burglar posed a violent 
threat to the victims in the home, the burglar could be slain regardless of the time of day; conversely, 
if it were clear that the burglar was only taking property, and would not attack the people in the 
home, even if they interfered with the burglary, the burglar could not be slain. Kopel, supra, at 32–
34. 
 333. THE WORD: THE BIBLE FROM 26 TRANSLATIONS 225 (Curtis Vaughn ed., 1993) (quoting 
THE MODERN LANGUAGE BIBLE: THE NEW BERKELEY VERSION IN MODERN ENGLISH). 
 334. EDWARD J. WHITE, THE LAW IN SCRIPTURES 77 (2000). If the deceased were not a real 
burglar, but someone who was mistaken for a burglar, there was no criminal offense. SAMUEL 
MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS 33 n.55 (The Lawbook 
Exchange 2001) (1891). 
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excuse).335
The Talmud, a multi-layered and ever-expanding commentary on 
Jewish law, is itself a source of Jewish law.  Regarding the passages in 
Exodus, the Talmud explains: 
What is reason for the law of breaking in? Because it is certain that 
no man is inactive where his property is concerned; therefore this one 
[the thief] must have reasoned, “If I go there, he [the owner] will oppose 
me and prevent me; but if he does, I will kill him.” Hence the Torah 
decreed “If he come to slay thee, forestall by slaying him.”336
This last sentence is sometimes translated, “If someone comes to kill 
you, rise up and kill him first.”337
The final sentence is not an option; it is a positive command. A Jew 
has a duty to use deadly force to defend herself against murderous attack. 
The Talmud also imposes an affirmative duty for bystanders to kill if 
necessary to prevent a murder, the rape of a betrothed woman, or 
pederasty.338 The commentators agree that a person is required to hire a 
rescuer if necessary to save the victim from the “pursuer” (the rodef).339 
Likewise, “if one sees a wild beast ravaging [a fellow] or bandits coming 
to attack him . . . he is obligated to save [the fellow].”340
The duty to use force to defend an innocent is based on two 
passages. The first is Leviticus 19:16, “you shall not stand up against the 
life of your neighbor.”341 Or in a modern translation, “nor shall you stand 
idly by when your neighbor’s life is at stake.”342
The second passage comes from Deuteronomy and explains that if a 
man and a betrothed (engaged) woman have illicit sex in the city, it 
would be initially presumed that she consented because she could have 
cried out for help. But if the sexual act occurred in the country, she 
would be presumed to have been the victim of a forcible rape, “For he 
found her in the field, and the betrothed damsel cried, and there was none 
 335. See infra Part VI.F.4. 
 336. HEBREW-ENGLISH EDITION OF THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: SANHEDRIN, folio 72a. (I. 
Epstein ed., 1994). 
 337. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, folio 72a. 
 338. 2 TALMUD BAVLI; THE GEMARA: THE CLASSIC VILNA EDITION WITH AN ANNOTATED, 
INTERPRETIVE ELUCIDATION, AS AN AID TO TALMUD STUDY, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN folio 73a1 
(Michael Wiener & Asher Dicker elucidators, Mesorah Pubs., 2d ed. 2002) [Hereinafter VILNA 
TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN]. 
 339. Id. at folio 73a3. 
 340. Id. at folio 73a1 (brackets in original). 
 341. See also Prov. 24:11–12 (“Rescue those who are being taken away to death; hold back 
those who are stumbling to the slaughter. If you say, ‘Behold, we did not know this,’ does not he 
who weighs the heart perceive it?”) (English Standard Version). 
 342. Lev. 19:16 (New American Bible). 
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to save her.”343 The passage implies that bystanders must heed a 
woman’s cries and come to her rescue.344
 
C.  Roman Law 
 
The law of the Roman Republic and Empire was the dominant legal 
system in the Western world for many centuries. Indeed, in Europe, 
North Africa, and Asia west of Persia, the Roman legal system was the 
only enduring legal system, as the Roman Empire encompassed every 
civilized region. 
Even after the Western Roman Empire fell in the fifth century AD, 
Roman law remained a foundation of European law, as we shall detail 
infra.345 As a foundation of European law, Roman law became part of the 
laws of much of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, through the process of 
colonization. Roman law continued to be a major part of the European 
legal system during the Napoleonic era.346
Although post-colonial nations have developed their legal systems in 
diverse ways, it is still fair to say that Roman law comes closer than any 
other legal system to being the common heritage of all mankind. In 1901, 
an international law treatise stated that it was “easy for Grotius and his 
successors to deduce from the Roman law by far the greater part of the 
system of international law as it exists to-day. In its fundamental 
principles it has changed but little since Grotius’s day.”347
The foundation of Roman law was the Twelve Tables.348 The Twelve 
Tables were, literally, twelve bronze tablets containing some of the basic 
legal rules, published in the final form in 449 BC. They were placed in 
the Forum, so that every citizen could easily read them. They were 
created after extensive public debate and discussion, by a committee of 
ten (decemvirs) which relied in part on Greek law, and which made 
revisions based on public comment by citizens.349
 343. Deut. 22:23–27. The presumption was not conclusive and could be overcome by other 
evidence. 
 344. 2(a) THE MISHNEH, SEFER NEZEKIN 150–51 (Matis Roberts trans. & commentary, 1987) 
(ch. 8, § 7); see also VILNA TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, folio 73a. Nezekin or Neziqin is the 
portion of the law dealing with damages of all sorts. Sefer means “Book of.” 
 345. See infra Parts V.D–H. 
 346. E.g. MARTENS, supra note 297, at 89 n.† (William Cobbett trans., 1986) (reprint of 1795 
English translation) (1788) (“The [R]oman law ought to be considered as the subsidiary law in 
Germany, Switzerland, Holland, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Polon, and in some of the tribunals in 
Great Britain.”). 
 347. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 19. 
 348. Lex Duodecim Tabularum, or Duodecim Tabulae. 
 349. TITUS LIVIUS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME 192–248 (bk. 3, *8–59) (Aubrey de 
Sélincourt trans., Penguin Books 1971) (First published sometime during the reign of Augustus 
Caesar). 
  
43] THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE 109 
 
The very creation of the Twelve Tables was a monumental 
development in due process; the laws were published, readily accessible, 
and written to be readily understood by an ordinary citizen. Previously, 
the laws had been closely guarded by an élite which secretly manipulated 
and perverted the law to its own benefit. As one legal historian 
summarized: 
 
From an historical point of view, their importance cannot be 
overrated. The fixing of the brazen tablets, in a conspicuous 
position in the heart of the city, marks, at a critical period in 
the infancy of the commonwealth, the successful issue of one 
of the many struggles of the plebeian element for that equality 
of rights which was denied them by the patricians, and which 
it was vain to look for until a preliminary step had been 
obtained, viz., the withdrawal, from the hands of a dominant 
caste, of the exclusive knowledge of, and power of perverting 
to their own ends, those hitherto unwritten usages which had 
served the purposes of law.350
 
Unfortunately, the Twelve Tables themselves were later destroyed, 
so what we know of them comes from secondary sources. The self-
defense rules are in Table VIII: 
12. If a theft be committed at night, and the thief be killed, let his 
death be deemed lawful. 
13. If in the daytime (only if he defend himself with weapons).351
The Twelve Tables thus contained a counterpart of the Hebrew law 
from Exodus, based on the principle that the slaying of a night-time 
burglar was lawful, because the burglar was presumed to be a deadly 
threat.352 A daytime burglar could also be slain, if the facts indicated that 
he were a deadly threat. 
 350. T. Lambert Mears, Introduction to THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN: THE 
TWELVE TABLES, AND THE CXVIIITH AND CXXVIITH NOVELS, lvi (T. Lambert Mears trans., The 
Lawbook Exchange 2004) (1882). 
 351. Id. at Table 8, items 12–13 (parenthetical addition by translator); see also ALLAN 
CHESTER JOHNSON et al., ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES 11 (2003) (alternate translation, to the same 
effect). Another scholar puts this law in Table 8, law 3: “If one is slain while committing theft by 
night, he is rightly slain.” INTERNET ANCIENT HISTORY SOURCEBOOK, http://www.fordham.edu/ 
HALSALL/ancient/12tables.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). Still another scholar puts the law in 
Table 2, law 4. “Where anyone commits a theft by night, and having been caught in the act is killed, 
he is legally killed.” S. P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW INCLUDING THE TWELVE TABLES, THE 
INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, THE RULES OF ULPIAN, THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS, THE ENACTMENTS OF 
JUSTINIAN, AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF LEO (1932), available at http://www.constitution.org/ 
sps/sps01_1.htm. 
 352. See supra Part V.B. 
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For a thousand years, the Twelve Tables were venerated as the 
embodiment of Roman law. For example, they were held in the highest 
esteem by the great Roman lawyer and orator of the first century BC, 
Cicero.353 Cicero himself, in a text that was studied for many centuries 
afterwards by almost everyone who learned Latin (that is, almost every 
well-educated person), affirmed the right of self-defense: 
 
What is the meaning of our retinues, what of our swords? 
Surely it would never be permitted to us to have them if we 
might never use them. This, therefore, is a law, O judges, not 
written, but born with us—which we have not learned, or 
received by tradition, or read, but which we have taken and 
sucked in and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we 
were not taught, but to which we were made—which we were 
not trained in, but which is ingrained in us—namely, that if 
our life be in danger from plots, or from open violence, or 
from the weapons of robbers or enemies, every means of 
securing our safety is honorable. For laws are silent when 
arms are raised, and do not expect themselves to be waited for, 
when he who waits will have to suffer an undeserved penalty 
before he can exact a merited punishment. 
The law very wisely, and in a manner silently, gives a 
man a right to defend himself . . . the man who had used a 
weapon with the object of defending himself would be decided 
not to have had his weapon about him with the object of 
killing a man.354
 
The principle of self-defense led directly to the commendation of 
tyrannicide.355 Self-defense against lone criminals and against tyrants 
 353. “Though all the world exclaim against me, I will say what I think: that single little book 
of the Twelve Tables, if anyone look to the fountains and sources of laws, seems to me, assuredly, to 
surpass the libraries of all the philosophers, both in weight of authority, and in plenitude of utility.” 
CICERO, DE ORATORE (On the Orator), bk. 1, § 44, ¶ 195 (John Selby Watson trans., George Bell & 
Sons 1884) (55 BC). 
 354. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Speech in Defence of Titus Annius Milo, in 3 ORATIONS OF 
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 134, 158–59 (Charles Duke Yonger trans., Colonial Pr., ed., rev. 1899) 
(52 BC), available at http://www.uah.edu/student_life/organizations/SAL/texts/latin/classical/ 
cicero/promilone.html. Cicero never delivered the speech as written, because Milo’s enemy Pompey 
surrounded the courtroom with troops. However, the speech was preserved and studied by many 
generations of Latin students and scholars. 
 355. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS [ON DUTIES], bk. 3, ch. 4, ¶ 19, at 287 (Walter Miller trans., 
Harvard University Press 1975) (44 BC) (“[I]f anyone kills a tyrant . . . of all glorious deeds, they 
[the Roman People] hold such an one to be the most noble.”); see also id. at bk. 3, ch. 6, ¶ 32, at 298 
( “[T]those fierce and savage monsters in human form [tyrants] should be cut off from what may be 
called the common body of humanity.”). 
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were both applications of the natural “instinct of self-preservation.”356
Cicero’s political theory thus drew a parallel between personal self-
defense against criminals, and national self-defense against public 
enemies. From this principle he extrapolated some basic principles of 
Just War, such as only fighting for a just cause, and sparing enemies who 
surrendered (unless they had fought the war with unusual cruelty). 
Cicero traced the decline of Roman fortunes in the first century BC to the 
abandonment of the Roman Republic’s adherence to just war 
standards.357 His views were based, in part, in his desire to strengthen 
“the common bonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all the 
members of the human race.”358
Under Roman law, citizens had a right to carry personal arms. This 
right was sometimes denied to conquered people. For example, at the 
time of Jesus, Roman law forbade the Jews and other subject people to 
carry swords, under penalty of death.359 (Apparently, the apostles of 
Jesus violated this law by carrying a pair of swords.)360 In AD 212, 
Roman citizenship was extended to all free subjects of the Empire,361 and 
 356. Id. at bk. 1, ch. 4, ¶ 11, at 13. 
 357. CICERO, DE LEGIBUS [ON THE LAWS], bk. 1, chs. 11–12 (n.p., n.d.); CICERO, DE 
OFFICIIS, supra note 355, at bk. 1, chs. 11–12, 23; bk. 2., ch. 8; bk. 3, ch. 20; see also WHEATON, 
supra note 214, at 20–24. 
 358. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, supra note 355, at bk. 1, ch. 42, ¶ 149. 
 359. GOODENOUGH, supra note 257, at 151 (citing 1 L. MITTEIS & U. WILCKEN, GRUNDZÜGE 
UND CHRESTOMATHIE DER PAPYRUSKUNDE [FUNDAMENTALS AND COLLECTIONS OF PAPYRUS 
KNOWLEDGE], pt. 2, No. 19 (1912)). The weapons prohibition was enacted sometime between 35 
BC and AD 5. 
 360. At the Last Supper, Jesus gave his final instructions to the apostles, and revoked the 
previous order about not carrying useful items. He asked, “When I sent you out with no moneybag 
or knapsack or sandals, did you lack anything?” “Nothing,” the apostles replied. Jesus continued: 
 
But now, let the one who has a moneybag take it, and likewise a knapsack. 
And let the one who has no sword sell his cloak and buy one. For I tell you 
that this scripture must be fulfilled in me: And he was numbered with the 
transgressors. For what is written about me has its fulfillment. 
 
The apostles responded, “Look, Lord, here are two swords.” Jesus said to them, “It is enough.” Luke 
22:35–38 (English Standard Version). The Apostle Matthew was a tax collector (Matthew 10:3). 
Accordingly, he might have been allowed legally to carry a sword. It is possible that Matthew 
walked around carrying two swords, although it was unusual for one person to carry two swords. The 
swords might have been carried concealed in a bag or knapsack, although Luke 22 suggests that the 
Apostles did not carry bags or knapsacks before the last supper. The typical Roman sword of the 
Republic was the gladius Hispaniensis, whose blade was approximately thirty inches long. In the 
first century AD, the gladius was replaced by the Pompeii-type sword, whose blade was only sixteen 
inches. James Hurst, The Roman Sword In The Republican Period And After, 
http://www.unc.edu/courses/rometech/public/content/special/James_Hurst/THE_ROMAN_ 
SWORD_IN_THE_REP.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). The latter type of sword would have been 
relatively easy to carry concealed, especially under loose flowing garments. 
 361. Emperor Caracalla, Constitutio Antoniniana De Civitate, in PAUL ROBINSON COLEMAN-
NORTON, FRANK CARD BOURNE, ALLAN CHESTER JOHNSON, & CLYDE PHARR, ANCIENT ROMAN 
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consequently they all enjoyed the right to arms. 
The right to arms was abolished in 361, at least for persons who did 
not have advance approval from the government.362 However, the 
Empires’ inability to protect their subjects led to a restoration of the right 
in 440 in both the Western and the Eastern Empires. The restoration was 
re-confirmed several years later by the Western Emperor Majorian 
Augustus.363
 
D.  Justinian’s Corpus Juris 
 
The Western Roman Empire vanished in 476, when the last emperor, 
Romulus Augustulus, was deposed. The Eastern Roman Empire, also 
known as the Byzantine Empire, was much stronger. The Eastern Empire 
lasted until 1453, when Constantinople fell to a Turkish Moslem army. 
The Byzantines never called themselves “Byzantines.” Instead, they 
considered themselves “Romans”—a continuation of the state which had, 
according to tradition, been founded in 753 BC. 
Around AD 534, the Byzantine Emperor Justinian ordered the 
creation of a compilation of all Roman law, which became known as the 
Corpus Juris.364
STATUTES: A TRANSLATION WITH INTRODUCTION, COMMENTARY, GLOSSARY, AND INDEX 212, 
225–26 (2003). 
 362. CLYDE PHARR, THE THEODOSIAN CODE § XV.15.1, at 439 (2001) (Emperors Valentian 
(Valentinianus I) and Valens Augustuses to Bulphorus, Governor of Campia, Decree of Oct. 5, 364, 
“No person whatever, without Our knowledge and advice, shall be granted the right to employ any 
weapons whatsoever.”). 
 363. Emperors Valentinianus III (West) and Theodosius II (East) “to the Roman People:” 
 
[B]ecause it is not sufficiently certain, under summertime opportunities for 
navigation, to what shore the ships of the enemy can come, We admonish 
each and all by this edict that, with confidence in the Roman strength and the 
courage with which they ought to defend their own, with their own men 
against the enemy, . . .they shall use those arms which they can, but they shall 
preserve the public discipline and the moderation of free birth unimpaired. 
 
CLYDE PHARR, Restoration of the Right to Use Weapons (De Reddito Jure Armorum), in The Novels 
of the Sainted Valentinian Augugustus, in THE THEODOSIAN CODE AND NOVELS, tit. 9, 524 (June 24, 
440). “Novels” was a legal term of art for new laws. The “enemy” mentioned in the law was the 
Visigoths, whose military victories in North Africa had exposed the entire Western Roman Empire 
to amphibious invasion. 
The Emperor Majorian reigned in the West from 457 to 461. He was “the only man to hold that 
office in the 5th century who had some claim to greatness.” ENCYLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (2002 
DVD edition). There are records of twelve laws enacted during his reign. One of those is titled 
Restoration of the Right to Use Weapons (De Reddito Jure Armorum). No text of the law survives. It 
is not known if the Restoration was co-issued with Leo I, the Eastern Roman Emperor. Of the ten 
Majorian decrees with surviving texts, the first two were not co-issued with Leo, and the latter eight 
all were. 
 364. The modern legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris Secundum was apparently named, 
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The Roman law was considered, in many respects, to embody 
universal principles of law. Gaius, a second-century Roman legal scholar 
who was a major source of authority for the Corpus Juris, explained that: 
 
All peoples who are governed by laws and customs use law 
which is partly theirs alone and partly shared by all mankind. 
The law which each people makes for itself is special to itself. 
It is called ‘state law’ [jus civile], the law peculiar to that state. 
But the law which natural reason makes for all mankind is 
applied the same way everywhere. It is called ‘the law of all 
peoples’ [jus gentium] because it is common to every 
nation.365
 
The term jus gentium (“the law of all peoples”) implied that the same 
law applies to individuals and to states, in that states are made up of 
peoples. Francisco de Victoria was among international law pioneers 
who used the principle of the necessarily universal application of the jus 
gentium in order to restrain the conduct of governments.366
somewhat optimistically, with the intention that the encyclopedia become a modern equivalent of 
Justinian’s Corpus Juris. 
 365. THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN, supra note 350, at G. INST. 1.1. We have 
changed the translator’s use of two letters, so that “ius ciuile” reads as “jus civile” and “ius gentium” 
as “jus gentium;” in a translation of Latin, either choice of modern English letters is correct, and we 
chose to use letters which are easiest for a modern English reader—since English readers say 
“justice” instead of “iustice” and “civil” instead of “ciuil.” 
The legal scholar most-quoted in the Corpus Juris, Ulpian, explained—in the very first passage of 
the Digest—that jus gentium was the law “which all human peoples observe,” while jus naturale 
also included animals. DIG. 1.1.1 (Ulpian, Institutes). Domitius Ulpianus was a lawyer from Tyre (in 
modern Lebanon), active during the Severan dynasty (AD 193–235). TONY HONORÉ, ULPIAN: 
PIONEER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 2002). “Europe’s view of the law has been formed more by 
Ulpian than by any other lawyer. This is true as regards substance, style, method of reasoning, and 
background philosophy . . . [I]t was Ulpian who expounded Roman law as a universal system 
capable, as it turned out, of being adapted to the needs of the radically different societies that 
emerged from the breakdown of the empire.” Id. at 229. His legal philosophy was “cosmopolitan and 
egalitarian,” believing that the law and its interpretation and application “should take account of the 
natural freedom, equality, and dignity of all.” Id. at 85. He emphasized that all human beings have 
dignity, and that dignity is the core of the human personality. “To be beaten up or defamed infringes 
a person’s dignity.” Thus, he argued that a legal remedy should protect even slaves who were 
unjustly beaten or tortured. His principles “freedom, equality, and dignity” are the basis “of the 
contemporary civil rights movement. . . . Because they form the framework and underpinning of 
Ulpian’s writing, he is properly to be regarded as the first human rights lawyer.” Id. at 85–86. 
In this Article, most of our citations to the Corpus Juris are to the Digest, which was the most 
important part of the Corpus Juris. The Digest (Digesta) consisted of fifty books that compiled 
excerpts from cases decided by Roman judges, and opinions written by legal scholars. Some of the 
material in the Digest was so old that it came from the time before Julius Caesar destroyed the 
Roman Republic and turned it into a dictatorship. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE 
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 127–28 (1983). 
 366. SCOTT, supra note 96, at 140. 
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The Corpus Juris, by preserving for posterity the work of Rome’s 
legal scholars, thereby transmitted to the world the greatest surviving 
elements of Rome’s historic culture of liberty.367
The Emperor Justinian’s Corpus Juris formally replaced the Twelve 
Tables as the embodiment of Roman law, and the self-defense principles 
of the Twelve Tables were incorporated into the Corpus Juris: 
The Law of the Twelve Tables permits one to kill a thief caught in 
the night, provided one gives evidence of the fact by shouting aloud, but 
someone may only kill a person caught in such circumstances at any 
other time if he defends himself with a weapon, though only if he 
provides evidence by shouting.368
The universal jus gentium included 
 
the right to repel violent injuries. You see, it emerges from this 
law that whatever a person does for his bodily security he can 
be held to have done rightfully; and since nature has 
established among us a relationship of sorts, it follows that it 
is a grave wrong for one human being to encompass the life of 
another.369
 
Significantly, for Frey’s theory that self-defense is an excuse rather 
than a justification,370 the Corpus Juris says that self-defense is “done 
rightfully”—a phrase which cannot apply to an excuse. For example, if a 
person committed a crime because of duress or insanity, we might excuse 
 367. After the Roman Republic was replaced by the Empire: 
 
The civil law was the only walk of public life in which the genius of old Rome 
still survived. The heart of the Roman patriot there still recognized his 
country. In performing the duty of interpreting the laws to their clients and 
fellow citizens, the patricians invented a sort of judicial legislation, which was 
improved from age to age by the long line of jurisconsults, following each 
other, in regular and unbroken succession, from the foundation of the republic 
to the fall of the empire. The consequence was that civil law, which seems 
never to have grown up to be a science in any of the Grecian republics, 
became one very early at Rome, and was thence diffused over the civilized 
world. The mighty fame and fortune of the Roman people in this respect 
cannot be contemplated without emotion. Its martial glory has long since 
departed, but the “Eternal City” still continues to rule the greatest part of the 
civilized and Christian world, through the powerful influence of her civil 
laws. 
 
WHEATON, supra note 214, at 30–31 (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. 1, ch. 1, 
pt. 3). 
 368. DIG. 9.1.4 (Gaius, Provincial Edict 7). 
 369. DIG. 1.1.3 (Florentinus, Institutes 1). 
 370. See infra Part VI.F.4. 
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the person from criminal punishment, but we would not say that a person 
had acted “rightfully.” 
Far more detailed than the Twelve Tables, the Corpus Juris 
contained numerous provisions affirming the right of self-defense. The 
general principle was that the use of deadly force was permissible when 
no lesser force would suffice. 
If someone kills anyone else who is trying to go for him with a 
sword, he will not be deemed to have killed unlawfully; and if for fear of 
death someone kills a thief, there is no doubt he should not be liable 
under the lex Aquila. But if, although he could have arrested him, he 
preferred to kill him, the better opinion is that he should be deemed to 
have acted unlawfully.371
A person lawfully in possession has the right to use a moderate 
degree of force to repel any violence exerted for the purpose of depriving 
him of possession, if he holds it under a title which is not defective.372
But anyone who uses force to retain his possession is not, Labeo 
says, possessing it by [illegitimate] force.373
Someone who recovers by force in the same conflict a possession of 
which he has been forcibly deprived is to be understood as reverting to 
his original condition rather than possessing it by force. So if I eject you 
and you immediately eject me, and I then eject you, the interdict “where 
by force” will lie effectively in your favor.374
[I]t is not always lawful to kill an adulterer or thief, unless he 
defends himself with a weapon . . . .375
 371. DIG. 9.2.5 (Ulpian, Edict 18). 
 372. Code Just. 8.4.1 (Honorius & Theodosius , 422). The Code (Codex Justinianus) was part 
of the Corpus Juris, and collected the laws and decisions made by Roman Emperors before 
Justinian. For detailed analysis of Code provisions on self-defense and arms, see Will Tysse, The 
Roman Legal Treatment of Self Defense and the Private Possession of Weapons in the Codex 
Justinianus, 16 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 163 (2004). This section of the Code was cited by the 
French Huguenots in the sixteenth century as justification for armed resistance to France’s central 
government, which was attempting to wipe them out. Parrow, supra note 257, at 45–46, citing Peirre 
Fabre, Traitte Du Quel on peut apprendre en quel cas il est permis à l’homme Chrestien de porter 
les armes et par lequel est respondu à Peirre Charpentier, tendant à la fine d’empescher la paix, & 
nous laisser la guerre (trans. from Latin to French 1576), in French Political Pamphlets collection in 
Newberry Library (Lindsay and Neu, no. 877) (arguing that the undisputed right of self-defense in 
“the case of a Christian assaulted by brigands in the forest” could be applied to national self-defense 
against an invader or a domestic tyrant). 
 373. DIG. 43.16.1.28 (Ulpian, Edict 69) (bracketed text added by translator). 
 374. DIG. 43.16.17 (Julian, Digest 48). In other words, the original rightful owner who 
forcefully reclaimed his own property would not lose a lawsuit which was based on the claim that 
the owner’s possession of the land was based merely on force. But see J. INST. 4.2 (Peter Birks & 
Grand McLeod trans., 1987) (A person who uses force to recover property which he thinks belongs 
to him is not punished, even if the person is mistaken. However, the forcible recovery is not 
authorized by law. Roman law aims “to induce men to renounce every type of violent seizure”). The 
Institutes, also part of the Corpus Juris, was an introductory textbook summarizing the law. 
 375. DIG. 4.2.7 (Ulpian, Edict 11). 
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If anyone kills a thief by night, he shall do so unpunished if and only 
if he could not have spared the man[‘s life] without risk to his own.376
[I]f I kill your slave who is lying in ambush to rob me, I shall go 
free; for natural reason permits a person to defend himself against 
danger.377
Someone who kills a robber is not liable, at least if he could not 
otherwise escape danger.378
A person who acted in lawful self-defense was immune from civil 
damages for any harm caused.379 As we will discuss infra, immunity 
from civil damages is one of the key distinctions between justification 
and excuse.380
The famous formulations of the self-defense rule were “arms may be 
repelled by arms” and “it is permissible to repel force by force.”381 The 
latter formulation is embodied in the self-defense provision of the 
modern Italian criminal code (è lecito respingere la violenza con la 
violenza), which recognizes self-defense as a justification, not a mere 
excuse.382
The Corpus Juris authorized the possession of arms for lawful 
defense, while forbidding the accumulation of arms for seditious 
purposes. For example, “[p]ersons who bear weapons for the purpose of 
protecting their own safety are not regarded as carrying them for the 
purpose of homicide.”383
 376. DIG. 48.8.9 (Ulpian, Edict 37) (bracketed text added by translator). 
 377. DIG. 9.2.4 (Gaius, Provincial Edict 7). 
 378. J. INST. 4.3. 
 379. DIG. 9.2.45 (Paul, Sabinus 10). 
 380. See infra Part VI.F.4. 
 381. DIG. 43.16.1.27 (Ulpian, Edict 69) (“Cassius writes that it is permissible to repel force by 
force, and this right is conferred by nature. From this it appears, he says, that arms may be repelled 
by arms.”). For another formulation of the rule, showing its use in the Portuguese legal system, see 
Henerik Kocher, Dicionário De Expressões E Frases Latinas, available at 
http://www.hkocher.info/minha_pagina/dicionario/v04.htm (item 720). 
 382. CODICE PENALE [C.P] art. 52 (It.); see also Id. art. 53 (legitimate use of arms as a 
justification). 
 383. DIG. 48.6.11 (Paul, Views 5); see also THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN, supra 
note 350, at J. INST. 4.18 (“Next, the Cornelian Act on Assassins. This puts to the sword murderers 
and those who carry arms with murderous intent.”). Also: 
 
A man is liable under the lex Julia on vis publica on the grounds that he 
collects arms or weapons at his home or on his farm or at his country house 
beyond those customary for hunting or a journey by land or sea. 
But those arms are excepted which someone has by way of trade or 
which come to him by inheritance. 
Under the same heading come those who have entered into a conspiracy 
to raise a mob or a sedition or who keep either slaves or freemen under arms. 
1. A man is also liable under the same statute if, being of full age, he appears 
in public with a missile weapon. 
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In the world of the Eastern Roman Empire—what we today call the 
Byzantine Empire—the Corpus Juris reigned for many centuries as the 
greatest and most complete expression of the law. But in the world of the 
fallen Western Roman Empire, a Dark Age descended, and most of the 
intellectual inheritance of Greece and Rome was lost. Cicero was one of 
the very few classical authors whose works remained available to the 
small fraction of the western population that was literate.384
In “the Little Renaissance” that began in the twelfth century, one of 
the most important events was the western rediscovery of Aristotle and 
of the Corpus Juris. The University of Bologna was the first western 
academic institution to study the Corpus; almost as soon as the Corpus 
Juris was rediscovered, and for centuries afterward, the greatest 
scholarly activity of law professors was studying the Corpus Juris and 
writing commentaries on it; the commentaries were usually written 
Talmud-style, in the form of marginal annotations.385 The Corpus Juris 
led to the University of Bologna creating the first law school that the 
western world had known since the fall of Rome. 
The Corpus Juris served as a source—and often as a primary 
source—for local laws, and was regarded as the authoritative source of 
international law. Indeed, the jus gentium became synonymous with what 
we today call international law.386 During the Middle Ages and 
thereafter, the portions of the Corpus Juris dealing with the proper 
authority of the king were analyzed to show that the king was granted his 
authority by the people, and that a king who broke his agreement with 
the people—by exercising ungranted powers, or by using his powers 
tyrannically—was a traitor, and could be resisted with force, as could 
any traitor.387
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIG. 48.6.1–3 (Marcian, Institutes 14 & Scaevola). 
 384. Even after the rediscovery of most of the works of classical Greece and Rome, Cicero’s 
popularity remained undiminished. His book De Officiis [On Duties] was the first classical book 
produced on a printing press (in 1465). CICERO, supra note 355, at xv. 
 385. See, e.g., BERMAN supra note 365; CLIFFORD STEVENS WALTON, THE CIVIL LAW IN 
SPAIN AND SPANISH AMERICA 75 (2003) (In medieval times, “the history of Rome, and above all, 
the study of its laws and practices” was the favorite subject “of the wise men of Europe and its 
schools.”). 
 386. WHEATON, supra note 214, at 32–33. 
 387. Parrow, supra note 257, at 54. 
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E.  Later Byzantine and Rhodian Law 
 
The Roman Byzantine Empire survived for nearly a millennium after 
the publication of the Corpus Juris. New laws created by the Byzantines 
continued to guarantee the right of self-defense.388
The rulers of the island of Rhodes, in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, 
promulgated the first true international legal code. The Rhodian Law, the 
earliest maritime code,389 was put into its final form between AD 600 and 
800.390 The Rhodian Law extended far beyond the boundaries of the 
island of Rhodes, and was the widely accepted international law for the 
thriving maritime trade of the eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes, having 
once been ruled by the unified Roman Empire, and then by the 
Byzantines, incorporated many principles of Byzantine law into the 
Rhodian Law. 
Notably, the Rhodian Law also addressed personal self-defense: 
Sailors are fighting and A strikes B with a stone or log; B returns the 
blow; he did it from necessity. Even if A dies, if it is proved that he gave 
the first blow whether with a stone or log or axe, B, who struck and 
killed him, is to go harmless; for A suffered what he wished to inflict.391
 
F.  Islamic Law 
 
During the period when the Rhodian Law was being established as 
the first true international legal code, a new transnational legal system 
was being created: Islamic law. While Shari’a law is the only law in 
several countries, it is also broadly influential in many more, where its 
values play an important role in the legal codes, and it is cited in 
constitutions as a source of law.392
 388. WALTER ASHBURNER, THE RHODIAN SEA LAW lxxxvi (The Lawbook Exchange 2001). 
 389. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 9. Earlier versions had been incorporated into the Roman legal 
code by the time of the Emperors Tiberius and Hadrian. Id. 
 390. ASHBURNER, supra note 388, at lxxv. 
 391. ASHBURNER, supra note 388, at 84. 
 392. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN art. 2 (“Islam shall be the religion of 
the State; Islamic Sharia a main source of legislation.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF 
EGYPT art. 2 (“Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.”); QANUNI ASSASSI 
JUMHURI’I ISLA’MAI IRAN [Constitution] 1358 [1980], pmbl. (“judicial system on the basis of 
Islamic justice, manned by just judges, well acquainted with the exact rules of the Islamic code.”); 
CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN ch. 6 (creating a judicial system of civil 
courts  Shari’a courts, and religious courts for communities of non-Muslims, based on their 
particular religion); KUWAIT CONSTITUTION art. 2 (“Islamic Sharia shall be a main source of 
legislation.”); CONSTITUTION ch. 7, part I, § E, ¶¶ 260–64, part II, § B, ¶¶ 275–79 (Nigeria) (creating 
Shari’a courts of appeal in one federal territory and in several states); PERMANENT CONSTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF QATAR art. 1 (“Shari’a law shall be a main source of its legislations.”); SAUDI 
ARABIA CONSTITUTION art. 8 (“in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah.”); SYRIA CONSTITUTION art 
3 (“Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of legislation.”); YEMEN CONSTITUTION art. 3 (“Islamic 
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While there are several distinct schools of Islamic law, all Islamic 
law agrees that self-defense, including defense of property, is lawful. 
According to a modern scholar’s summary of Islamic criminal law: 
There is a natural right to self-defense. One may defend oneself from 
a criminal act that poses an imminent threat to person or property, but 
only necessary force may be used. An intruder who might be repelled 
with a stick may not be shot and killed; neither may one pursue an 
intruder who has retreated and is no longer a threat. Violation of the 
limits of self-defense is aggression and renders one criminally liable.393
The nineteenth century Islamic jurist ‘Ulaysh wrote that all jurists 
have always agreed that Muslims have the right to defend their life and 
their property. From this undisputed right, ‘Ulaysh argued that the self-
defense right includes resistance to a government which is destroying 
Muslim lives or property. The people who resist such a government are 
not rebels; rather, it is the wrongdoing government that is in rebellion.394
The right of resistance is affirmed in Universal Islamic Declaration 
on Human Rights.395 This document was proclaimed at UNESCO 
(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), 
adding a United Nations imprimatur to the right of resistance “by all 
available means” against the suppression of the “inalienable right to 
freedom.” 
 
 
jurisprudence is the main source of legislation.”). 
 393. MATTHEW LIPPMAN, SEAN MCCONVILLE & MORDECHAI YERUSHALMI, ISLAMIC 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 56 (1988). 
 394. KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION & VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW 334–35 (2001). 
‘Ulaysh was making a point which was also made in England in the seventeenth century, and in 
America in the twentieth: 
 
In the English Bill of Rights dated Feb. 13, 1688 . . . [a]nother complaint was 
that of “causing several good subjects, being protestants, to be disarmed and 
employed contrary to law.” If we are to erect this complaint against disarming 
part of the people into a general principle, it must be that in order to maintain 
freedom we must keep alive both the spirit and the means of resistance to 
government whenever “government is in rebellion against the people,” that 
being a phrase of the time. This of course included the right to advocate the 
timeliness and right of resistance. 
 
THEODORE SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS 105–06 (1916) (Schroeder was a founder of 
the Free Speech League, the first group in American history to defend the rights of all speakers on 
all subjects, based on the principles of the First Amendment). See also MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND 
PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM, 12–13, 69, 78 (2006) (explaining that Khawārij legal thought 
emphasized democracy, social contract theory, and the right of revolution against a tyrant, while 
other Islamic schools of thought argued for obedience even to tyrants). 
 395. Universal Islamic Declaration on Human Rights, 21 Dhul Qaidah 1401, art. 2 (Sept. 19 
1981), available at http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html (emphasis added). 
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G.  Canon Law 
 
Just as Islamic law became established as a law applied across 
national boundaries, so did the Canon law established by the Roman 
Catholic Church. Canon law was closely intertwined with Roman law. 
“The church lives by Roman law” (ecclesia vivit lege Romana) was the 
saying, for the law of the Roman Catholic Church entwined itself with 
Roman law in order to incorporate ancient Rome’s principles of justice, 
and in order to share in the esteem in which ancient Rome was 
universally held.396
In the medieval Christian world, Canon law became the foundation 
for international law. 
For centuries the great offices of state, especially those having to do 
with foreign relations, were held by bishops learned in canon law, and, as 
canon law was based upon Roman law and especially adapted to the 
government of the Church whose jurisdiction was not bounded by state 
lines, it naturally suggested many of the rules that have found a place in 
international law.397
“Unquestionably the most powerful influence that was exerted upon 
the science of international law during its formative period was that of 
the Roman Church.” 398 Canon law was “found to be applicable to the 
decision of a great variety of controversies, ranging in importance from 
the disputes of private individuals to the adjustment of difficulties of 
serious international concern.”399
As with Islamic law and Jewish law, we will not, in this Article, 
attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of Catholic Canon law. We 
will simply point to the foundational text of Canon law, the Decretum, 
written around 1140 by Gratian, a Professor of Theology at the 
University of Bologna.400 The Decretum began: “The human race is ruled 
by two things, namely natural law and usages.”401 Gratian explained 
 396. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 111 (1995); WHEATON, supra note 214, 
at 33. 
 397. New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “International Law,” http://www.newadvent.org/ 
cathen/09073a.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). 
 398. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 13. 
 399. Id. at 12. 
 400. New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Corpus Juris Canonici,” 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04391a.htm; New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Johannes 
Gratian,” http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06730a.htm. The University of Bologna was where, in 
the late eleventh century, the Western re-discovery of the Corpus Juris had created such an 
intellectual sensation. 
 401. GRATIAN: TEXT UND IMAGES DER EDITION FRIEDBERGS Pt. 1, D.1 p.1. (1879) 
(“uiolentiae per uim repulsion”), available at http://mdz.bib-bvb.de/digbib/gratian/text/ 
@Generic__BookView;cs=default;ts=default. 
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natural law: 
Natural law is common to all nations because it exists everywhere 
through natural instinct, not because of any enactment. 
For example: the union of men and women, the succession and 
rearing of children, the common possession of all things, the identical 
liberty of all, or the acquisition of things which are taken from the 
heavens, earth, or sea, as well as the return of a thing deposited or of 
money entrusted to one, and the repelling of violence by force. This, and 
everything similar, is never regarded as unjust but is held to be natural 
and equitable.402
Later in the Decretum, Gratian explained that war is lawful, but is 
allowed only for necessity. Even then, wars must not be fought with 
cruelty.403
An especially influential commentary on the Decretum was written 
by Joannes Teutonicus sometime in 1211–15, in a work which drew 
heavily on Roman law. He distinguished vengeance (injuring someone 
when there was no longer any danger) from legitimate defense of person 
and property against an immediate attack.404
Also foundational in Canon law were the Decretals of Pope Gregory 
IX, published in 1234, which continued the consolidating work of the 
Decretum, incorporated the commentary by Teutonicus, and affirmed the 
legitimacy of self-defense.405 The Canon lawyer Raymond of Pennaforte 
(or Peñafort) (ca. 1180–1275)—who wrote Pope Gregory IX’s 
Decretals—followed the Corpus Juris self-defense rule: “it is always 
lawful to meet force with force.”406
The Decretum (including later commentaries) was the definitive 
consolidation, harmonization, and analysis of all church laws since the 
time of the apostles. The Decretum was taught in law schools, and until 
1917 served as the first volume of the Corpus Juris Canonici, the law of 
the Roman Catholic Church. 
The principles articulated by the Decretum and the Decretals were 
developed in sophisticated detail by the Scholastics, including the 
 402. GRATIAN, supra note 401, at Pt. 1 D.1 p.2c.7. For the original Latin text, see 
http://mdz.bib-bvb.de/digbib/gratian/text/@Generic__BookView;cs=default;ts=default (“uiolentiae 
per uim repulsion”). 
 403. GRATIAN, supra note 401, at Pt. 2, D. 23; see also Nys, supra note 95, at 58. 
 404. Parrow, supra note 257, at 30 (citing FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES 131–32 (Walter Ullman ed., Cambridge University Press 1975)). 
 405. The Latin Library at Ad Fontes Academy, Decretals of Gregory IX (1234), V.12.18, 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/gregdecretals5.html (citing Dat. Viterbii Kal. Iul. Pont. nostr. Ao. 
XII. 1209). 
 406. RAYMOND OF PENNAFORTE, SUMMA, vol. 2, ch. 5, § 18, quoted in M. H. KEEN, THE 
LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 67 (Routledge & Kegan Press 1965). Raymond was so 
influential that, centuries later, his works were a primary text in universities. 
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“universal doctor,” Thomas Aquinas, in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. Aquinas and the other scholastics affirmed the right of self-
defense against lone criminals and against tyrants, and used the 
principles of legitimate personal defense to build a theory of just war and 
limits on the conduct of warfare.407 As discussed supra, the Spaniards of 
the School of Salamanca in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
including Victoria and Suárez, were known as the “Second Scholastics,” 
and their humanitarian scholarship achieved the apogee of 
Scholasticism.408
The Reformation removed Canon law as an authority in a large 
fraction of Europe. Roman law, however, remained prestigious and 
influential in Protestant nations and in Catholic ones.409
 
H.  Spanish Law 
 
Self-defense has always been well-established in Spanish law. As 
part of the Roman Republic, and, later, the Roman Empire, Spain was 
part of the Roman law system with its right of self-defense. 
The Visigothic kingdom succeeded the Roman Empire as ruler of 
Spain, and incorporated self-defense into its own legal code, following 
the Roman Twelve Tables.410 Self-defense was considered to be a 
“justifiable” form of homicide.411
 407. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 2d Pt. of the 2d. Pt., questions 42, 64 (Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed., 1947) (1265–1274), discussed in 
Kopel, The Catholic Second Amendment, supra note 100. 
 408. See supra Parts IV.A.3, IV.A.5. 
 409. For example, the Protestant authors discussed in Part IV, such as Gentili, Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Textor, all frequently cited Roman law. 
 410. THE VISIGOTHIC CODE: (FORUM JUDICUM) 230 (bk. 6, tit. 5, law 19) (S. P. Scott ed., 
Riverdale Press 1910), available at http://libro.uca.edu/vcode/visigoths.htm (if “the parricide was 
committed in self-defense[,] the party accused shall be in no danger of his life, and shall be 
discharged, without loss of property or subjection to torture; such discrimination being used as is 
proper in all cases of homicide.”); see also id. at 222 (bk. 6, tit. 5, law 12), id. at 243 (bk. 7, tit. 2, 
law 15) (“If a thief should be killed in the daytime, while defending himself with a sword, no 
responsibility shall attach to anyone on account of his death.”); id. at 243 (bk. 7, tit. 2, law 16) (“If a 
thief should be surprised at night, and should be killed while he is attempting to remove stolen 
property, his death shall under no circumstances be punished.”); id. at 270 (bk. 8, tit. 1, law 13) (“ 
Where anyone takes the property of another by force, and is wounded, or killed in the act,” there 
shall be “no legal responsibility for the same.”). 
 411. Homicide was justifiable, as has been seen, when committed in self-defense against an 
attacking party; in certain cases of trespass vi et armis. . . . Justification could also be 
pleaded where a criminal was killed while committing highway robbery, larceny, or 
burglary; the latter (furtum nocturnum) being a much more comprehensive term than 
ours, and including all kinds of nocturnal depredations. The employment of that popular 
American fiction, the “unwritten law,” by means of which so many homicides have been 
acquitted, and which appeals so strongly to the primitive sense of retributive justice 
which still dominates humanity, was thus openly endorsed by the Visigothic Code. 
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The greatest Western scholar during that time was the Spanish 
theologian Isidore of Seville (ca. AD 560–636). In Isidore, “Spain found 
the writer to express those principles which became the philosophy of 
her government” for many centuries to come.412 Gratian’s explanation of 
natural law and self-defense was directly quoted from Isidore’s 
encyclopedia, the Book of Sentences and Etymologies.413 Isidore is 
considered the last of the Western Fathers of the Church, and has been 
canonized (officially labeled as a Saint) by the Roman Catholic 
Church.414
Following the Moorish conquest of Spain, Shari’a law was imposed 
on much of Spain, and of course Shari’a includes the right of self-
defense.415 Pursuant to Shari’a, the Christian and Jewish communities 
continued to govern their internal affairs according to their own laws, 
including the relevant self-defense provisions. 
In the thirteenth century, King Alfonso X of Castile, the Learned, 
compiled an extensive legal code known as Las Siete Partidas (The 
Seven Divisions), which was strongly influenced by Roman law.416 Las 
Siete Partidas is considered one of the proto-sources of international law. 
As Spain’s empire grew, Las Siete Partidas grew into a major global 
source of law—in Spanish colonies in South America, Central America, 
Texas, California, Louisiana, and the Philippines. 
One of the best features of Las Siete Partidas was its prohibition on 
double jeopardy, a principle that was not entirely original, but which was 
expressed by Las Siete Partidas in terms which left little room for 
evasion.417
Las Siete Partidas protected the right of defensive homicide: 
[F]or it is but natural and proper that every man should have the 
power to protect himself from death when anyone seeks to kill him; and 
he should not wait for the other to strike him first, because it might 
happen that the attacked party would be killed by the first blow which he 
received, and afterwards could not defend himself.418
S.P. Scott, Note for Book VI, Title V in THE VISIGOTHIC CODE, supra note 410, at 224 n.1. 
 412. MARIE R. MADDEN, POLITICAL THEORY AND LAW IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN 19 (The 
Lawbook Exchange 2005). 
 413. GRATIAN, supra note 401, at 142. 
 414. TIERNEY, supra note 130, at 142. 
 415. See supra Part V.F; WALTON, supra note 385, at 60–61 (2003) (Islamic law in Spain was 
based on the Koran, without local innovation). 
 416. Id. at 75. 
 417. The only exception was when the defendant had originally “caused the accusation to be 
fraudulently brought,” and, in furtherance of the fraud, had concealed evidence. LAS SIETE 
PARTIDAS, 5 UNDERWORLDS: THE DEAD, THE CRIMINAL, AND THE MARGINALIZED 1309 (Div. 7, tit. 
1, law 12) (Robert I. Burns ed., Samuel Parsons Scott trans., Univ. of Penn. Press 2001). 
 418. Id at  1342 (Div. 7, tit. 8, law 2). 
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Defensive homicide was also allowed against rape, arson (including 
arson of agricultural property), any attempt to take property by force, or 
“any one who is well known to be a thief, or any robber who publicly 
frequents the highways.”419
Throughout the Middle Ages, Spanish law, legal commentators, and 
popular culture authorized resistance to a king who became a tyrant.420
One modern exemplar of the traditional Spanish law principles is the 
Argentine Penal Code, which broadly protects self-defense while 
specifically authorizing unlimited use of force against home invaders.421
 
I.  Anglo-American Law 
 
The English legal system at its height was the rule of law in a third of 
the world, and its international influence is today at least as extensive as 
any other contemporary legal system. 
The earliest laws of the Anglo-Saxons protected the right of self-
defense.422 The right of self-defense is affirmed by Bracton,423 Matthew 
 419. Id. at 1342–43 (Div. 7, tit. 8, law 3). 
 420. MADDEN, supra note 412, at 115–18, 167–69 (citing, inter alia, the Valencia constitution 
of June 1340). 
 421. CÓD. PEN. § 34: 
 
The following are not criminally liable: 
. . . 
6. Anyone acting in defense of his person or rights under the following 
circumstances: 
(a) unlawful aggression, 
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or avert 
aggression, 
(c) absence of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender 
Any person who at nighttime repels another who climbs or breaks fences, 
walls or entrances to his dwelling or an inhabited part thereof, or of the 
curtilage, regardless of the extent of harm caused to the aggressor, shall be 
deemed to be in compliance with these circumstances. The same provision is 
applicable to any person who acts against a resisting stranger found in the 
home. 
 
THE ARGENTINE PENAL CODE 2004, at 11–12 (2004) (English translation). 
 422. Laws of King Ine,, law 16 in ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 49 
(Benjamin Thorpe ed., The Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1840) (whoever slays a thief must swear an 
oath that the thief was slain while offending). Ine was the King of Wessex from 688 to 726, and is 
most-remembered for his legal code. Other similar laws: Laws of King  Withraed (reigned 690–725), 
laws 25–26, in ANCIENT LAWS 19 (no need to pay blood money for the slaying of thief caught in the 
act; reward of seven shillings for slaying a thief); Laws of King Alfred (King of Wessex, reigned 
871–901), laws 21, 25, in ANCIENT LAWS 21, 23 (no punishment for self-defense killing; no 
punishment for slaying a night-time burglar). 
 423. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET COVSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIÆ, bk. III, 155, 36, cited in SCOTT, 
supra note 351; Also FLETA, COMMENTARIUS JURIS ANGLICANÆ, bk. I, XXIII, 14. 
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Hale,424 Edward Coke,425 and by statute.426 The law in Scotland was 
similar.427 And so were the laws of Wales, which included laws 
prohibiting the disarming of a man.428 These laws supported the duty of 
citizens in England (and in France, under Norman law) to arrest 
criminals at the scene of the crime, and to pursue fleeing criminals, upon 
the “hue and cry” (or haro in French).429 It was also a crime to disarm a 
man.430
From at least 1330 onward, English law recognized an absolute 
justification for the killing of home invaders. Against a home invader, 
 424. MATTHEW HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (Historia Placitorum 
Corone) 487–88 (The Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1736). 
 425. 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ch. 8. 
 426. Stat. 24, Hen. VIII, ch. 5 (1532–33) (stating that defensive killings of robbers, murderers, 
and nocturnal burglars are not crimes). 
 427. SCOTT, supra note 351, n.1 available at http://www.constitution.org/sps/sps01_1.htm 
(citing JOHN BURNETT, A TREATISE ON VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 
57 (1811)). 
 
It is lawful to kill a Thief, who in the night offers to break our Houses, or steal 
our Goods, even though he defend not himself, because we know not but he 
designs against our Life; and Murder may be easily committed upon us in the 
night, but it is not lawful to kill a Thief who steals in the day time, except he 
resist us when we offer to take him, and present him to Justice. 
 
Id.; see also GEORGE MACKENZIE, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF SCOTLAND IN MATTERS CRIMINAL, 
110–16 (The Lawbook Exchange 2005) (1678); DAVID HUME, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES 217–29 (3d ed. 1729) (“The right to kill” includes defense of self 
and others against felony attacks, including rape, forcible robbery or invasion of property, night-time 
home burglary, daytime burglary when lesser force will not suffice, and arson). 
 428. THE ANCIENT LAWS OF CAMBRIA (William Probert trans., The Lawbook Exchange 2005) 
(1823). “The paraphernalia denotes clothes, arms, and the implements of the privileged arts; for 
without these a man is deprived of his just station in society; and it is not right for the law to unman 
a citizen, or to prevent him from practising the arts.” Id. at 23. “There are three native rights 
belonging to every free born Cambrian, whether male or female. . .Second, the privilege of carrying 
defensive arms and armorial bearings, which are not allowed to any one except a free born Cambrian 
of unquestionable nobility.” Id. at 33. “There are three persons who ought to be kept from arms: a 
captive, a child under fourteen years of age, and an idiot . . . .” Id. at 51. “There are three reasons for 
deposing arms, so that they may not be held naked in the hand: [at a religious meeting, in courts or 
other government meetings, and] the guest in his lodging.” Id. at 52. “But none are allowed to have 
arms except the free born Cambrian, or the bondman upon the third of his lineal descendants, so that 
they may guard against treachery and concealed murder.” Triad 222, at 79. 
 429. Parrow, supra note 257, at 17 (citing, inter alia, HIPPOLYTE PISSARD, LE CLAMER DE 
HARO DANS LE DROIT NORMAND 95–101 (1911); Laws of King Aethelstan (reigned 924–939), 
Judicia Civitatis Londoniae, §§ 4–5, in ANCIENT LAWS 98–99; Laws of King Cnut (a/k/a Canute the 
Great; Danish King who ruled England 1017–1035), law 29 in ANCIENT LAWS 168 (financial penalty 
for anyone who finds a thief but does not raise the hue and cry, or who fails to assist the hue and 
cry). The hue and cry was still in use in 1735. 1 HALE supra note 424, at 494 (ch. 41, § 6); 2 HALE 
supra note 424 at 98–104 (ch. 12) (detailing the procedures for the hue and cry). In addition, citizens 
had the authority to arrest felons in many circumstances, and the killing of a felon during arrest was, 
if unavoidable, considered “justifiable.” Id. at 72–82 (ch. 10). 
 430. Laws of King Cnut (1017–1035), law 61 in ANCIENT LAWS 175 (“If any one unlawfully 
disarms a man, let him compensate with his ‘heals-fang’ [a financial penalty].”). 
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English law had no requirement for proportionality, or for use of lesser 
force when possible. A home invasion was considered such a grave 
threat to society that the slaying of the invader was regarded as a very 
positive social good.431
Again, Frey’s assertion that self-defense is always an excuse, rather 
than justification,432 is simply incorrect. 
Following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689 specifically guaranteed the right of subjects to possess 
arms for personal defense.433
William Blackstone’s Commentaries is the most influential legal 
treatise ever written in English, with enormous authority in every nation 
which has adopted the common law. In detailing the common law’s 
protection of human rights, Blackstone first set forth the three primary 
rights: personal security, personal liberty, and private property.434 
Blackstone then turned to the auxiliary rights—such as the right to 
petition the government for redress of grievances—which protect the 
primary rights: 
 
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at 
present mention, is that of having arms for their defence 
suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed 
by law . . . and it is indeed a public allowance under due 
restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self 
preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found 
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.435
 
So according to Blackstone, humans have “the natural right of 
resistance and self preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws 
are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.” Blackstone 
also upheld self-defense against ordinary criminals.436
 431. David Caplan & Susan Wimmershoff-Caplan, Postmodernism and the Model Penal 
Code, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1080 (2005) (also noting that Glanville’s earlier restrictive statements 
about self-defense were clearly not followed after 1330 for cases involving the home). 
 432. See infra text at Part VI.F.4. 
 433. “That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to 
their Conditions and as allowed by Law.” English Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). 
Catholics, who constituted about two percent of the population, were excluded from the formal right, 
because they were considered potentially subversive, but in practice they were allowed to own and 
carry personal defensive arms. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS 
OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 118–26 (1994). 
 434. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *142. 
 435. Id. at *143. 
 436. Id. at 4 COMMENTARIES *1–3, *176, *183–85. 
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The historical English common law is incorporated as part of the 
legal system almost everywhere among England’s former colonies.437 In 
Fiji, the rights based on the English common law are specifically 
protected by the Constitution.438 Just as many English kings infringed, or 
sometimes completely ignored, the rights guaranteed in the Magna 
Carta,439 many of the rights guaranteed by the common law and by the 
English Bill of Rights have been ill-treated by modern governments in 
the common law system.440 The same could be said regarding how many 
nations have treated modern human rights treaties.441
Regarding human rights treaties, the common approach of human 
rights advocates is not to despairingly pronounce that the treaties are 
irrelevant because they are often honored only in the breach; rather, 
human rights activists strive for the meaningful implementation of the 
treaties. Similarly, for the human rights which are protected by the 
common law and by the English Bill of Rights (and those rights 
protected by Shari’a, or other modern legal systems), human rights 
advocates, when seeking to discover the state of international human 
rights, would recognize and respect the rights which are stated in 
principle, even while acknowledging that the rights are too often violated 
in practice. 
Currently, the most influential nation within the Anglo-American 
legal system, and internationally, is the United States. The United States 
Constitution includes the Second Amendment, which does not explicitly 
 437. For the post-Blackstone common law, which was fully in accord with Blackstone, see, 
e.g., FREDERICK POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 201 (New American ed., from 3d 
English ed. 1894); ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed., Foundation Press 1969) 
(summarizing the views of Bishop, Stephens, and other authorities); Caplan & Wimmershoff-
Caplan, supra note 431 (summarizing English and American views up to and including the twentieth 
century). 
 438. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE FIJI ISLANDS § 43 (“The specification in this 
Chapter of rights and freedoms is not to be construed as denying or limiting other rights and 
freedoms recognised or conferred by common law . . . .”). 
 439. The Magna Carta guarantees a right of armed resistance to a tyrannical king, with 
resistance to be led by the barons. See Magna Carta art. 61 (1215); DAVID I. CAPLAN & SUE 
WIMMERSHOFF-CAPLAN, 2 GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 371–72 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., ABC-CLIO 2002). 
 440. For example, the English Bill of Rights forbids fines without trial. Yet the Blair 
government has created a procedure by which a policeman can decide to impose an on-the-spot fine 
on an alleged offender. See Q&A: On-the Spot Fines, BBC NEWS, Aug. 12, 2002; Spot Fine Britain, 
BBC NEWS, Nov. 21, 2006 (“This week we look at a developing area of the law which empowers 
police, or your local council, to declare you guilty without going before a judge.”); see generally 
Joseph E. Olson & David B. Kopel, All the Way Down the Slippery Slope: Gun Prohibition in 
England and Some Lessons for Civil Liberties in America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 399, 438–47 (1999) 
(describing erosion of freedom of speech and of the press, tremendous shrinkage of the right to jury 
trial, and destruction of the right to grand jury indictment). 
 441. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE 
L.J. 1935, 1940 (2002) (“[N]oncompliance with treaty obligations appears to be common.”). 
  
128 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 22 
 
mention personal self-defense; but until the early twentieth century, the 
Amendment was (except by one judge in Arkansas) unanimously 
construed to include the right of individuals to possess arms for personal 
defense.442 The Amendment became more controversial in the twentieth 
century, but the overwhelming number of Supreme Court cases which 
have mentioned the Second Amendment, including all of the cases in 
recent decades, treat the Second Amendment as an individual right, 
although usually doing so in dicta.443
Thirty-seven American state constitutions include the explicit right 
of personal self-defense; sometimes the self-defense is stated in 
conjunction with an arms right and sometimes stated independently.444
 442. David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 
1359 (1998). Explaining the Second Amendment, St. George Tucker, the leading constitutional 
scholar of the Early Republic, began: “This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty. . . . 
The right of self-defence is the first law of nature . . . .” ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. at 300 (Lawbook 
Exch. 1996) (1803). 
 443. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding the 
Washington, D.C., handgun ban and ban on any use of a firearm for self-defense to be violations of 
the Second Amendment and summarizing the current status of the circuit split); David B. Kopel, The 
Supreme Court’s Thirty-five Other Second Amendment Cases, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99 
(1999) (reviewing Supreme Court cases). 
 444. See ALA. CONST. § 26 (“That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself 
and the state.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 26. (“The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in 
defense of himself or the state shall not be impaired . . . .”); ARK. CONST. art. 2, § (“All men . . . 
have certain inherent and inalienable rights; amongst which are those of enjoying and defending life 
and liberty . . . .”), id. art. 2, § 5 (“The citizens of this state shall have the right to keep and bear 
arms, for their common defense.”); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (“All 
persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the 
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . .”), id. art. 2, § 13 (“The right of no 
person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil 
power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question . . . .”); CONN. CONST. § 15 
(“Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.”); DEL. CONST. pmbl. 
(“Through Divine goodness, all people have by nature the rights . . . of enjoying and defending life 
and liberty . . . .”); FLA. CONST. art 1, § 2 (“All natural persons . . . have inalienable rights, among 
which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty . . . .”), id. art 1, § 8a (“The right of the 
people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall 
not be infringed . . . .”); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inalienable rights, 
among which are enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . .”); IND. CONST. 32. (“The people shall 
have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.”); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 1 
(“All men and women . . . have . . . inalienable rights . . . of enjoying and defending life . . . .”); 
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 4 (“The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and 
security . . . .”); KY. CONST. § 1 Bill of Rights (“All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have 
certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: The right of enjoying and 
defending their lives and liberties. . . . The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the 
State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying 
concealed weapons.”); ME. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have certain natural, inherent and 
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life . . . .”); MASS. CONST. art. 
1 (“All men . . . have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights . . . enjoying and defending 
their lives . . . .”); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (“Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the 
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J.  A Universal Human Right 
 
Modern international law is the product of millennia of legal 
development, and has grown from the soil of many great legal systems. It 
would be easy to identify many important differences among the legal 
defense of himself and the state.”); MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 12 (“The right of every citizen to keep and 
bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto 
legally summoned, shall not be called in question . . . .”); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (“That the right of 
every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully 
summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned . . . .”); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (“All 
persons . . . have certain inalienable rights . . . and the rights of . . . defending their lives . . . .”), id. 
art. 2, § 12 (“The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and 
property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in 
question . . . .”); NEB. CONST. art 1, (“All persons have certain inherent and inalienable rights; 
among these are life . . . and the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, 
home, and others . . . .”); NEV. CONST. art 1, § 1 (“All men have certain inalienable rights among 
which are those of . . . defending life . . . .”), id. art. 1, § 11 (“Every citizen has the right to keep and 
bear arms for security and defense . . . .”); N.H. CONST. Bill of Rights, art 2. (“All men have certain 
natural, essential, and inherent rights. . . . All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense 
of themselves, their families, their property and the state.”); N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All persons . . . 
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of . . . defending life . . . .”); 
N.M. CONST. art. 2 § 4 (“All persons . . . have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among 
which are the rights of . . . defending life . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1 “all persons are . . . with 
certain inalienable rights; that among these are life . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art 1, § 1 (“All 
individuals . . . have certain inalienable rights . . . defending life . . . to keep and bear arms for the 
defense of their person, family, property, and the state . . . .”); OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men are, 
by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of 
enjoying and defending life . . . .”); id. art. 1, § 4 (“The people have the right to bear arms for their 
defense and security . . . .”); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 26 (“The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms 
in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally 
summoned, shall never be prohibited . . . .”); PA. CONST. § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent and 
indefeasible rights . . . defending life . . . .”); id. art. 1, § 21 (“The right of the citizens to bear arms in 
defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”); S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (“All men . . . 
have certain inherent rights . . . defending life . . . .”); id. art. 6, § 24 (“The right of the citizens to 
bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied.”); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 23 
(“Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the 
State . . . .”); UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties . . . .”); id. art. 1, § 6 (“The individual right of the people to keep and 
bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other 
lawful purposes shall not be infringed . . . .”); VT. CONST. art. 1 (“That all persons . . . have certain 
natural, inherent, and unalienable rights, amongst which are . . . defending life . . . .”); id. art. 16 
(“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State . . . .”); 
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (“The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or 
the state, shall not be impaired . . . .”); W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 22 (“A person has the right to keep 
and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state . . . .”); WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (“The 
people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense . . . .”); WYO. CONST., art. 1, § 24 
(“The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied.”). 
Some states which do not have a self-defense clause but do have a right to arms clause have 
specifically interpreted the arms right to include self-defense. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; State v. 
Delgado, 298 Or. 395, 692 P.2d 610 (1984) (state constitutional right to arms includes arms which 
are useful for personal defense); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22; Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031 (R.I. 
2004); TENN. CONST. art I, § 26; Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. (50 Tenn.) 165 (1871) (right protects 
personal possession and use of arms “which will properly train and render him efficient in defense of 
his own liberties . . . .”). 
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systems of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic law, or among the laws of 
Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Spain, and the Anglo-American nations. 
Notably, the self-defense principles of every one of these great legal 
systems are remarkably similar; their distinctions consist, at most, of 
details, while there is universal agreement on the core issues. As the 
twentieth-century American legal scholar Herbert Wechsler observed, 
laws regarding self-defense reflect the “universal judgment that there is 
no social interest in preserving the lives of the aggressors at the cost of 
those of their victims.”445
If any principle of international human rights law can be discerned 
from the universal agreement of major legal systems, it is the right of 
self-defense. 
Frey’s narrow interpretation claims that there is no right to self-
defense because it is not specifically enumerated in enough 
contemporary treaties to satisfy her. Yet the survey of the jurists and the 
world’s legal systems shows that the right of self-defense has always 
been an essential part of international law, and has always been a 
principle of all major legal systems. 
Frey, while briefly acknowledging that self-defense has been widely 
recognized, argues that self-defense is not “expressly” declared to be a 
“right.”446 Frey is doubly wrong. First of all, the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice instructs its international law judges to be 
guided by “general principles.” There is no requirement in the Rome 
statute for Frey’s “Mother may I?” tenet that a general principle must be 
“expressly” stated as a “right.” Moreover, many of the major legal 
systems have expressly described self-defense as a “right.”447
 
VI.  CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
In Part VI, we first examine contemporary international treaties. 
Next, we examine current state practice, as demonstrated by statutes and 
constitutions. Finally, we address Frey’s inaccurate claim that self-
defense is always regarded as an excuse rather than a justification. 
 
 
 
 
 445. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. 
REV. 701, 736 (1937). 
 446. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 20–21. 
 447. See supra Part V.C–I (describing Roman law, Islamic law, Canon law, Anglo-American 
law as having expressly described self-defense as a right). 
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A.  Modern Human Rights Treaties 
 
Frey states that self-defense is only mentioned in a single 
international human rights treaty. First of all, most international human 
rights treaties deal with very particular subjects (e.g., torture,448 
discrimination,449 and cultural rights450) in which it would be unexpected 
to enumerate a general human right of self-defense. There are really only 
a few “general” international law human rights treaties, and of these, 
most do incorporate self-defense in one form or another. Only the 
American Convention on Human Rights says nothing directly about self-
defense.451
As the commentators discussed above made very clear, the right of 
collective self-defense against tyranny is simply the right of personal 
defense writ large. The right of collective self-defense against tyranny 
(such as colonial oppression) is part of the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights.452 It is likewise implicitly part of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.453 The European Convention on 
Human Rights states: 
 448. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 449. E.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 1995; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Cf. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, GA Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/45/49s (Dec. 18, 1990). 
 450. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) 
(Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (explaining rights to participate in cultural life, economic rights 
such as right to work and right to form trade unions, and social rights such as right to old-age 
pensions). 
 451. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313. 
 452. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 20, available at 
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199259113/resources/cases/ch02/1981_african_chpr.pdf. The 
Article states: 
 
1. All peoples . . . have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-
determination . . . . 
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from 
the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the 
international community. 
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States Parties to the 
present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it 
political, economic or cultural. 
 
Id. 
 453. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 312, art. 1(1) (“All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status.”). The same language appears in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, supra note 450, art. 1(1). 
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Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution 
of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for 
which this penalty is provided by law. 
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this article when it results from the use of 
force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape 
of a person lawfully detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a 
riot or insurrection.454
 
Frey asserts that deadly force may be used in self-defense only as a 
last resort against a deadly threat.455 However, the European Convention 
takes a contrary view, contemplating the use of deadly force for defense 
against “unlawful violence”—such as attempted rape, mayhem, or 
robbery.456
In the European Convention, self-defense is not stated as a “right,” 
notes Frey. This is a fair point. If we had no international resources other 
than the European Convention, Frey would be correct in stating that 
international law does not “expressly” include a “right” of self-defense. 
For the moment, let us leave aside the many sources of international 
law which do include an express right, and which Frey has failed to 
acknowledge. Even then, a right of self-defense is a necessary 
implication of all modern international human rights treaties. 
The European Convention does not explicitly state that there is a 
right to breathable air, to food, to sleep, or to clean drinking water. By 
Frey’s artificially narrow reading then, there would be no violation of the 
Convention if a European government forbade breathing, eating, 
drinking, or sleeping—or even if the government took affirmative steps 
to make it impossible for citizens to breathe, eat, drink, or sleep. 
Yet, obviously, a person cannot survive if he cannot breathe, eat, 
drink, or sleep. Accordingly, a government depriving people of the 
ability to breath, eat, drink, or sleep would be in violation of the right to 
life, which is explicitly guaranteed in the European Convention, and in 
the other broad modern treaties. 
 454. European Convention on Human Rights, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 2 [hereinafter European 
Convention]. 
 455. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 9, ¶ 21. 
 456. European Convention, supra note 454, art. 2. 
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Similarly, if a government forbade a person to defend her own life 
from a deadly attack, the government would violate the right to life. 
Forbidding self-defense against rape or robbery would also violate other 
rights which are included in the human rights treaties.457
Of course, if a government set up a program that provided everyone 
with sufficient food, then a government might, theoretically, forbid the 
private cultivation of food, and the prohibition would not necessarily 
violate the right to life. Similarly, a government that provided full-time, 
effective protection to every citizen might, theoretically, be able to 
abolish self-defense without violating the right to life. On the other hand, 
if the government forbade the private cultivation of food, and if the 
government supplied only enough food for some people to survive, and 
other people died of starvation, then the government would be culpable 
of violating the right to life. 
The analogy to self-defense is straightforward. If a government 
forbids self-defense, and simultaneously provides sufficient police 
protection to protect only some of the people some of the time, and some 
undefended people are killed by criminals, then the government is guilty 
of violating the right to life. 
Accordingly, even if one accepts Frey’s claim that self-defense is not 
a right in itself, self-defense is a necessary corollary to the right to life 
(and the right to property, and the right not to be maimed or raped), and 
government may abolish self-defense if, and only if, government 
provides citizens with complete security. To state the obvious, no 
government in the world is currently capable of providing the necessary 
replacement for the right of self-defense.458 No government has sufficient 
police forces to protect everyone all the time; the existence of violent 
criminal attacks, some of them deadly, even in wealthy nations which are 
relatively safe by global standards, proves that abrogation of the 
unenumerated right to self-defense would be a direct breach of the 
enumerated right to life. 
 457. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 312, art. 5(1) (“Every person has 
the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.”); id. art. 7(1) (“Every person 
has the right to personal liberty and security.”); id. art. 21(1) (“Everyone has the right to the use and 
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of 
society.”); European Convention, supra note 454, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); id. art. 5(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty 
and security of person.”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 311, art. 3 (“Everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”); id. art. 17(1) (“Everyone has the right to own 
property alone as well as in association with others.”); id. art. 17(2) (“No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his property.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 312, art. 
7 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”); id. art. 9(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.”). 
 458. In a few very tranquil nations, such as Japan and Taiwan, the government comes fairly 
close, mainly because there is so little (non-organized) violent crime in the first place. 
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B.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Another important contemporary international law source in which 
the right to self-defense is recognized is the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (hereinafter Universal Declaration), adopted by the 
United Nations in 1948.459 The Universal Declaration is not a binding 
legal treaty, but rather a statement of principles.460
The Universal Declaration’s Preamble clearly recognizes the right of 
people to defend themselves against tyranny, with force if necessary: 
“Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, 
as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human 
rights should be protected by the rule of law . . . .”461 The principle of a 
right of resistance is reinforced by Article 8 of the Universal Declaration: 
“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy.”462
The principle of the Preamble is congruent with Vattel’s statement 
that armed resistance to an absolute ruler “ought to be attempted only in 
cases of extremity, when the public miseries are raised to such a height 
that the people may say with Tacitus, miseram pacem vel beno mutatri, 
that it is better to expose themselves to a civil war than to endure 
them.”463
The Preamble likewise parallels Blackstone’s statement that the 
primary purpose of the right to arms was “the natural right of resistance 
and self preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found 
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.”464
 459. The Universal Declaration was most of all the work of Eleanor Roosevelt, America’s first 
Ambassador to the United Nations. Mrs. Roosevelt, incidentally, began carrying a handgun for 
protection in 1933, and continued to do so for the rest of her life, including when she traveled alone 
to dangerous parts of the American South, in order to speak out for civil rights. See Dave Kopel, 
Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, Her Own Bodyguard, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 24, 2002, available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel012402.shtml. 
To ensure continued U.N. attention to Human Rights, the United Nations Human Commission on 
Human Rights was created. Eleanor Roosevelt served as the first Chair of the Commission, from 
1946 to 1950. She used her chairmanship to lead the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly created the “Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” which, after being ratified by a sufficient number of 
nations, became international law in 1951. 
 460. Ambassador Roosevelt explained that the entire Declaration is “not a treaty” and “does 
not purport to be a statement of law or legal obligations.” 19 Dept. of State Bull. 751 (1948); see 
also Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004). 
 461. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 311, pmbl. 
 462. Id. art. 8. 
 463. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 19 (bk. 1, ch. 4, § 51). Vattel noted that when there were 
checks on the prince’s power, such as a senate or parliament, it was much easier to redress 
grievances without causing “violent shocks.” Id. The Tacitus quotation, which Vattel slightly 
misphrased, is miserman pacem vel bello mutari (exchanging agreeably an unhappy peace for war). 
TACITUS, ANNALS (bk. 3, § 44). 
 464. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 434, at *143. 
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Tellingly, Frey does not address the international law implications of 
the Universal Declaration’s recognition of a pre-existing right of people 
to use force as a last resort against tyranny.465
 
C.  The Resolution on the Definition of Aggression 
 
The Universal Declaration’s principle about the legitimacy of self-
defense against tyranny is reinforced by the UN General Assembly’s 
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression: 
 
Nothing in this definition . . . could in any way prejudice the 
right to self-determination, freedom and independence . . . 
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other 
forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to 
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support.466
 
The General Assembly resolution is especially concerned with 
“peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien 
domination.”467 Yet significantly, the resolution is not limited to 
situations of racism, colonialism, or foreign domination. To the contrary, 
the language of the resolution applies to all places in which a 
government violates the right of “self-determination” or “freedom” or 
“independence.” Almost any dictatorship that prohibits fair elections 
violates the people’s right to “self-determination.” Likewise, almost 
every dictatorship violates the right of “freedom.” 
 
D.  The United Nations Charter 
 
Article 51 of United Nations Charter affirms “the inherent right” of 
self-defense.468 Frey accurately states that Article 51 is directly 
concerned with the defense of states, and not of individuals.469 We agree. 
 465. Instead, she cites Kopel, Gallant, & Eisen, supra note 58, and in a parenthetical 
summarizes the article’s point about the Universal Declaration, but she never addresses the 
argument. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 9 n.14. 
 466. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 7 (Dec. 
14, 1974), reprinted in IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 704 (5th ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2003). General Assembly resolutions do not create binding international law. 
 467. Id. 
 468. U.N. Charter art 51. See also General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 
94 L.N.R.S. 57; H. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 
22 AM. J. INT’L L. 105, 109–13 (1928) (describing formal notes exchanged between the signatories, 
reserving the right to self-defense). 
 469. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 13, ¶ 39 (“Article 51 was not intended to apply to 
situations of self-defence for individual persons.”) 
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However, what Frey elides is that the right of national self-defense is 
the child of the right of personal self-defense—as we detailed supra.470 
Notably, the UN Charter does not purport to grant states a right of self-
defense. The charter simply recognizes an “inherent” right. In the French 
text of the UN charter, it is a “droit naturel”, which means natural right 
or natural law. As Yoram Dinstein observes, “The choice of words has 
overtones of jus naturale, which appears to be the fount of the right to 
self-defense.”471 (Jus naturale is Latin for “natural law”; as discussed 
above, jus naturale included a strong right of personal defense.)472
Given the UN Charter’s choice of language which explicitly invoked 
natural right, it was not surprising that the International Court of Justice 
wrote: “The Court therefore finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only 
meaningful on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right of self-
defense . . . .”473
Elucidating Article 51, Dinstein writes: 
 
The legal notion of self-defence has its roots in inter-personal 
relations, and is sanctified in domestic legal systems since 
time immemorial. From the dawn of international law, writers 
sought to apply this concept to inter-State relations, 
particularly in connection with the just war doctrine.474
 
If one explicitly recognizes the existence of the child, then one can 
scarcely deny the implication that a parent exists. “I admit that there was 
a person named Martin Luther King, Jr., but I deny the existence of 
Martin Luther King, Sr.” The previous sentence is illogical—and so is 
Frey’s claim that the explicit recognition of the natural, inherent right of 
national self-defense in Article 51 can be reconciled with the denial of 
the natural, inherent right of personal self-defense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 470. See supra Parts III.C–V. 
 471. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 179. Dinstein goes on to reject the overtone, because he 
rejects the whole concept of natural law, for reasons detailed supra note 308. 
 472. See supra Part IV. 
 473. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 474. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 176; see also M. A. Weightman, Self-Defense in International 
Law, 37 VIR. L. REV. 1095, 1099–1102 (1951). 
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E.  Contemporary Constitutions and Statutes 
 
1.  Personal self-defense 
 
The International Court of Justice is instructed to use as a source of 
law “the general principles” from the laws of “civilized nations.”475 
Without arguing about what nations currently count as “uncivilized,” we 
note that personal self-defense is part of the law of every legal system in 
the world today.476 In addition, many nations have constitutionalized 
self-defense, in a variety of forms. 
Before surveying the constitutions, we must acknowledge that 
around the world, many constitutional rights are honored only in the 
breach. For example, the constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees the right 
of free assembly477 but all forms of dissent are ruthlessly suppressed. In 
2007, opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was badly beaten by the 
government.478 In Kenya, the constitution is clear: “No person shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a 
court . . . .”479 However, in 2007 shoot-to-kill orders were issued to 
police who executed the orders with a series of extrajudicial killings.480 
Even so, the expression of a standard in a national constitution is a signal 
of the importance of that standard in the national and international 
community, such that even governments which do not obey the standard 
feel compelled to assert that they do.481
 475. Stat. of the I.C.J. supra note 64. 
 476. See Schlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced 
Consequences, 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 999 (2005) (“the right to self-defense is recognized in all 
jurisdictions”). 
 477. THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE ch. III, art. 21(1) (“[N]o person shall be hindered in 
his freedom of assembly and association . . . and in particular to form or belong to political 
parties . . . .”). 
 478. See Tsvangirai Held in Intensive Care, BBC News, Mar. 14, 2007 (concerning breach of 
Zimbabwe’s guarantees “Zimbabwean opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai is being treated in an 
intensive care unit as doctors examine wounds he received in police custody . . . . He and dozens of 
other activists were arrested at a rally on Sunday.”) 
 479. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA ch. 5, art. 71(1). 
 480. See Cyrus Ombati, Govt Burns 8,000 Guns As Minister Orders Police to Kill Thugs, THE 
EAST AFRICAN STANDARD (Nairobi), Mar. 16, 2007. (Internal Security minister John Michuki 
stated: “An illegal weapon in the hands of a criminal has no other purpose except to kill an innocent 
person. It is, therefore, justifiable for the law enforcers to take equal measure against such a 
person.”). 
 481. “Hypocrisy is a form of homage that vice pays to virtue.” FRANÇOIS DE LA 
ROCHEFOUCAULD, COLLECTED MAXIMS AND OTHER REFLECTIONS 63 (E.H. Blackmore, A.M. 
Blackmore & Francine Giguère, trans., Oxford Univ. Pr. 2007) (incorporating the 1678 5th edition 
of Rochefoucauld’s Réflexions ou Sentences et Maximes morales). “If a State acts in a way prima 
facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or 
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact 
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than weaken the rule.” 
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There are fifteen nations which use nearly-identical language to 
constitutionalize self-defense: Antigua & Barbuda,482 the Bahamas,483 
Barbados,484 Belize,485 Cyprus,486 Grenada,487 Guyana,488 Jamaica,489 
Malta,490 Nigeria,491 Samoa,492 St. Kitts & Nevis,493 Saint Lucia,494 Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines,495 and Zimbabwe.496 Another country, 
Slovakia,497 uses a variation of the formula. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 473, at 98. 
 482. THE CONSTITUTION OF ANTIGUA & BARBUDA art. 4. 
 483. THE BAHAMAS CONSTITUTION art. 16. 
 484. CONSTITUTION OF BARBADOS art. 12. 
 485. CONSTITUTION OF BELIZE art. 4. 
 486. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS art. 7. 
 487. THE GRENADA CONSTITUTION ORDER 1973 art 2. 
 488. THE CONSTITUTION OF GUYANA art. 138. 
 489. THE JAMAICA ORDER IN COUNCIL [Constitution] art. 14. 
 490. CONSTITUTION OF MALTA § 33. 
 491. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA art. 33. 
 492. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF SAMOA art. 5. 
 493. THE CONSTITUTION OF ST. KITTS & NEVIS art. 4. 
 494. CONSTITUTION OF ST. LUCIA art. 2. 
 495. THE ST. VINCENT CONSTITUTION ORDER 1979 art. 2. 
 496. THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE art. 12: 
 
(1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of 
the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been 
convicted. 
(2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in 
contravention of subsection (1) if he dies as the result of the use, to such 
extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is 
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case 
(a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained; 
(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny or of 
dispersing an unlawful gathering; or 
(d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence; or 
if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war. 
(3) It shall be sufficient justification for the purposes of subsection (2) in any 
case to which that subsection applies if it is shown that the force used did not 
exceed that which might lawfully have been used in the circumstances of that 
case under the law in force immediately before the appointed day. 
 
 497. CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 15: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to life. Human life is worthy of protection even 
before birth. 
(2) No one shall be deprived of life. 
(3) The death penalty shall be inadmissible. 
(4) No infringement of rights according to this Article shall occur if a person 
has been deprived of life in connection with an action not defined as unlawful 
under the law. 
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One more nation, the United Kingdom, has, in a more limited sense, 
put similar language into its supreme law. The U.K. has no written 
constitution, but the U.K.’s Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and makes it pre-eminent over 
any conflicting national statute.498 The Human Rights Act thereby 
incorporates the European Convention’s language on self-defense; the 
incorporation complements the English Bill of Rights provision that 
subjects have the right to possess arms “suitable for their defence.”499
The language in the seventeen constitutions (eighteen, if we count 
the U.K.) is similar to the language of the European Convention on 
Human Rights on self-defense.500 Although Frey asserts that use of lethal 
force for self-defense is permissible only against a deadly peril, the 
European Convention—and fourteen of the sixteen national 
constitutions—specifically legitimize deadly force used in defense 
against “violence” or in “defense of property.” These constitutions 
declare that when a person dies as a result of such self-defense, his right 
to life was not violated. 
In the next section, we will address Frey’s theory that the European 
Convention language requires that self-defense be considered an excuse 
rather than a justification. Her theory would necessarily apply to the 
nearly-identical language in all the national constitutions. The Zimbabwe 
constitution explicitly contradicts her theory. That constitution contains a 
“right to life” article very similar to that of the European Convention. 
The Zimbabwe constitution also specifically states (in a clause making 
the constitutional self-defense provision retroactively applicable) that 
self-defense is a “justification.” 
Regarding the European Convention, Frey made the plausible 
argument that the language (in which self-defense is enumerated as one 
of the exceptions to the right to life) could be construed as not granting a 
right of self-defense.501 On the other hand, the European Convention and 
national constitutions are also consistent with the interpretation that the 
constitution-writers carefully enumerated the exceptions on the right to 
life so as not to interfere with the pre-existing right of self-defense. 
It would not be surprising that some constitution-writers would 
decide that nothing more regarding self-defense was needed, because 
(until very recently), the right itself has hardly been questioned. In 
contrast, many governments have pervasively violated the right to 
freedom of expression, and so the need to make an especially firm 
 498. Human Rights Act 1998, 42 U.S.C. ch. 22 (1998). 
 499. See supra text accompanying note 433. 
 500. See supra text accompanying note 454. 
 501. See supra Part VI.A. 
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statement about the right of free expression in a constitution is 
understandable. 
While many tyrannical governments have adopted censorship rules 
which restricted the entire population, there are few, if any, historical 
examples of governments prohibiting self-defense for the entire 
population. There are many examples of particular groups in a society 
being restricted in self-defense (e.g., Blacks in Jim Crow America being 
deprived of defensive arms;502 Jews in medieval Europe being deprived 
of arms;503 disarmed commoners in feudal Japan being forbidden to 
defend themselves when attacked by an aristocrat;504 Jews and Christians 
in Muslim countries being forbidden to possess arms and to defend 
themselves from attacks by Muslims.505). But all of these deprivations of 
the right of self-defense were based on some form of class, racial, or 
religious discrimination. There were never broadly applicable bans on 
self-defense per se. Even in feudal Japan, a commoner who was attacked 
by another commoner could defend himself, as could a Muslim who was 
attacked by another Muslim in nineteenth-century Algeria. The right to 
 502. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an 
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEORGETOWN L.J. 309 (1990); Robert J. Cottrol and 
Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms 
Regulation and Racial Disparity-the Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence? 70 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995). 
 503. DAVID NIRENBERG, COMMUNITIES OF VIOLENCE: PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES 146, 221 (1996). Cf. VISIGOTHIC CODE, supra note 410, bk. 12, tit. 2, law 15 (“XV. 
All Christians are Forbidden to Defend or Protect a Jew, by Either Force or Favor. . . . No one shall 
attempt, under any pretext, to defend such persons in the continuance of their depravity, even should 
they be under his patronage. No one, for any reason, or in any manner, shall attempt by word or 
deed, to aid or protect such persons, either openly or secretly, in their opposition to the Holy Faith 
and the Christian religion.”). 
 504. GORDON WARNER & DONN F. DRAEGER, JAPANESE SWORDSMANSHIP: TECHNIQUE AND 
PRACTICE 68–69 (1982); DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: 
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 30 (1992) (describing 
how the peasantry was disarmed by the central government. The inferior status of the peasantry 
having been affirmed by civil disarmament, the Samurai enjoyed kiri-sute gomen, permission to kill 
and depart. Any disrespectful member of the lower class could be executed by a Samurai’s sword). 
 505. See A.S. TRITTON, THE CALIPHS AND THEIR NON-MUSLIM SUBJECTS: A CRITICAL STUDY 
OF THE COVENANT OF ‘UMAR 5–9 (F. Cass) (1970) (describing the standard formulation from the 
Covenant of ‘Umar, which traditionally was said to have been a seventh-century treaty between the 
Caliph Umar I and Syrian Christians. Although the true historical origins of the Covenant are 
unclear, the Covenant was universally accepted by Muslim legal scholars as setting forth the basic 
standards for Christian rule over conquered monotheists. The Covenant requires that the conquered 
people agree “not to ride on saddles; not to keep arms nor put them in our houses nor to wear 
swords . . . he who strikes a Muslim has forfeited his rights.”); see also BAT YE’OR, MIRIAM 
COCHAN & DAVID LITTMAN, Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide, 56 MIDDLE EAST 
J. 733 (2002); BAT YE’OR, THE DECLINE OF EASTERN CHRISTIANITY UNDER ISLAM: FROM JIHAD TO 
DHIMMITUDE (1996); BAT YE’OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM (1985); David 
B. Kopel, Dhimmitude and Disarmament, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. (forthcoming 2008). In 
practice, conquered Jews and Christians were often left unprotected by Muslim governments, and 
were forbidden to resist violence perpetrated by Muslim criminals or bullies. 
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self-defense, like the right to sleep, or the right to breast-feed infants, 
was itself never in doubt; accordingly, self-defense, like sleeping and 
breast-feeding, was not necessarily a right that needed protection by 
being constitutionally enumerated as a right. Even so, more than a dozen 
national constitutions, with lawyerly caution, did explicitly ensure that 
the right to life was not misconstrued so as to forbid self-defense.  
Two national constitutions include an explicit right to armed self-
defense which is coupled with an explicit arms right. These are Haiti 
(“[e]very citizen has the right to armed self defense, within the bounds of 
his domicile . . . .”),506 and Mexico (arms for legitimate defense in the 
home).507 The United States and Guatemala508 constitutions have a right 
to arms, although the right is not expressly tied to personal self-defense. 
(As noted supra, many American state constitutions do have an express 
right of self-defense, which is sometimes, but not always, tied to an arms 
right.)509 Two other countries constitutionally enumerate a right of self-
defense without specific reference to arms: Honduras (“the right of 
defense is inviolable”)510 and Peru.511
 506. CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI art. 268-1 (“Every citizen has the right to 
armed self defense, within the bounds of his domicile, but has no right to bear arms without express 
well-founded authorization from the Chief of Police.”). 
 507. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [Constitution], as 
amended, art. 10 Dario Oficiale de la Federación [D.O], 5 de Febero de 1917 (Mex.) (“Los 
habitantes de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos tienen derecho a poseer armas en su domicilio, para su 
seguridad y legítima defensa, con excepción de las prohibidas por la Ley Federal y de las reservadas 
para el uso exclusivo del Ejército, Armada, Fuerza Aérea y Guardia Nacional. La ley federal 
determinará los casos, condiciones, requisitos y lugares en que se podrá autorizar a los habitantes la 
portación de armas.”) (The inhabitants of the United States of Mexico have the right to possess arms 
in their domiciles, for security and legitimate defense, with the exception of the prohibitions by 
federal law and the reservations for exclusive use of the military, army, air force, and national guard. 
Federal law will determination the cases, conditions, requirements, and place under which the 
inhabitants will be authorized to carry arms.) 
 508. GUATEMALA CONSTITUTION art. 38 (“Tenencia y portación de armas. Se reconoce el 
derecho de tenencia de armas de uso personal, no prohibidas por la ley, en el lugar de habitación. No 
habrá obligación de entregarlas, salvo en los casos que fuera ordenado por el juez competente. Se 
reconoce el derecho de portación de armas, regulado por la ley.”) ( Possession and carrying of arms. 
The right of possession of arms for personal use is recognized, not prohibited by the law, in the 
home. There will be obligation no to surrender them, save in cases that are ordered by a competent 
judge. The right of carrying of arms is recognized, and regulated by the law.). 
 509. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
 510. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS DE 1982, art. 82. 
 511. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 2 (“Toda persona tiene derecho: . . . § 23. A la 
legítima defensa.”) (Every person has the right: . . . § 23 [t]o legitimate defense.). The Peruvian 
constitution also contemplates the possession, carrying, and use of non-military firearms by the 
public, in accordance with the law. Id. art. 175 (“Sólo las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional 
pueden poseer y usar armas de guerra. Todas las que existen, así como las que se fabriquen o se 
introduzcan en el país pasan a ser propiedad del Estado sin proceso ni indemnización. . . . La ley 
reglamenta la fabricación, el comercio, la posesión y el uso, por los particulares, de armas distintas 
de las de guerra.”) (Only the Armed Forces and the National Police can possess and use military 
arms. All those that exist, as well as those that are made or they are introduced in the country, 
  
142 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 22 
 
To these countries which directly mention personal self-defense in 
their constitutions we might also add the nations which constitutionally 
base their law, in whole or in part, on Islamic law; as discussed supra, 
Shari’a considers self-defense to be a right (albeit not when practiced by 
non-Muslims against Muslims).512 Accordingly, the constitutionalization 
of Shari’a serves, indirectly, to constitutionalize self-defense. 
 
2.  Self-defense against tyranny 
 
As Grotius, Pufendorf, and many other legal and moral philosophers 
have elaborated, self-defense against tyranny is just a larger application 
of self-defense against a lone criminal. Many nations have 
constitutionalized the right of self-defense against tyrants. In five 
countries, the constitutionalization is framed as a constitutional intention 
to assist the liberation of other nations from tyranny: Algeria,513 
Angola,514 Cuba,515 Portugal,516 and Suriname.517
In thirteen nations, the constitution affirms a right and duty of 
citizens to resist or revolt against domestic or foreign tyranny: 
Andorra,518 Argentina,519 Congo,520 Greece,521 Guatemala,522 
Honduras,523 Hungary,524 Lithuania,525 Mauritania,526 Peru,527 Portugal,528 
become property of the State with neither process nor indemnification. . . . The law regulates the 
manufacture, the commerce, the possession and the use, by the individuals, of arms different from 
the military ones.”). 
 512. See supra text accompanying notes 393–95. 
 513. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA art. 27 and 33. 
 514. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA art. 16. 
 515. CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA DE 1976 art. 12. 
 516. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA art. 7(3) (“Portugal recognizes the right 
of peoples to revolt against all forms of oppression, . . . .”). 
 517. CONSTITUTION OF SURINAME art. 7. 
 518. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA art. 5 (incorporating the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights). The Universal Declaration affirms the right of violent 
resistance to tyranny (see supra text accompanying notes 311), so the incorporation of the Universal 
Declaration into a national constitution thereby incorporates the rightfulness of resisting tyranny. 
 519. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARGENTINE NATION § 36 (“This Constitution shall rule even when 
its observance is interrupted by acts of force against the institutional order and the democratic 
system. These acts shall be irreparably null . . . Those who, . . . . were to assume the powers foreseen 
for the authorities of this Constitution . . . .  shall be punished . . . .  and shall be civil and criminally 
liable for their acts. . . .  All citizens shall have the right to oppose resistance to those committing the 
acts of force stated in this section . . . .”). 
 520. CONGO CONSTITUTION art. 17. 
 521. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN] [Constitution] art. 120(4) (Greece) (“Observance of the 
Constitution is entrusted to the patriotism of the Greeks who shall have the right and the duty to 
resist by all possible means against anyone who attempts the violent abolition of the Constitution.”). 
 522. GUATEMALA CONSTITUTION art. 45. 
 523. CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS DE 1982 art. 3 (“Nadie debe 
obediencia a un gobierno usurpador ni a quienes asuman funciones o empleos públicos por la fuerza 
de las armas o usando medios o procedimientos que quebranten o desconozcan lo que esta 
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Romania,529 and Slovakia.530
 
3.  Security against home invasion 
 
Finally, a very common item in constitutions that include a Bill of 
Rights is the right to security against home invasion. Sometimes—as in 
the United States’ Fourth Amendment—the right is stated in terms that 
apply only to home invasions by the government.531 Very frequently, 
however, the right is stated in terms that are not limited to government 
actors. 532 For example, Afghanistan’s constitution insists, “no one, 
Constitución y las leyes establecen. Los actos verificados por tales autoridades son nulos. el pueblo 
tiene derecho a recurrir a la insurrección en defensa del orden constitucional.”) (Nobody owes 
obedience to an usurping government nor to those who assume functions or public powers by the 
force of arms or by uses or procedures that violate or are unknown this Constitution and the 
established laws. The acts proclaimed by such authorities are null. The people have the right to resort 
to insurrection in defense of the constitutional order.”). 
 524. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 2(3) (Hung.) (“No activity 
of any person may be directed at the forcible acquisition or exercise of public power, nor at the 
exclusive possession of such power. Everyone has the right and obligation to resist such activities in 
such ways as permitted by law.”). 
 525. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA art. 3. 
 526. MAURITANIA CONSTITUTION pmbl. (incorporating the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, and thereforce incorporating by 
implication the right of resistance contained in those documents. See supra text accompanying notes 
452 and 461.) 
 527. CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DEL PERU art. 46  (similar to Honduras Constitution, supra note 
523). 
 528. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA art. 21 (“Everyone has the right to resist 
any order that infringes his rights, freedoms, or safeguards and to repel by force any form of 
aggression when recourse to public authority is impossible . . . .”). See also id., at art. 16(2) 
(Portuguese constitution shall be construed “in accordance with the Universal Declaration of human 
rights”; as discussed supra note 461, the Universal Declaration recognizes the right of violent self-
defense against tyranny. 
 529. CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA art. 20 (incorporating right of resistance articulated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights). See supra text accompanying notes 461. 
 530. CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 32 (“The citizens shall have the right to 
resist anyone who would abolish the democratic order of human rights and freedoms set in this 
Constitution,”). 
 531. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 532. THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN art. 38.1–2 (“Other than the situations and 
methods indicated in the law, no one, including the state, are allowed to enter or inspect a private 
residence without prior permission of the resident or holding a court order.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE 
PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA art. 14 (“No one shall enter a dwelling or any other premises against the 
will of the owner or without a warrant, except in case of flagrant delicto.”); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA art. 44 (“The State shall guarantee the inviolability of the 
home . . . .”); THE CONSTITUTION OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ch. 2(3)(c) (“protection for his family 
life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property . . . .”); THE (FIRST) 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA art. 21 (“It is prohibited to enter a person’s dwelling 
against his or her own will except under cases prescribed by law.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC art. 33.1–2 (“With the exception of cases specified by Law or Court no one 
shall be authorized to enter the Apartment against the will of the Resident.”); THE BAHAMAS 
CONSTITUTION ch. 3.15(c) (“protection for the privacy of his home and other property . . . .”); 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS art. 29 (“No person shall have the right, save in due 
course of law to enter the premises or other legal property of a citizen against one’s will.”); BELGIUM 
CONSTITUTION art. 15 (“The domicile is inviolable; no visit to the individual’s residence can take 
place except in the cases provided for by law and in the form prescribed by law.”); CONSTITUTION 
OF BELIZE art. II.9.1 (“Except with his own consent, a person shall not be subjected to the search of 
his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”); CONSTITUTION DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE DU BENIN art. 20 (“Le domicile est inviolable. Il ne peut y être effectué de visites 
domiciliaires ou de perquisitions que dans les formes et conditions prévues par la loi.”) (The 
domicile is inviolable. There may be no inspections or searches except according to the forms and 
conditions envisaged by the law.); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA art. 21 
(“Toda casa es un asilo inviolable; de noche no se podrá entrar en ella sin consentimiento del que la 
habita y de día sólo se franqueará la entrada a requisición escrita y motivada de autoridad 
competente, salvo el caso de delito ‘in fraganti’.”) (Every house is an inviolable asylum; at night, no 
one may enter without the consent of the inhabitants, and by day only by written authorization of a 
competant authority or in case of flagrante delicto.”); CONSTITUICÃO FEDERAL art. 5 (Braz.) (“La 
casa es asilo inviolable del individuo, no pudiendo penetrar nadie en ella sin el consentimiento del 
morador, salvo en caso de flagrante delito o desastre, o para prestar socorro, o, durante el dia, por 
determinacion judicial”) (The home is the  inviolable asylum of the individual; it is forbidden to 
enter except with the consent of those who live there, in case of a crime detetected in the act, a 
disaster, or to give aid, according to a judicial determination.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF BULGARIA 
art. 33.2 (“(2) Entering a residence or staying in it without the consent of its occupant or without the 
permission of the judicial authority may be allowed only for the purpose of preventing an imminent 
crime or a crime in progress, for the capture of a criminal, or in extreme necessity.”); CONSTITUTION 
DU BURKINA FASO art. 6 (“La demeure, le domicile, la vie privée et familiale, le secret de la 
correspondance de toute personne sont inviolables.”) (“[T]he residence, the domicle, the private and 
family life, the secrecy of the correspondence of every person are inviolable.”); CONSTITUTION DE 
BURUNDI art. 23 (“Nul ne peut faire l’objet d’immixtion arbitraire dans sa vie privée, sa famille, son 
domicile ou sa correspondance . . . . Il ne peut être ordonné de perquisitions ou de visites 
domiciliaires que dans les formes et les conditions prévues par la loi.”) (No one can be the subject of 
arbitrary interference his private life, his family, his residence or hiss correspondence. . . . There may 
not be orders for searches or home inspections except by the forms and the conditions envisaged by 
the law.); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA art. 40 (“The rights to privacy of 
residence . . . shall be guaranteed.”); XIAN FA art. 39 (1982) (P.R.C.) (“Unlawful search of, or 
intrusion into, a citizen’s home is prohibited.”); CONGO CONSTITUTION art. 29 (“Le domicile est 
inviolable. Il ne peut y être effectué de visite ou de perquisition que dans les formes et les conditions 
prévues par la loi.”) (The home is inviolable. There may not be inspections or searches except 
according to the forms and conditions envisaged by the law.); CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LA 
REPUBLICA DE CUBA DE 1976 art. 56 (“Nobody can enter the home of another against his will, 
except in those cases foreseen by law.”); CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA 
DE 2002 art. 8.3 (“La inviolabilidad de domicilio. Ninguna visita domiciliaria puede verificarse sino 
en los casos previstos por la ley y con las formalidades que ella prescribe.”) (Inviolability of the 
home. No domiciliary inspection can be legitimate but in the cases anticipated by the law and with 
the formalities that it prescribes.); CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 44 
(“Homes shall have their sanctity and they may not be entered or inspected except by a causal 
judicial warrant prescribed by the law.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL 
SALVADOR DE 1983 art. 20 (“La morada es inviolable y sólo podrá ingresarse a ella por 
consentimiento de la persona que la habita, por mandato judicial, por flagrante delito o peligro 
inminente de su perpetración, o por grave riesgo de las personas.”) (The dwelling is inviolable and it 
will only be able to be entered by consent of the person who inhabits it, by judicial mandate, in case 
of a flagrant crime or imminent danger of its perpetration, or of serious risk to the people.); ERITREA 
CONSTITUTION art. 18(2) (“No person shall be subjected to unlawful search, including his home or 
other property”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA art. 33 (“No one’s dwelling . . . shall 
be forcibly entered or searched, except in the cases and pursuant to procedure provided by law.”); 
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA art. 26.1 (“Everyone 
has . . . the right not to be subjected to searches of his home, person or property.”); GRUNDGESETZ 
FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Constitution] art. 13.1 (F.R.G.) (“The home is 
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inviolable.”); THE GRENADA CONSTITUTION ORDER 1973 ch. 1.7 (“Except with his own consent, no 
person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his 
premises.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA art. 23 (Guat.); THE CONSTITUTION OF GUYANA art. 40.1(c) 
(“protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without 
compensation.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS DE 1982, art. 99 (“El 
domicilio es inviolable. Ningún ingreso o registro podrá verificarse sin consentimiento de la persona 
que lo habita o resolución de autoridad competente.”) (The domicile is inviolable. No entrance or 
registry will be able to be authorized without consent of the person who inhabits it or resolution of 
competent authority.); XIANGGANG JI BEN FA [Constitution] art. 29 (H.K.) (“Arbitrary or unlawful 
search of, or intrusion into, a resident’s home or other premises shall be prohibited.”); 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN art. 22 (“The dignity, life, property, rights, 
residence, and occupation of the individual are inviolate, except in cases sanctioned by law.”); IRISH 
CONSTITUTION art. 40.5 (“The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly 
entered save in accordance with law.”); CONST. art. 14 (Italy) (“No one’s domicile may be inspected, 
searched, or seized save in cases and in the manner laid down by law”); THE JAMAICA ORDER IN 
COUNCIL 1962 [Constitution] art. 19.1 (“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subject to 
the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”); THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN art. 10 (“Dwelling houses shall be inviolable and shall not 
be entered except in the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law.”); KUWAIT 
CONSTITUTION art. 38 (“Places of residence shall be inviolable. They may not be entered without the 
permission of their occupants except in the circumstances and manner specified by law.”); 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA art. 96 (“Everyone has the right to inviolability of a 
private life, place of residence and correspondence.”); THE LEBANESE CONSTITUTION art. 14 (“The 
citizen’s place of residence is inviolable. No one may enter it except in the circumstances and 
manners prescribed by law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA art. 16 (“No person shall 
be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home or correspondence except by 
order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”); LIBYA CONSTITUTION art. 12 (“The home is inviolable 
and shall not be entered or searched except under the circumstances and conditions defined by the 
law.”); CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG art. 15 (“No domiciliary visit may be made except in cases 
and according to the procedure laid down by the law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA art. 26.1 (“The inviolability of the home is guaranteed.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR art. 13.1 (“Everyone shall be assured of protection of his person, his 
residence, and his correspondence.”); MONGOLIA CONSTITUTION art. 16.13 (“Privacy of citizens, 
their families, correspondence, and homes are protected by law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM 
OF NEPAL art. 22 (“Except as provided by law, the privacy of the person, house, property, document, 
correspondence or information of anyone is inviolable.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA 
REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA art. 26  (“Toda persona tiene derecho: 1. A su vida privada y la de su 
familia. 2. A la inviolabilidad de su domicilio, su correspondencia y sus comunicaciones de todo 
tipo.”) (Every person has the right: 1. To his private life and that of his family. 2. To the 
inviolabilidity of his domicile, his correspondence and his communications of all types.); 
CONSTITUTION art. 37 (Nig.) (“The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone 
conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.”); THE WHITE 
BOOK I. THE BASIC LAW OF THE SULTANATE OF OMAN [Constitution] art. 27 (“Dwellings are 
inviolable and it is not permitted to enter them without the permission . . . except in the 
circumstances specified by the Law”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA art. 
26  (“El domicilio o residencia son inviolables.”) (The domicile or residence are inviolable.); 
CONSTITUCION POLITICA art. 33 (Para.)  (“La intimidad personal y familiar, así como el respeto a la 
vida privada, son inviolables.”) (Personal and familiar privacy, as well as respect to private, are 
inviolable.); id. art. 34 (“Todo recinto privado es inviolable.”) (Every private enclsure is inviolable.); 
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 2.9  (“A la inviolabilidad del domicilio.”) (To the 
inviolability of the domicide.); CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA art. 34 (“The 
individual’s home and the privacy of his correspondence and other means of private communication 
are inviolable . . . .”); QATAR CONSTITUTION art. 37 (“The sanctity of human privacy shall be 
inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of 
residence . . . may not be allowed save as limited by the provisions of the law stipulated therein.”); 
CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA art. 27.1 (“No one shall enter or remain in the domicile or residence of 
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including the state, is allowed to enter or inspect a private residence 
without prior permission of the resident or holding a court order.”533 The 
Slovak constitution combines two principles often stated in other 
constitutions: “A person’s home is inviolable. It must not be entered 
without the resident’s consent.”534 Zimbabwe’s constitution tends to be 
careful about making exceptions to general rules, so the Zimbabwe text 
is “Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no 
person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the 
entry by others on his premises.”535
Thus, it would be accurate to say to a burglar in Afghanistan, 
Slovakia, or Zimbabwe, and in many other countries: “You are violating 
a person without his consent.”); KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSISKOI FEDERATSII [Konst. RF] [Constitution] 
art. 25 (Russ.) (“No one shall have the right to penetrate the home against the will of those residing 
in it unless in cases provided for by the federal law or upon the decision of the court.”); THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 22 (“A person’s home is inviolable.”); THE 
CONSTITUTION OF SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS art. 9.1 (St. Kitts & Nevis) (“Except with his 
own consent, a person shall not be subject to the search of his person or his property or the entry by 
others on his premises.”); CONSTITUTION OF SAINT LUCIA art. 7.1 (same as St. Kitts); THE SAINT 
VINCENT CONSTITUTION ORDER 1979 art. 7.1 (same as St. Kitts); CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC art. 21.1 (“Entrance without consent of the person residing therein is not permitted.”); 
SAUDI ARABIA CONSTITUTION art. 37 (“The home is sacrosanct and shall not be entered without the 
permission of the owner or be searched except in cases specified by statutes.”); CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA art. 16 (“All citizens are free from intrusion into their place of 
residence.”); SPAIN CONSTITUTION art. 18.2 (“The home is inviolable.”); CONSTITUTION OF 
SURINAME art. 17.1 (“Everyone has a right to respect of his privacy, his family life, his home”); 
BUNDESVERFASSUNG DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT [BV] [Constitution] art. 13.1 
(Switz.) (“Every person has the right to receive respect for their private and family life, home, and 
secrecy of the mails and telecommunications.”); SYRIA CONSTITUTION art. 31 (“Homes are 
inviolable.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND § 35 (“The entry into a dwelling place 
without consent of its possessor or the search thereof shall not be made except by virtue of the 
law.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO art. 4(c) (“the right of the 
individual to respect for his private and family life.”); TUNISIA CONSTITUTION art. 9 (“The 
inviolability of the home and the secrecy of correspondence are guaranteed, save in exceptional 
cases established by the law.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY art. 21.1 (“The 
domicile of an individual shall not be violated.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA art. 11 
(Uru.) (“El hogar es un sagrado inviolable. De noche nadie podrá entrar en él sin consentimiento de 
su jefe, y de día, sólo de orden expresa de Juez competente, por escrito y en los casos determinados 
por la ley.”) (The home is an inviolable asylum. At night nobody may enter without consent of the 
head of the house, and by day, only by express order of a competent judge, in writing and according 
to cases determined by the law.); CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA 
art. 47 (“El hogar doméstico y todo recinto privado de persona son inviolables.”) (The domestic 
home and all private personal enclosures are inviolable.); CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST 
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM art. 73.1–2 (“No one is allowed to enter the another person’s home without 
the latter’s consent, unless otherwise [authorized] by the law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
ZAMBIA art. 17.1 (“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his 
person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE 
art. 17.1 (“Except with his own consent . . . no person shall be subjected to the search of his person 
or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”).
 533. THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN art. 38.1–2. 
 534. CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 21.1.
 535. CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE art. 17.1.
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my constitutional rights.” While preventing government intrusions is a 
prime objective of the home security provisions, the language articulates 
a broader and more fundamental principle of the right to be secure 
against any home invader. 
It is plausible to infer that the explicit right against home invasion 
includes the implicit, derivative right to take steps to prevent or halt a 
home invasion—such as the right to put locks on one’s door or windows. 
In the common law, there is a strong connection between the right of 
home security and the right to defend the home. As discussed supra, the 
English common law specially protected, as a justification, the use of 
deadly force against home invaders.536 The saying that “a man’s home is 
his castle”—a well-established element of popular understanding of 
practical rights—comes from a famous English case, and affirms the 
right of even the poorest peasant to bar his home to anyone, including, 
but not limited, to the king.537 It is not a coincidence that American laws 
that protect self-defense rights often style themselves as “Castle 
Doctrine” laws. 
David Caplan has shown how the common law connection between 
self-defense and home defense influenced the American constitution, so 
that the Second, Third, and Fourth amendments are placed next to each 
other partly because they comprise a cluster of home security 
protections.538 The Third Amendment ensures that a family cannot be 
forced to allow an armed ruffian into the home.539 The Fourth 
Amendment guards the home against irregular intrusions, or intrusions 
not supported by probable cause. The Second Amendment ensures that 
citizens will have the practical means to stop (and deter) home invasions. 
On a global level, we need not resolve the issue of firearms in the 
home in order to conclude that the worldwide principle of the sanctity of 
the home against violent intrusions reinforces, and is an especially 
privileged place for the exercise of, the right of self-defense. 
 
 536. See supra text accompanying notes 431, 433–35. 
 537. Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1603) (That the house of 
everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defense against injury and violence as for 
his repose.); T. 14 Hen. VII (1499) reported in 21 Henry VII 39 pl. 50 (K.B. 1506) (But a man’s 
house is his castle and his defense, and where he has an absolute right to stay.) (Original text in Law 
French; translations by Kopel). 
 538. Caplan & Caplan, supra note 431 at 1075; David I. Caplan, The Right to Have Arms and 
Use Deadly Force Under the Second and Third Amendments, 2 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y. 165 
(1989). 
 539. At the time of the Third Amendment, the enlisted soldiers in standing armies such as 
those of Great Britain and France tended to be drawn from the dregs of society. Forced enlistment in 
the army was often the soldier’s only alternative to avoid a prison sentence or execution for a serious 
crime. 
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F. Frey’s Theory that Self-defense Violates the Aggressor’s Rights 
 
The statute of the International Court of Justice states that the 
opinions of leading legal scholars are a source of international law. Frey 
does not even address the opinions of the leading scholars, because she 
claims that they are not “primary” sources. Yet she inconsistently cites 
other scholars when it suits her purpose.540 The Rome statute tells judges 
to look to the general principles of law of civilized nations; when we 
look at the laws of the nations of the world—from the ancient democracy 
of Athens, to the young democracies of Eastern Europe, to the Spanish- 
and Roman-influenced laws of the New World, to the Islamic law of the 
Old World—we find that self-defense is a universal right. Indeed, it 
would be difficult to find any legal rule that is more universal than self-
defense. 
Frey acknowledges the universality in passing,541 but attempts to 
make it disappear with a rhetorical sleight of hand: 
 
Self-defence is a widely recognized, yet legally proscribed, 
exception to the universal duty to respect the right to life of 
others. Self-defence is a basis for exemption from criminal 
responsibility that can be raised by any State agent or non-
State actor. Self-defence is sometimes designated as a “right”. 
There is inadequate legal support for such an interpretation.542
 
Frey’s paragraph contains a host of errors. She claims “there is 
inadequate legal support” to call self-defense a “right.”543 As we have 
detailed supra, self-defense is explicitly described as a “right” by the 
Corpus Juris, Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Vattel, Burlamaqui, 
Martens, and Bowyer, and by numerous legal systems, past and present, 
all over the world. 
Frey proposes an alternative theory. In support of her theory, she 
cites two treaties. It does not seem that Frey is consistent in her standards 
about how much legal authority is needed to be “adequate.” 
As is turns out, the first treaty actually says directly the opposite of 
 540. For Frey’s interpretation of “primary sources,” see text accompanying notes 316–18. 
 541. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 9, ¶ 22 (“Self-defence is broadly recognized in customary 
international law as a defence to criminal responsibility as shown by State practice. There is not 
evidence however that States have enacted self-defence as a freestanding right under their domestic 
laws, nor is there evidence of opinio juris that would compel States to recognize an independent, 
supervening right to self-defence that they must enforce in the context of their domestic jurisdictions 
as a supervening right.”). 
 542. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 20. 
 543. Id. 
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what Frey claims. For the second treaty, Frey erroneously quotes the 
section on duress, rather than the section on self-defense. 
 
1.  The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Frey asserts that “[s]elf-defence is more properly characterized as a 
means of protecting the right to life and, as such, a basis for avoiding 
responsibility for violating the rights of another.”544
This argument fails as soon as one reads the source on which Frey 
bases her theory: the European Convention on Human Rights. According 
to Frey, when the victim of attempted murder kills the perpetrator in 
lawful self-defense, the victim must seek “a basis for avoiding 
responsibility for violating the rights of another.” In other words, the 
victim “violat[ed] the rights of another,” namely the criminal who was 
trying to murder the victim. 
But the European Convention makes it clear that there was no 
“violation” of the criminal’s rights; because the criminal was attempting 
to commit a murder, the would-be murderer had no “right to life” against 
the intended victim: “Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as 
inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of 
force . . . .” such as self-defense.545 Similarly, the national constitutions 
which contain analogues to the European Convention’s right to life and 
self-defense articles also explicitly state that the criminal who is killed by 
a victim acting in lawful self-defense was not deprived of the right to 
life: “A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life 
in contravention of this section if he dies as the result of [lawful self-
defense] of person or property.”546
Simply put, Frey’s main source for her theory that self-defense is not 
a right states directly the opposite of what she says. 
Further, although Frey repeatedly claims that deadly force is lawful 
only when used to prevent a homicide, the European Convention 
authorizes deadly force when necessary against “unlawful violence.”547
 
2.  The Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
Frey also cites a trial court from a former Yugoslavian tribunal in 
which a defendant raised a self-defense claim. The trial court stated that 
self-defense “form[s] part of the general principles of criminal law which 
 544. Id. 
 545. European Convention, supra note 454, art. 2 (emphasis added). 
 546. See supra text accompanying note 500. 
 547. See European Convention, supra note 454, art. 2. 
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the International Tribunal must take into account in deciding the cases 
before it.”548 The court then said that self-defense was protected by the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.549
Frey writes: 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia noted “that the ‘principle of self-defence’ 
enshrined in article 31, paragraph 1, of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court ‘reflects provisions found in most 
national criminal codes and may be regarded as constituting a 
rule of customary international law’”. As the chapeau of 
article 31 makes clear, self-defence is identified as one of the 
“grounds for excluding criminal responsibility.” The legal 
defence defined in article 31, paragraph (d) is for: 
conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting 
from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent 
serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and 
the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, 
provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater 
harm than the one sought to be avoided. 
Thus, international criminal law designates self-defence 
as a rule to be followed to determine criminal liability, and not 
as an independent right which States are required to enforce.550
 
This is a difficult argument to take seriously. The statutory language 
quoted by Frey is not about self-defense; it is about duress, as the 
statutory text plainly states. The self-defense part of the statute, unquoted 
by Frey, appears in the preceding subsection.551
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (“I.C.C. Statute”) 
makes self-defense an exemption from criminal responsibility. From this 
fact, Frey deduces that self-defense is not “an independent right which 
States are required to enforce.”552
To state the obvious, the I.C.C. Statute does not name any 
 548. Kordić & Ćerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, § 449 (Feb. 26, 2001). 
 549. Id. § 450. 
 550. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 23 (endnote markers omitted). “Chapeau” here means the 
first sentence of Article 31, which applies to all the various subsections of Article 31. 
 551. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, 
A/CONF.183/9* art. 31(c) (self-defense) & (d) (duress) (July 17, 1998), available at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf [hereinafter I.C.C. Statute]. 
 552. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 23. 
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“independent right which States are required to enforce.” The I.C.C. 
Statute does not purport to be a bill of rights. It is a statute that sets up a 
criminal court for certain heinous offenses and provides rules of 
procedure for the operation of that court. The only rights mentioned in 
the I.C.C. Statute are various procedural rights of suspects and 
defendants in the court itself.553
The mere fact that the Rome Statute (and national criminal codes) 
specifies self-defense as an exception to the rule against killing (and 
against injuring or hitting) is no contradiction of the numerous 
international law sources, which characterize self-defense as a right. 
After all, every legally justified form of violence (e.g., a state employee 
carrying out a capital sentence) is necessarily an exception to the general 
rule against killing or assault. 
Consider, for example, Barbeyrac, who believed self-defense to be 
an absolutely fundamental human right. Barbeyrac also wrote: 
 
Then we must injure no Man, because every one is our Fellow 
citizen of the great City of the World. Do the Hands endeavor 
to hurt the Feet, or Eyes the Hands? As therefore the Members 
of the Body keep a fair Correspondence with one another for 
the Preservation of the whole: So Men ought to deal friendly 
one with another, because they are born for Society, which 
can’t be preserved, unless all the Parts, of which it is 
compounded, love one another, and endeavor mutually their 
own Preservation.554
 
Barbeyrac was articulating a general rule against any person harming 
any other person. Barbeyrac also vigorously articulated the right of self-
defense. By Frey’s tendentious reasoning, Barbeyrac did not really 
 553. I.C.C. Statute, supra note 551, at 3–4 (creating the structure of the court, specifying its 
rules and procedures, and asserting jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and “[t]he crime of aggression”—the last item pending UN definition of the crime). To be precise, 
there are a few stray references in the statute to other rights: depriving people of their rights to a fair 
trial is denominated as a war crime under certain circumstances; the anti-slavery clause refers to the 
property right of the slave-owner; and there are various references to rights of governments. 
 554. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 213 n.2 (Barbeyrac note). Pufendorf’s own text made the 
same point. A footnote by Pufendorf then quoted the Roman philosopher and statesman Seneca: 
 
It is a sin to injure one’s Country; and therefore to injure a Fellow Subject, 
inasmuch as he is a Member of our Country. The Parts ought to be held 
sacred, if the whole deserve our Veneration. And likewise the Person of every 
Man ought to be inviolable, because every Man is our Fellow Citizen in the 
great and universal Society. 
 
 Id. at 214 n.a (quoting LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA, DE IRE (Of Anger) bk. 2, ch. 31 (41 AD)). 
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believe that self-defense was a right, because Barbeyrac considered self-
defense an exception to the general rule against harming people. 
Anywhere there is a government that respects the right of self-
defense, the criminal code regarding illegal use of violence will contain 
an exemption for people who act in self-defense. Simply because self-
defense functions as an exemption in many criminal codes, Frey asserts 
that there is no right to self-defense. That the right is protected, inter alia, 
by the structure of a criminal code is hardly proof that the right itself 
does not exist. 
The exemption does not in itself prove the existence of the right; the 
right is proven by affirmative statements of right in constitutions and 
codes, treaties, and treatises. It is quite unpersuasive for Frey to dismiss 
all these sources as “inadequate.” More than three thousand years of 
legal protection for a human right are much more “adequate” than a pair 
of plainly erroneous citations to a treaty and a statute. 
 
3.  National self-defense in the United Nations Charter 
 
Another way to see the flaw in Frey’s argument is to look at the 
United Nations Charter. The Charter imposes a general prohibition on 
the interstate use of force.555 Then the Charter makes an exception, in 
Article 51, for “the inherent right of self-defense.” In the UN Charter, the 
right of self-defense operates solely as an exemption from the broad rule 
against force; the Charter does not, in Frey’s formulation, create a “free-
standing” right of national self-defense. Frey argues that personal self-
defense constitutes, at most, one of the “circumstances” which must be 
taken into account in a criminal prosecution.556 Likewise, some persons 
argue that in Article 51, self-defense “connotes only a de facto condition, 
rather than a veritable right.”557
However, explains Yoram Dinstein, “since it is conceded that the 
State exercising self-defence is ‘exonerated’ from the duty to restrain 
from the use of force against the other side (the aggressor), we fail to see 
a difference between that and a de jure right.”558
Similarly, Frey’s whole argument is a “purely nominal” exercise. It 
amounts, at best, to a distinction without a difference. Her argument 
 555. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, ¶¶ 3–4 (“All Members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
 556. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 24. 
 557. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 178. 
 558. Id. 
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about individual self-defense depends on her careless misreading of a 
treaty (which in truth directly contradicts her) and her misquotation of a 
statute (which, if properly quoted, provides no support for her argument). 
 
4.  Justification, not excuse 
 
The Frey theory is that self-defense, rather than being a right, is 
merely “a basis for avoiding responsibility for violating the rights of 
another.”559 If Frey were correct, then self-defense would have to be an 
excuse; self-defense could not be a justification. Yet the great weight of 
international legal authority treats self-defense as a justification, and not 
as an excuse. 
Under the Frey theory, self-defense should be treated the same as 
insanity or duress. For example, if A (who is insane) and B (who is 
acting under legally sufficient duress) burn down C’s house, we would 
certainly say that C’s property rights have been violated by A and B. 
Even so, the criminal justice system might not punish A and B, because 
their conduct was excused. Similarly—according to Frey—a court should 
take into account the existence of self-defense, as a court should take into 
account all “factual, personal, or extenuating circumstances,” such as 
“distress or mental capacity” in deciding whether to punish a 
defendant.560
Now consider a different situation: a policeman sees a young man 
running down the sidewalk, carrying a woman’s purse. Several dozen 
yards away, an elderly woman is shouting “Stop, thief!” The policeman 
stops the purse-snatcher. He takes the purse from the purse-snatcher, and 
returns it to its owner, the elderly woman. Would we say that the purse-
snatcher’s property rights were violated? Of course not. The purse-
snatcher had no property rights to the purse. The policeman’s actions did 
not violate anyone’s rights; rather, the policeman’s actions protected the 
woman’s property rights. Therefore, the policeman’s actions were 
justified. 
According to the Frey theory, self-defense must be an excuse and not 
a justification, because self-defense is a violation of the rights of another 
person. Self-defense is “a basis for avoiding responsibility for violating 
the rights of another.”561
But Frey has no support for her claim that self-defense means 
“violating the rights of another.” As discussed supra, the primary source 
of authority for her claim, the European Convention on Human Rights, 
 559. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 9. 
 560. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 10. 
 561. Id. ¶ 20. 
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clearly says that self-defense by the victim does not result in the violation 
of the rights of the aggressor.562
There are three standard distinctions between a justification and an 
excuse, and every one of them shows self-defense to be a justification: 
Accomplice liability. If you assist an insane person in the 
commission of a crime, you will be guilty as an accomplice. If you assist 
in self-defense, you will not be guilty of anything. 
Permissible self-defense of the “victim.” If an insane person starts 
hitting you, you have the legal right to use violence in self-defense. If the 
victim of an attempted rape in progress starts hitting her attacker, the 
attacker has no legal right to hit back.563
Civil liability. A person who engages in lawful self-defense will owe 
no civil damages to the attacker. A person who—acting under the 
influence of duress or a mistake—injures another might be excused from 
criminal punishment, but could still be civilly liable to the victim.564
The Oxford University Press treatise International Criminal Law is 
written by Antonio Cassese, one of the world’s leading experts on the 
subject.565 The Frey Report recommends the book as “an authoritative 
discussion” of self-defense in international criminal law.566 But—quite 
strangely for a Special Rapporteur—Frey does not inform her audience 
about the book’s straightforward and very mainstream explanation of 
self-defense. 
In the chapter on justifications and excuses, Cassese states that self-
defense is a “justification.” He distinguishes self-defense from 
“excuses,” such as duress, insanity, or mistake. Cassese cites six cases in 
which international law courts “discussed this justification.” Among the 
six is the Yugoslavia Tribunal case, which Frey cited as support for her 
theory.567 Cassese here is supplying hornbook law, for, as detailed supra, 
 562. See supra text accompanying notes 544–47. 
 563. As Pufendorf pointed out, a person who violently attacks another renounces his own right 
of self-defense. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 220 (“He tacitly disclaims this Right, who in a 
violent manner sets upon another without just Cause. For since other has a Right of repelling the 
Violence by any Means he can, the Assailant is to accuse himself only for any harm he suffers in the 
Repulse of his own unlawful Force.”) (emphasis in original). Cf. United States v. Von Weizsaecker 
et al. (“the Ministries case”), 14 N.M.T. 314, 329 (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1949) (in a national context, “there 
can be no self-defense against self-defense”); DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 178. 
 564. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 220–24 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
The three distinctions are Cassese’s; the illustrations are ours. 
 565. Id. 
 566. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 16 n.13. 
 567. CASSESE supra note 564, at 223–24 (citing Kordić & Ćerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, § 
449 (Feb. 26, 2001); Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp et al., 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NÜRNBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, NÜRNBURG, OCTOBER 
1946—APRIL 1949, 1327 (1950); Trial of Willi Bernhard Karl Tessmann et al., 5 UNITED NATIONS 
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 66, 73 n.1 (1948); Trial 
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the world’s legal systems have long treated self-defense as a 
justification.568
That self-defense is a justification does not, by itself, prove that self-
defense is a right under international law. By analogy, capital 
punishment is also a justification. Yet if a nation abolishes capital 
punishment, no one’s international law human rights are violated. 
What we can glean from the well-recognized status of self-defense as 
a justification is additional evidence that Frey’s anti-rights theory is 
wrong. The fact that self-defense is a justification is one more reason 
why she was incorrect to announce that “[s]elf-defence is more properly 
characterized as a means of protecting the right to life and, as such, a 
basis for avoiding responsibility for violating the rights of another.”569
 
G.  Cassese’s Choice: Can You Only Resist Genocide When the 
Perpetrators Are of Another Race? 
 
An endnote in the Frey Report cautions: 
 
[T]he legal concepts discussed herein assume a non-conflict 
setting. Situations of mass human rights abuse and armed 
conflict involve international humanitarian law and security 
law principles that require an extended if not completely 
separate set of legal and policy considerations. For the Special 
Rapporteur’s findings and recommendations regarding role of 
small arms and light weapons in violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law in armed conflict, see her 
progress report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37).570
 
Yet Frey’s cited report on situations of armed conflict and mass 
human rights abuses follows the same IANSA/UN agenda as did the 
Brazilian gun confiscation referendum which she worked to support: 
promote gun confiscation, and ignore every claim that—even in the most 
of Yamamoto Chusaburo, 3 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS 
OF WAR CRIMINALS 76 (1948) (self-defense includes protection of property); Frank C. Schultz, 18 
C.M.A. 133 (1969); Trial of Erich Weiss and Wilhelm Mundo, 13 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 149 (1949). 
 568. See supra Part V. We are not claiming that self-defense has never been regarded as an 
excuse in any legal system; for example, medieval and Renaissance English and Scottish law did 
sometimes (although not always) treat self-defense as an excuse. See supra Part V.I. Frey has 
certainly not produced evidence that making self-defense an excuse is the normal practice of past or 
present criminal justice systems; rather, she confines her argument to contemporary international 
criminal law, in which self-defense is clearly a justification. 
 569. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 20. 
 570. Id. at 16 n.13. 
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extreme situations of mass human rights violations or genocide—anyone 
except a government employee should be allowed to possess a firearm 
for protection.571
The very next endnote contains a citation to our own article, “Is 
Resisting Genocide a Human Right?” from the Notre Dame Law 
Review.572 The article argued that national or international gun control 
laws should be considered inapplicable (under the authority of the 
Genocide Convention) in situations in which a group which is the victim 
of a continuing genocide wants to acquire arms for self-defense.573 Frey 
characterizes our legal argument, which we explicitly and repeatedly 
confined to situations of genocide, as “negating or substantially 
minimizing the duty of States to regulate possession” of firearms.574 It is 
hard to see how any state could have a legal “duty” to prevent the flow of 
defensive arms to genocide victims. But Frey does not explicitly state 
that genocide victims have no right of self-defense. 
That declaration is made instead by Cassese. Like the Founders of 
international law, Cassese does not attempt to draw an artificial 
distinction between the right of defending oneself against a solitary 
criminal and the right of defending oneself against a criminal tyrant 
whose minions are carrying out genocide. The Founders argued that 
everyone has a human right to resist both. Cassese argues that there is no 
human right to resist either one; instead, he argues, positive law (in a 
national code, or an international instrument) can and sometimes does 
authorize resistance, but the scope of the currently-authorized resistance 
against tyrants and genocidaires is quite limited: 
 
The right of self-defence under international law governs 
relations between states as opposed to groups and individuals. 
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (UN, 1945) and 
corresponding customary international law, states have a right 
to defend themselves against an “armed attack” if the UN 
Security Council fails to take effective action to stop it. 
Rebels, insurgents, and other organized armed groups do not 
have a right to use force against governmental authorities, 
except in three cases. Liberation movements can use force in 
order to resist the forcible denial of self-determination by (1) a 
colonial state, (2) an occupying power, or (3) a state refusing a 
 571. For Frey’s role in the Brazil referendum, see supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
 572. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 16 n.14. 
 573. See Kopel, Gallant, & Eisen, supra, note 58. 
 574. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 19. 
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racial group equal access to government. These situations, 
however, are not considered ones of “self-defence” under 
international law. Individuals who are not organized in groups 
have even less scope for the use of force under international 
law. Individuals have no legal right to use force to repel armed 
violence by oppressive states. This includes governments that 
commit acts of genocide or other serious human rights 
violations. Nor does international law grant individuals a right 
to defend themselves against other individuals. This right is 
provided for by states in their national legal systems as each 
state determines the conditions under which individuals can 
use force for these purposes. It is not surprising that states 
have refused to legitimize the resort to armed violence by 
individuals given the threat this would pose to their own 
authority. International law is made by states and tends to 
reflect their interests and concerns. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights nevertheless provides a moral endorsement 
of the violent reaction of individuals to political oppression or 
other forcible denial of fundamental human rights: “it is 
essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a 
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that 
human rights should be protected by the rule of law.” 575
 
Cassese is an important contemporary scholar of international law, 
but his article does not negate all the other scholars, nor can it negate the 
many positive enactments which affirm a fundamental right of self-
defense. 
Cassese is commendably forthright in expressing the implications of 
his theory, and the applications are quite straightforward: the German 
Jews had no right of self-defense against Hitler’s genocide (since the 
Nazi government was not an “occupying power” and since the Jews were 
of the same racial group—Caucasian—as their persecutors, although 
they were of different ethnicity and religion). Similarly the Cambodians 
had no right to resist the genocide of the native Pol Pot regime (which 
was not based on race). 
If a government encourages rape (such as by allowing rape charges 
to be brought only if there are four male witnesses), the woman has no 
inherent right of self-defense against a rapist. 
 575. Antonio Cassese, The Various Aspects of Self-Defence, Background paper (Small Arms 
Survey 2003), excerpted in SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004, 10 (2005). 
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If a government (such as the government of Rwanda) incites and 
directs the genocide of an ethnic group, the victims have no right to resist 
as long as the victims are of the same race as the genocidaires. 
By Cassese’s theory, the Darfuri victims of genocide, rape, ethnic 
cleansing, and other atrocities have a right to resist only if they are of a 
different race than their persecutors. The Darfuri victims have very dark 
skins, live in Africa, and are often called “Africans.” The genocidaires 
have very dark skin, live in Africa, and are Arabs. It is preposterous that 
the Darfuris’ collective right to resist genocide—or an individual Darfuri 
female refugee’s right to use a cooking knife to fight off a rapist—would 
depend on whether the Darfuris are the same or a different race than their 
persecutors. 
Cassese argues that international law only justifies resistance in 
situations of racism, colonialism, or foreign occupation, but he is 
adopting an overly narrow reading of the UN General Assembly’s 
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression. That resolution did endorse 
violent resistance to racist, colonial, or foreign regimes; but the plain 
language of the resolution also endorsed resistance to any regime which 
violates the people’s rights to self-determination, freedom, or 
independence.576
The notion that the rights of individuals or groups to resist genocide 
depend on the race of the victims and the race of the perpetrators is a 
theory unworthy of international law. An international “law” which 
blandly denies victims the right to attempt to save their own lives hardly 
deserves to be called a “law” at all. Such a “law” amounts to nothing 
more than a pretext for the strong to rape and murder the weak. It is 
repugnant. It is contrary to civilization itself, and to the entire course of 
development of international law.577
Half a millennium ago, systematic international law arose from the 
efforts of Victoria to stop the depredations against Indians and Muslims, 
 576. See supra text accompanying notes 466–67. 
 577. The French have sometimes referred to the enactments of the pro-Nazi Vichy government 
in terms such as “pretend laws” or “decrees said to be law.” See PIERRE LEMIEUX, CONFESSIONS 
D’UN COURER DES BOIS HORS-LA-LOI 42 (2001); Les Acquisitions Immobilieres de la Ville de Paris 
Entre 1940 et 1944 Sont-Elles le Produit de Spoliations? Rapport établi par le Conseil du Patrimoine 
Privé de la Ville de Paris avec le concours de son Groupe d’experts (Nov. 16, 1998), available at 
http://www.v1.paris.fr/FR/La_Mairie/executif/communiques/ 
ancienne_mandature/mandature_1995_2001/patrimoine.ASP (describing certain Vichy laws as “les 
Actes dits ‘lois’”, or as “prétendus lois, décrets et arrêtés, règlements ou décisions”). The 
appellations of “pretend law” or “said-to-be laws” rightly recognize that purported acts of a 
government, even though the acts may follow the standard form of law, may be so manifestly unjust 
(as the Vichy laws were) so as not to be real laws. The pretend laws do not merit the presumption of 
obedience which is accorded to real laws. Surely any international “law” (or academic interpretation 
thereof) which purported to forbid self-defense against genocide, homicide, rape, or tyranny is 
pretend law, not a real one. 
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and the efforts of Grotius to stop the pillaging of civilians during the 
religious wars in Europe. Victoria, Grotius, Suárez, and the many other 
humanitarian Founders knew that personal self-defense was “the greatest 
of all rights.”578 Indian, Spaniard, or Turk; Catholic, Protestant, Jew or 
Muslim—we all share a common humanity. When we recognize that 
each and every one of us has an inherent right of self-defense, then we 
can begin to reason towards an international system in which people and 
nations (that is, large groups of people) who do not understand each 
other can find common rules for treating each other fairly. 
That was how the Founders reasoned. Cassese bluntly expresses the 
alternative: to deny the individual, inherent, and universal right of self-
defense is to eliminate the right to resist genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, 
and every other atrocity. 
 
VII.  IS THERE AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO GUN CONTROL? 
 
A very large body of international law sources affirms that self-
defense is a human right. But Frey has invented standards so rigorous 
that she almost never has to admit to the existence of those sources. 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice tells us that the 
opinions of scholars are sources of international law, but Frey ignores 
them, as they are not “primary”579—even though she often cites other 
scholars for other points. 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice tells us that the 
“general principles of law derived . . . from national laws of legal 
systems of the world” are sources of international law,580 and we have 
seen that self-defense is a part of every major legal system that gave rise 
to international law,581 and of every contemporary legal system.582 But 
this too does not count for Frey, because she claims statements that self-
defense is a right are not “expressly set forth.”583 Yet there are in fact a 
multitude of “express” statements; moreover, the Statute asks for 
“general principles,” not “express” statements.584
All the rest of the evidence Frey waves away with the bizarre—and 
plainly incorrect—theory that self-defense is a violation of the criminal’s 
rights.585
 578. See TIERNEY, supra note 130, at 314. 
 579. See supra Part IV.D. 
 580. See I.C.C. Statute, supra note 551, at 15. 
 581. See supra Part V. 
 582. See supra Part VI. 
 583. See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 21. 
 584. See I.C.C. Statute, supra note 551, at 15. 
 585. See supra Part III.D. 
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Frey is not so rigorous, however, when she declares that current 
international law mandates highly restrictive gun control, and that the 
international mandate is so powerful that it over-rides every contrary 
law, including national constitutions. In support of her declaration, the 
Special Rapporteur offers no direct support from any source of 
international law—not even a “subsidiary” citation to a single 
commentator. 
Instead, she offers a theory based on a series of deductions she draws 
from some general rules of international law. The Special Rapporteur 
does not appear to be applying intellectually consistent standards in her 
report. Her operative rule could be stated as “no evidence is good 
enough.” That is, when the issue is the right of self-defense, it is 
impossible for even an immense body of legal authority to be sufficient. 
When the question is the “right” of gun control, her conclusion  can be 
proven without need for legal authority. 
 
A.  Due Diligence 
 
The basis for Frey’s right to gun control is the principle that a state 
must exercise “due diligence” in preventing human rights violations.586 
For example, if police officers are not trained in how to use firearms 
safely, and if an untrained officer fires wildly into a crowded street in 
order to catch a fleeing thief, and the officer misses the thief but hits a 
dozen innocent bystanders, then the state might be culpable of a human 
rights violation, for having failed to exercise “due diligence” in training. 
Similarly, a state can be responsible when it allows groups that 
exercise de facto state power (even though the groups are nominally not 
state actors) to attack people. One good example (although not cited by 
Frey) would be the contemporary government of Sudan, which supports 
Arab tribal proxies in the extermination of the Africans of Darfur.587 
Likewise, the government of Mississippi (like several other American 
states) had a long-standing practice of tolerating, and tacitly encouraging, 
Ku Klux Klan terrorist violence against blacks and other supporters of 
civil rights.588
 586. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 8–18, 33–37; see also Barbara A. Frey, Small Arms and 
Light Weapons: The Tools Used to Violate Human Rights, DISARMAMENT FORUM 37 (no. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter DISARMAMENT FORUM]. “Due diligence” can be subject to widely varying 
interpretations. Perhaps the first international law use of the term was in the 1871 Washington 
Treaty, settling various disputes between the United States and the United Kingdom. Washington 
Treaty for the Amicable Settlement of All Causes of Difference between the Two Countries, 1871, 
U.S.–U.K., 143 Consol. Treaty Series 145, 149. While the treaty as a whole was successful, the “due 
diligence” language proved difficult to interpret and enforce. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 29. 
 587. See, e.g., Kopel, Gallant, & Eisen, supra, note 58, at 1277. 
 588. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 502, at 351–55. Cf. 
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She also cites one due diligence case in which a government did 
nothing to protect a person in peril, refusing to investigate death threats 
against an individual in Colombia, and two others where the government 
refused to act against discrimination.589
Frey’s summary of due diligence rules, and cases and commentary 
thereon, provides no precedent for any government being required to 
enact items from a list of regulatory laws drawn up by a commentator or 
by an international organization. Nevertheless, Frey and the HRC 
subcommission proclaim that every government in the world must 
implement their gun control agenda, or else be declared guilty of failing 
to practice due diligence.590
Even if we hypothesize that each of Frey’s gun controls would be a 
good idea, there is no support in international law for the proposition that 
“due diligence” about the general risk of crime can be used as an 
international law hammer to force governments to adopt particular types 
of regulatory laws. 
As noted supra, Frey’s standards for the minimum “due diligence” 
required under her purported right to gun control are so severe that even 
the laws of New York City and Washington, D.C., would be considered 
WILLIAM B. ZIFF, THE RAPE OF PALESTINE 121–29 (1938) (describing the disarmament of Jews in 
Hebron, Palestine, in 1929, by British officials, after which British officials incited a program 
against the Jews by Arabs and failed to respond to the ensuing violence for eight days). It might be 
noted in passing that the depredations of the Sudanese Arabs and the American Klan were made 
possible in part because the governments had previously disarmed the intended victims. See, e.g., 
sources cited supra notes 504–05. 
 589. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 13–14. 
 590. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 7–8, 12–13. The closest she gets to precedential support 
for her mandate about citizen gun control is a quote from a 1975 law review article that under the 
European Convention’s right to life provisions, a crime victim should have “a general duty to avoid 
the use of force where non-violent means of self-protection are reasonably open to the person 
attacked.” Frey Report, supra note 48, at 19 n.36 (citing A.J. Ashworth, Self-defence and the Right 
to Life, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 289 (1975)). At most, the law review article might raise questions about 
laws in many American states that some persons (e.g., a person in her own home) who are attacked 
by violent felons have no duty to retreat. Some American states also state that a person who is 
attacked by a violent felon (again, such laws most often apply to the home) and who, under the 
circumstances had the right to use force in self-defense, cannot be prosecuted for using deadly force. 
Even these laws are not necessarily in conflict with Ashworth’s law review article. The legislative 
decision that a victim should not be forced to retreat reflects the social judgment that it is not 
reasonable to force a victim to retreat from a place where she has a right to be (especially her own 
home). Likewise, the laws against prosecutions for a particular level of force reflect the social 
consensus (as reflected in legislation) that it is unreasonable for prosecutors to second-guess a 
decision that a victim must make in split seconds. As the United States Supreme Court put it: 
“Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.” Brown v. United 
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
In any case, the law review article’s analysis of the proper rules for self-defense have nothing to do 
with Frey’s claim that due diligence requires governments to enact laws about the acquisition of 
firearms. 
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to be human rights violations, since they are not sufficiently restrictive.591
Frey has elsewhere suggested that, under international law, the 
minimum investigational standards for issuing a firearms possession 
license should be “akin in scope to those required for the effective 
investigation of an individual’s death.”592 By this standard, even the gun 
laws of Japan and the United Kingdom, the most restrictive in the 
industrialized world, would be insufficient. Both nations have very 
intrusive licensing systems, including (in the United Kingdom) a home 
inspection, but even so, the police resources devoted to issuing a single 
gun license do not come remotely close to the resources ordinarily used 
to investigate a homicide. 
It is hard to see why a sensible government would devote the same 
resources to issuing a single gun license as to investigating a single 
homicide. Homicide investigation is well known to be a very resource-
intensive investigation. Because homicide is the worst of all crimes, it is 
easy to understand why a single homicide investigation is given much 
greater resources than the investigation of a single robbery, a single 
burglary, and so on. 
In the United States, there were 17,732 homicides in 2003,593 and 
there are tens of millions of lawful gun owners.594 If the police began 
devoting homicide-investigation-level resources to gun licenses, which 
Frey and the HRC subcommission would require for every gun owner, 
with periodic renewals,595 the police would be able to do little else. In the 
United Kingdom, there were approximately 1,100 homicides in 2002–
2003.596 Authorities in the UK reported approximately 760,000 firearms 
and shotgun certificates “on issue.”597 The criminal justice results would 
 591. See supra text accompanying notes 586–90. 
 592. DISARMAMENT FORUM, supra note 586, at 43. 
 593. See Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2004, National Vital Statistics Reports, Centers for 
Disease Control, and Prevention, Vol. 54, Number 19, June 28, 2006, Table 2. But see FBI UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2003, Table 2.4 (14,408 murder victims), 
http://www.fbi.gov./ucr/03cius.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007). 
 594. See L. Hepburn, M. Miller, D. Azrael & D. Hemenway, The US Gun Stock: Results from 
the 2004 National Firearms Survey, 13 INJ. PREV. 15 (2007) (57 million adult gun-owners in the 
U.S.). 
 595. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 16; U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 6, at 10. 
 596. See CRIME IN ENGLAND AND WALES 2002/2003: SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 1: HOMICIDE 
AND GUN CRIME 1 (David Povey ed., 2004), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hosb0104.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2007) (“There were 1,045 deaths initially recorded as homicides in England 
and Wales based on cases recorded by the police in 2002/03. This includes 172 victims of Dr Harold 
Shipman (see note 1 on page 3) all of which relate to offences committed in previous years.”); see 
also STATISTICS RELEASE HOMICIDE IN SCOTLAND, 2003 – STATISTICS Published, 4 November 
2004, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/11/20292/47178 (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) 
(“In 2003, there were 108 cases currently recorded as homicide by the police.”).
 597. See Olivia Christophersen & Jason Lal, Firearm Certificates in England and Wales, 
2002/2003, Home Office Online Report 03/04, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/ 
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be catastrophic if each gun license application were ramped up to 
homicide investigation levels. 
Practically speaking, there could be two results: the police could try 
conscientiously to process the license applications within a few weeks or 
months (the time for a typical homicide investigation); if so, police 
resources available for patrol and for investigation of crimes would be 
reduced to nothing. Alternatively, the police could simply decide that the 
investigations take too much time, and so license applications would 
languish for years; law-abiding gun owners would be turned into felons 
as their license renewal applications sat in an immense stack in a police 
office. That is what has happened in South Africa, thanks to a highly-
restrictive gun owner licensing law enacted several years ago.598
If the Frey/HRC theory that “due diligence” mandates highly 
restrictive gun control were to be accepted, then the same reasoning 
would require an almost limitless series of international law mandates for 
repressive legislation on many subjects. For example, in all industrial 
countries, including the United States, more people die from automobile 
accidents than from gunfire.599 A fortiori, governments would have to act 
rdsolr0304.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2007). In England and Wales, the renewal cycle for rifles and 
shotguns is 5 years. See Renewal of a Rifle Certificate, Metropolitan Police, Firearms Enquiries, 
http://www.met.police.uk/firearms-enquiries/f_renew.htm, (last visited Mar. 19, 2007); Renewal of a 
Rifle Certificate, Metropolitan Police, Firearms Enquiries, http://www.met.police.uk/firearms-
enquiries/s_renew.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007); see also Frequently Asked Questions, Sussex 
Police Online, http://www.sussex.police.uk/online_forms/firearms_faq.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 
2007). In Scotland, the renewal cycle is also five years for rifle and for shotgun certificates. See 
STATISTICAL BULLETIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES CRJ/2004/4 FIREARM CERTIFICATES STATISTICS, 
SCOTLAND, 2003 (May 2004), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/ Publications/2004/05/19425/38096#2 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2007). 
 598. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, Human Rights and Gun 
Confiscation 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at 
http://www.davekopel.com/2A/Foreign/Human-Rights-and-Gun-Confiscation.pdf; Lizel Steenkamp, 
No Legal Guns Sold Since July, NEWS24.COM (Johannesburg), Sept. 27, 2004, 
http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1595913,00.html (noting a drop 
in monthly gun sales from 15,000 to zero and a backlog of appeals from individuals whose license 
applications were refused); see also Michele O’Connor, New Gun Law Chaos, NEWS24.COM (Cape 
Town), Aug. 23, 2005, http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_ 
1758060,00.html (no new gun licenses, and only sixteen renewals, have been issued in Western 
Cape since the new law took effect; at the current rate, processing the current license applications 
will take thousands of years); Wyndham Hartley, Firearms Control Act Well Wide of its Target, 
BUSINESS DAY (South Africa), Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/ 
topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A93763 (“Implementation of the Firearms Control Act is threatening to 
spiral out of control with government’s Central Firearms Registry processing only a fraction of the 
hundreds of thousands of reapplications for gun licences it was scheduled to process this year.”); 
Sheena Adams, Firearms Registry Slammed for ‘Ineptitude’, INDEPENDENT ONLINE (South Africa), 
Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=6&art_id= 
vn20050915060958770C464804 (“Of the 20,397 applications for competency certificates received 
since January, 3,937 had been finalised.”). 
 599. In 2003, there were 37,341 fatalities of vehicle occupant and motorcycle riders; there 
were also 5,543 non-motorist fatalities. Thus, the total of automobile-related fatalities in 2003 was 
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with “due diligence” to protect the right to life by enacting extremely 
strict anti-automobile laws. Like firearms, automobiles are already 
pervasively regulated,600 but “due diligence” for the right to life would 
seem to require much, much more. 
Not that there is any need for international organizations to actually 
create anti-automobile treaties, or for such treaties to be ratified by 
national governments. The requirement for severe anti-automobile 
legislation is already, by Frey’s theory, a mandatory requirement of 
international human rights law. Any government that has ratified a treaty 
respecting the right to life has, by necessary implication, accepted a 
requirement to enact drastic automobile control legislation in order to 
fulfill Frey’s mandate that governments “must maximize protection of 
the right to life.”601 The maximization rule, invented by Frey,602 offers 
nearly limitless opportunities for coercive utopians to use international 
law to force governments to enact extremely restrictive laws on almost 
everything. 
 We suggest that there are many good pro and con arguments 
about what kind of automobile controls are best—and that nations have 
not foreclosed their choices about automobile regulation simply by 
ratifying treaties guaranteeing the right to life. 
The same point can be made about firearms control. Whatever the 
arguments for or against particular gun laws, Frey’s theory that the right 
to life necessarily creates an international law mandate for her favorite 
forms of gun control has no precedential support. 
 
B.  Frey’s Erroneous Claims of Empirical Support 
 
As a Special Rapporteur, Frey was obligated to inform the Human 
Rights Council of the leading research on her topic. Unfortunately, while 
insisting that her proposed gun controls should become international 
42,884. See Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) Web-Based Encyclopedia, NHTSA, 
http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2007); see also Deaths: Final Data for 2003, 54 
Nat’l Vital Statistics Reps. (no. 13, Apr. 19, 2006, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), at 
80, table 19 (listing total firearm-related deaths for 2003 as 30,136, including justifiable homicides). 
 600. See David B. Kopel, Treating Guns Like Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV 1701 
(2000) (detailing how U.S. laws for possession for carrying guns in public places, or for 
possessing/using guns on private property are much more restrictive than the laws for driving 
automobiles in public places or possession/driving on private property; also detailing how firearms 
are much more highly regulated than alcohol or prescription drugs). 
 601. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 9. 
 602. Frey’s only citation for her alleged duty of maximization is a book which never claims 
that there is a duty of maximization: “As a norm of jus cogens, no government may deny the 
existence of the right to life and a higher duty and standard of protection of the right is imposed upon 
governments.” Frey Report, supra note 48, at 15 n.3 (quoting B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE RIGHT TO 
LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1985)). 
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mandates, Frey did not inform the HRC of significant research, which 
casts serious doubt on her claim that her proposals would be effective. 
For example, in 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”), released a meta-study of the efficacy of gun 
control. The report included a review of fifty-one published studies on a 
variety of restrictive gun laws, including bans on specific firearms and 
ammunition, measures prohibiting felons from purchasing guns, 
mandatory waiting periods, firearm registration, and background 
checks.603 The Associated Press summarized the report: “A sweeping 
federal review of the nation’s gun control laws—including mandatory 
waiting periods and bans on certain weapons—found no proof such 
measures reduce firearm violence.”604
The National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) reached a similar 
conclusion in 2004: no link could be established between restrictive 
firearm laws and lower violent crime rates, firearm-related violence, or 
even firearm accidents. The 328-page report contained a review of 253 
journal articles, 99 books, and 43 government publications, as well as 
independent research by the NAS.605
There is no requirement that other scholars, such as Frey, agree with 
the CDC or NAS assessments of the research evidence. But it is 
surprising that a Special Rapporteur would not even inform the HRC 
about the existence of the two most extensive meta-studies ever 
conducted on gun control efficacy. 
Agnostic on gun control, the CDC and NAS also declared that the 
current evidence did not yield a clear answer on the benefits, if any, of 
defensive gun ownership. 
The Frey Report attempted to argue that gun possession for self-
defense is ineffective and dangerous. Unfortunately, Frey’s argument—
while omitting the meta-studies—relies on assertions that are not even 
supported by her own cited sources. 
Frey claims that “research indicates that firearms are rarely used to 
stop crimes or kill criminals.”606 Her lone support for this assertion is that 
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports recorded “only 203 justifiable 
 603. See TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PREVENTIVE SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, FIRST REPORTS EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES FOR 
PREVENTING VIOLENCE: FIREARMS LAWS (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/ 
mmwrhtml/rr5214a2.htm. 
 604. Kristen Wyatt, CDC Finds No Proof Gun Laws Curb Violence, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 
2, 2003, available at http://jacobisrael.us/gunscdc.htm. 
 605. See Charles F. Wellford, John V. Pepper & Carol V. Petrie eds., COMMITTEE ON L. & 
JUST., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW (Nat’l Acad. Press 
2004).   
 606. See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 36. 
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homicides by private citizens using firearms” in 2003.607 From this 
datum, she infers that guns are rarely useful for self-defense. By Frey’s 
reasoning, we could count the number of criminals killed by police 
departments in different jurisdictions and conclude that whoever kills the 
most criminals is the best at protecting the public—what an inhumane 
method of measuring anti-crime efficacy. 
Frey is apparently unaware of research data indicating that the FBI 
figures, which are based only on initial police reports, are a gross 
undercount, because they do not include determinations later made by 
prosecutors, grand juries, petit juries, or appellate courts that an 
individual acted in self-defense.608
In any case, Frey provided data only about how often firearms are 
used to “kill criminals” while providing no data about how often firearms 
are used “to stop crimes.” Although her footnote cites the CDC for data 
about non-justifiable firearms deaths, she does not discuss the report 
from the CDC showing that in the United States, firearms are used over 
half a million times in a typical year against home invasion burglars; 
usually the burglar flees as soon as he finds out that the victim is armed, 
and no shot is ever fired.609
Frey also asserts that guns “are often turned on the very person who 
may have the best arguments for self-defence—the woman herself.”610 
Yet her citation for this assertion, a study led by Kimberly Grassel,611 
provides no support for Frey’s statement. The Grassel study did not 
collect such data.612 Nor were all the women in the Grassel study 
 607. See id. 
 608. GARY KLECK, BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 111–16 (1991). 
 609. See Robert M. Ikeda et al., Estimating Intruder-Related Firearms Retrievals in U.S. 
Households, 1994, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 363 (1997) (reporting results of study conducted by the 
CDC). See generally Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and 
Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995) (survey data 
showing 2.5 million defensive gun uses annually in the United States, most without firing a shot). 
Pro-control criminologist Marvin Wolfgang reluctantly praised the methodology used by Kleck and 
Gertz, stating: “I am as strong a gun-control advocate as can be found among the criminologists in 
this country . . . [Kleck and Gertz] have provided an almost clear-cut case of methodologically sound 
research in support of something I have theoretically opposed for years, namely, the use of a gun in 
defense against a criminal perpetrator . . . the methodological soundness of the current Kleck and 
Gertz study is clear. I cannot further debate it.” Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a View I Have 
Opposed, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 188, 188 (1995). 
 610. See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 36. 
 611. K.M. Grassel, G. J. Wintemute, M.A. Wright & M.P. Romero, Association Between 
Handgun Purchase and Mortality from Firearm Injury, 9 INJ. PREV. 48 (2003). 
 612. See Id. Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey show that a victim’s weapon 
is taken by the attacker in, at most, one percent of cases in which the victim resists with a weapon. 
See Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS 168–69 (1997). The data from the National Crime Victimization 
Survey and other sources show that “[t]here is no sound empirical evidence that resistance does 
provoke fatal attacks.” See Jongyeon Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim 
Action on the Outcomes of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 861, 903 (2004). 
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murdered with firearms. Indeed, the authors admitted that they do not 
even know whether the subjects owned a gun at the time of their 
deaths.613
Frey cites another study, by Bailey et al., for the proposition that 
“having one or more guns in the home makes a woman 7.2 times more 
 613. Grassel et al., supra note 611, at 48, 51 (“We do not know if the gun deaths of the 
purchasers in our study population involved the handguns they bought between 1996 and 1998, nor 
do we know if any purchasers resold their guns before death and were no longer exposed.”). Frey 
parenthetically describes the Grassel article as “reporting that women who were murdered were 
more likely, not less likely, to have purchased a handgun in the three years prior to their deaths.” 
Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 36. 
It is not surprising that women who accurately perceive that they are at high risk of criminal 
victimization would be more likely to take protective measures; women who are more at risk of fatal 
illness are also more likely to take protective measures, such as going to a doctor. That sick people 
go to doctors does not mean that doctors make people worse off; that women at risk of victimization 
take protective measures does not mean that the protective measures are harmful. 
Suppose a study showed that female murder victims were more likely to have bought high-quality 
locks for their homes. Would the study prove that locks are not useful for protection? Would the 
study prove that locks “are often turned on the very person who may have the best arguments for 
self-defence—the woman herself”? 
It is not surprising that women at risk would be more likely to take protective measures. To ascertain 
whether the protective measures were effective, one would have to compare the murder victims with 
a sample of women who were equally at risk, but who survived. Comparing an at-risk population 
with the general population does not tell us about the efficacy of any given protective measure. 
Mere association (murder victims were more likely to have bought locks or guns; people who die of 
cancer are more likely to have gone to a hospital in the three years before their death) does not prove 
causation. Increased levels of ice cream sales are associated with hot days, but the association does 
not prove that ice cream makes the weather hotter. In evaluating the relationship between a particular 
action and a particular outcome, it is a mistake to assume that the action necessarily causes the 
outcome. See Jane L. Garb, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL RESEARCH: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 27–
28 (1996): 
 
To test hypotheses about the relationship between a risk factor and an 
outcome, one must always compare two or more groups . . . . When we find a 
difference between the groups, we must consider the possible explanations for 
this difference: 
A spurious association: The difference in the groups is due to non-
comparability—that is, a difference in the composition of the groups. This 
association is the subject of bias and confounding. 
A chance association: The difference in the groups is due to chance. This 
association is the basis of statistical analysis. 
A causal association: The difference in the groups is due to a true causal 
association between the risk factor and the outcome. 
 
In order to prove our hypothesis and conclude that the last explanation is correct—that is, that the 
risk factor led to or caused the outcome—we must first rule out the other two explanations. 
For example, ice cream, cold drinks, and sleeveless shirts are associated with the heat of 
summertime. But although these three items are associated, they are not causal to each other, nor to 
the heat of summer, and one would have to be ignorant about association and causality to so state. 
The Grassel study does show an association, but does not show causation. See Gary Kleck, Can 
Owning a Gun Really Triple the Owner’s Chances of Being Murdered?: The Anatomy of an 
Implausible Causal Mechanism, 5 HOMICIDE STUD. 64 (2001). 
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likely to be murdered by an intimate partner.”614 This would be a 
frightening statistic if odds ratios were equivalent to risk factors. 
However, Frey wrongly described the article’s adjusted odds ratio of 7.2 
for “keeping 1 or more guns” as a risk factor for violent death.615
 
C.  Jus Cogens 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that under the 
principle of jus cogens, a treaty is void if it contradicts “a norm accepted 
 614. See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 36 (citing James E. Bailey et. al., Risk Factors for 
Violent Death of Women in the Home, 157 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 777, 780 (1997)). 
 615. Odds ratios are not equivalent to risk factors, and it is odds ratios which are used in the 
analysis of the Bailey article. When studying a population group that is at high risk for a disease 
(e.g., coal miners for black lung disease), it is scientifically inappropriate to replace risk factors with 
odds ratios. 
Dr. Jeanine Baker explains that “[a]lthough homicide is quite rare in the general population, caution 
is required when interpreting odds ratios on subsets of the population with high risks for the variable 
being examined. In these situations, the odds ratio overestimates the risk.” E-mail from Jeanine 
Baker, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of Adelaide (Australia), to Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen 
(Mar. 17, 2007) (on file with authors). Baker continued: 
More importantly, in studies such as that described by Bailey et al. (1997), an overestimated odds 
ratio combined with the biases and confounding factors introduced by comparing  high risk sub-
groups with the general population will result in the authors postulating causal association, 
thus masking the real causes . . . . It is sad that the Frey report has failed to recognise the 
methodological constraints of odds ratios and distressing that the real issues facing women and 
highlighted in the Bailey et al. study are mental illness and living alone[, which] have been ignored. 
These are key areas that still lack real input from the international aid agencies and are neglected by 
the community and government funding. 
See also Louise-Anne McNutt, John P. Holcomb, Jr., & Bonnie E. Carlson, Logistic Regression 
Analysis: When the Odds Ratio Does Not Work: An Example Using Intimate Partner Violence Data, 
15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1050 (2000). The authors note: 
Many areas of research involve the investigation of events that occur frequently. Intimate partner 
violence (IPV) is one such event. Estimates of the prevalence in clinic populations range between 
10% and 25%, and sometimes as high as 50% . . . . Often researchers are interested in estimating the 
strength of association between a risk factor . . . and an adverse outcome . . . . The prevalence ratio is 
a measure of association between the exposure status [e.g. exposure to a firearm] and the outcome 
status [e.g., violent death] . . . . Another measure of association is the odds ratio . . . . [I]f the measure 
of association needs to be adjusted for other factors . . . the odds ratio is much easier to calculate 
[than the prevalence ratio]. And more important, the confidence intervals for the odds ratios are 
simpler to calculate compared with the prevalence ratios’ confidence intervals. Using the knowledge 
that the odds ratio approximates the value of the prevalence ratio when the outcome is rare (less than 
10%), the odds ratio gained popularity in scientific research . . . . Many articles in the violence and 
health literature incorrectly interpret odds ratios . . . as relative risks or prevalence ratios. When the 
incidence or prevalence of the health outcome is more than 10%, this will typically result in an 
overestimation of the effects of violence on women’s health. 
See also Ulka B. Campbell, Nicolle M. Gatto & Sharon Schwartz, Distributional Interaction: 
Interpretational Problems When Using Incidence Odds Ratios to Assess Interaction, 2 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC PERSPECTIVES & INNOVATIONS (2005), http://www.epi-perspectives.com 
/content/2/1/1 (last visited Mar. 16, 2007) (“The incidence odds ratio is a very convenient measure 
of effect with many appealing statistical properties including estimability in a case-control study. 
However, when assessing interaction, as when assessing main effects, interpreting the incidence 
odds ratio as if it were a risk ratio can be misleading.”). 
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and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”616
Charles de Visscher, one of the most influential international judges 
and scholars in the twentieth century, observed that “the proponent of a 
rule of jus cogens . . . will have a considerable burden of proof.”617 In 
Principles of Public International Law, Ian Brownlie writes that “more 
authority exists for the category of jus cogens than exists for its particular 
content. . . . However, certain portions of jus cogens are the subject of 
general agreement, including the rules [relating] to the use of force by 
states, self-determination, and genocide. Yet even here many problems of 
application remain . . . .”618
Frey contends that her gun control program is not only part of the 
“right to life” protected by various treaties, but also a jus cogens—
meaning that it overrides every other contrary law, including 
constitutional rights.619 In 1992, the United States ratified the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which declares 
that “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life.”620 According to 
Frey, the United States thereby signed up for her 2006 gun control 
program. And since the gun control program is a jus cogens, it 
necessarily supersedes the Second Amendment, the forty-four state 
constitutional right-to-arms provisions,621 and all thirty-seven of the state 
constitutions which declare that self-defense is a human right,622 not to 
mention the multitude of state and federal statutes which authorize self-
defense in circumstances far broader than Frey’s standard that lethal self-
defense cannot be used when it is necessary to prevent a rape or any 
other major violent felony short of homicide.623 Also crushed under 
Frey’s jus cogens are all the constitutional self-defense guarantees in 
other nations which authorize self-defense—against lone criminals and 
against criminal tyrants—in circumstances disfavored by Frey.624 This 
 616. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 617. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THÉORIES ET RÉALITIES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 295–96 (4th 
ed. 1970), quoted in IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 466, at 516. 
 618. Id. at 516–17. 
 619. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 27. 
 620. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 312, art. 6, pt 1; Office 
Of The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status Of Ratifications Of The 
Principal International Human Rights Treaties 11 (2004), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. 
 621. See supra Part VI.E. 
 622. See supra text accompanying note 444. 
 623. Frey Report, supra note 48. 
 624. Id. 
  
170 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 22 
 
result seems hard to reconcile with the 2006 report of the UN’s 
International Law Commission that self-defense is one of the “most 
frequently citied examples” of jus cogens.625
Frey’s effort to invent a jus cogens against self-defense is contrary to 
the very principle of jus cogens—of a universally-binding moral duty 
applicable in every nation; for jus cogens itself is a direct application of 
natural law,626 and the first principle of natural law is the right of self-
defense.627
All the flaws of Frey’s attempt to claim that the right to life mandates 
her severe gun control and anti-self-defense program are magnified by 
her claim that the program is a jus cogens. One of the reasons that 
international law is viewed with intense suspicion in some circles is the 
tendency of some activists to twist international law so that it evades 
people’s right to self-government and self-determination, imposing an 
elitist, far left social policy agenda on a population against its will. Frey’s 
jus cogens claim, and the Human Rights Council’s acquiescence, 
represents the worst of this tendency.628
 
 
 
 625. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, at 189, (Apr. 13, 2006), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G06/610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElement. 
 626. See Bruno Simma, The Contribution of Alfred Vedross to the Theory of International 
Law, 6 EURO. J. INT’L L. 34, 51–54 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/ 
No1/art3.pdf (without the journal pageination) (explaining that through the 19th century, the natural 
law basis of international law made it obvious that some rules were universal and non-derogable; 
during the 20th century, the legal positivist view that international law is purely the artificial creation 
of states, with no necessary normative content, gained ascendancy. The formalization of the 
principle of jus cogens in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties returned to the natural 
law principles, albeit without explicitly acknowledging the reliance on natural law.); See also Karen 
Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling The Law Of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 411, 419 (1989) (“jus cogens is clearly an attribute of natural law.”) 
 627. See supra Part IV. 
 628. As we discuss in the next Part, we have argued for a jus cogens right of the victims of an 
on-going genocide to acquire defensive arms. See Kopel, Gallant, & Eisen, supra note 59. We 
should point out that our jus cogens claim is much, much smaller than the one that Frey makes; the 
article makes the jus cogens claim, on the basis of the Genocide Convention, solely in the context of 
a continuing genocide in which the international community has failed to take effective steps to stop 
the genocide. Moreover, we cite international case law which directly states a jus cogens right of 
genocide victims to acquire defensive arms. Id. at 1277–78 (citing Application of Convention on 
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993 
I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13, 1993) (Lauterpacht, J., concurring)) (Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures Order of Apr. 8). Our genocide article does not assert that the narrow application of jus 
cogens to cases of active genocide (or, perhaps, imminent genocide) means that all nations are 
required to adopt types of firearms laws which we would favor as a matter of policy, or that a wide 
range of national firearms laws which we disfavor on policy grounds are necessarily invalid. 
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VIII.  DOES THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE IMPLY A RIGHT TO ARMS? 
 
If there is a right to self-defense, is there a right to arms? In 
answering this, we must be careful to distinguish two questions: “Is there 
a right to possess some kind of defensive arms?” and “Is there a right to 
possess firearms for defense?” The answer to the second question is 
much more complicated than the answer to the first. 
 
A.  Right to Arms 
 
A common-sense principle is embodied in the legal maxims “[w]hen 
the law grants anything to any one, all incidents are tacitly granted”629 
and “[w]hen the law gives a man anything, it gives him that also without 
which the thing itself cannot exist.” So if people have a right to the free 
exercise of religion, then they must necessarily have the right to possess, 
buy, and sell the scriptures of their religion, and related religious 
writings. If people have a right to freedom of the press, then the people 
must have a right to possess, buy, and sell newspapers and magazines. 
And since the right to publish newspapers is an incident of the right to 
freedom of the press, the publication of newspapers must not be hindered 
by, for example, a heavy tax imposed solely on newspaper ink.630 
Likewise the freedom of the press and of religion both imply that people 
have a right to learn how to read.631
To recognize a right while forbidding the means to exercise it would 
make the right a nullity. As Thomas Hobbes wrote: “because it is in vain 
for a man to have a right to the End, if the right to the necessary means 
be denied him, it follows, that since every Man hath a right to preserve 
himself, he must also be allowed a right to use all the means, and do all 
the actions, without which he cannot preserve himself.”632
 629. Cent. Bureau of Investigation v. Shri Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS and Anr., [Supreme 
Court] 36 of 2002, (2006) (India), http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=27925. 
 630. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1988); See also 
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
 631. This does not necessarily mean a positive right for the government to teach them how to 
read, but at least a negative right that the government not forbid them from learning how to read, not 
forbid educators from teaching people to read, and not forbid the sale, possession, and use of tools 
which help people learn how to read (such as audio tapes, Montessori materials, and so on). 
 632. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 223, at 116 (emphasis in original). Hobbes of course 
agreed with the other philosophers about the primacy of self-defense; the preceding sentence stated: 
“That the first Foundation of natural Right, is the Liberty which each man hath, to preserve, as far as 
he is able, his own Life and Limbs, and to apply all his Endeavors towards the guarding his Body 
from Death, and from Pains.” PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 106 (quoting HOBBES, DE CIVE); see 
also HOBBES, supra note 223, at 115 (slightly different translation). 
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If there is a right of self-defense, there must necessarily be a right to 
possess some defensive arms—for otherwise the right would be a 
practical nullity. How can a 110 pound woman defend herself against a 
pair of 250 pound rapists if she cannot use arms? How can a frail 85-
year-old man protect himself against three young men who are intent on 
robbing and killing him? It is true that some people can successfully 
defend themselves, in some circumstances, through martial arts, or 
similar techniques of unarmed combat. But, typically, it takes very 
extensive practice for a person to obtain proficiency. 
Suppose that a government said, “Yes, we admit that our citizens 
have a right to freedom of the press. However, we have completely 
outlawed all non-government publications in the native language of our 
nation. Even so, we are not violating the right to freedom of the press, 
since we allow independent publications to be published in Ancient 
Greek.” Although Ancient Greek is a beautiful and useful language, to 
prohibit vernacular newspapers, while allowing only newspapers in 
Ancient Greek, would obviously be contrary to the freedom of the press. 
Only a small, elite portion of the public would ever be able to master the 
Ancient Greek language sufficiently to take advantage of the freedom of 
the press. Likewise, to ban the possession of all defensive arms, while 
allowing only unarmed self-defense, would be to confine the right of 
self-defense to a small elite possessing the physical capability, the time, 
and the money to pay for a long and arduous course of training. 
So it seems clear that, because there is a universal human right to 
self-defense, there must be a universal human right to some arms. 
Because there is a right to possess some (not necessarily “any” or 
“all”) arms, there must necessarily be a right to learn how to use those 
arms. If there is a right to freedom of religion, then the government 
cannot forbid people to be instructed in the tenets of their faith. If there is 
a right to freedom of the press, then the government cannot forbid 
teaching people how to read and write. The ability to receive instruction 
that makes it possible for a person to exercise a right is, necessarily, an 
incident of that right. Accordingly, a government may not forbid 
instruction in self-defense—either in self-defense with legal arms, or in 
unarmed self-defense, or in self-defense with improvised weapons (e.g., 
throwing a paperweight at an attacker’s head, or using a key ring in one’s 
fist to strike an attacker). 
Functionally speaking, firearms, and especially handguns, are ideal 
defensive arms. As the International Committee of the Red Cross 
observes, firearms are among the types of weapons that “are easy to 
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handle effectively with a minimum of training.”633 What do the data say 
about efficacy of the use of firearms for self-defense, and defense of 
others? 634
In answering the question, we need data about the order in which 
events took place in a crime. For example, in cases where the victim was 
injured, we need to know if the injury occurred before the victim used 
the gun (which might suggest that use of the gun stopped the crime in 
progress), or if the victim was injured after he used the gun (which might 
suggest that the display of the gun prompted the criminal to injure the 
victim). Before 1992, there was no useful data on the subject.635 In 1992, 
the National Crime Victimization Surveys began to record the sequence 
of criminal events and victim response. 
After analyzing the new data, Tark and Kleck discovered that “[a] 
variety of mostly forceful tactics, including resistance with a gun, 
appeared to have the strongest effects in reducing the risk of 
injury . . . .”636 They concluded that “the best available evidence indicates 
that victim resistance to crimes is generally wise.”637 Further, “armed and 
other forceful resistance does not appear to increase the victim’s risk of 
injury.”638
 
B.  Right to Firearms? 
 
Does the human right to possess defensive arms encompass the right 
to possess firearms? We can begin the inquiry by, again, examining the 
practices of the major legal systems. The constitutions of the United 
States,639 of almost every American state,640 of Mexico,641 of Haiti,642 and 
 
 633. International Committee of the Red Cross, Arms Availability and the Situation of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict, June 1999, at 21, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0734/$File/ ICRC_002_0734_ARMS%20AVAILABILITY.PDF!Open. 
 634. The CDC and NAS studies described supra did not attempt to analyze data regarding the 
efficacy of armed victim resistance. See supra notes 603–05 and accompanying text. 
 635. Philip J. Cook, The Relationship between Victim Resistance and Injury in 
Noncommercial Robbery, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 414–16 (1986): 
 
Since we cannot distinguish between the influence of the robber’s actions on 
the victim’s response and the influence of the victim’s actions on the robber’s 
response, we are left simply not knowing how to interpret the statistical patterns 
of association between resistance and injury . . . the temporal sequence of 
events may not tell us enough about the causal process to support definitive 
conclusions. 
 
 636. Jongyeon Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim Action on the 
Outcomes of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 861, 861 (2004). 
 637. Id. at 904. 
 638. Id. at 902. 
 639. U.S. CONST. amend. II. See supra text accompanying notes 442–43. 
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of Guatemala,643 all contain a right to possess arms, particularly firearms, 
for personal defense. The English Bill of Rights and the common law 
also contain an explicit right to possess firearms for lawful personal 
defense.644 As noted supra, the English system is part of the foundation 
of the law for approximately one-third of the planet. Of course, it should 
also be acknowledged that, particularly in the last decade, many 
Commonwealth nations have not respected the right to arms provision of 
the 1689 Bill of Rights and have also disrespected many of the other 
rights in that Bill of Rights.645
As detailed supra, Roman law (which was foundational for the law 
in most of continental Europe and its colonies) recognized a right to 
arms. The original Roman law was created long before firearms were 
invented. However, the Roman law continued in force in Europe until the 
nineteenth century, by which time firearms had been in common use for 
centuries. 
This Article does not contend for a universal right to firearms under 
all circumstances. In the Notre Dame Law Review, the authors of this 
Article have argued that current international law, including the 
Genocide Convention, guarantees a right of self-defense by groups that 
are the victims of an on-going genocide; it further argued that the right 
includes the right to defensive firearms.646 The main case in point is the 
current genocide in Darfur. The Notre Dame Law Review article suggests 
that Darfur refugees have a right to use firearms to protect themselves 
against genocide, rape, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities being 
perpetrated at the direction of the government of Sudan. When Darfuris 
are prosecuted in Sudanese courts for possessing arms in violation of 
Sudan’s extremely stringent (but selectively enforced) gun control laws, 
the Darfur refugees have a valid claim that their international law right to 
use arms for protection against active genocide trumps the Sudanese gun 
control laws. (The Notre Dame article acknowledges that Sudanese 
courts are hardly likely to respect international human rights law.) The 
Notre Dame legal argument was limited solely to the narrow context of 
actual genocide, while noting that the argument could be extended to 
cases of threatened genocide. 
 
 640. See supra text accompanying note 444. 
 641. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 10 (Mex.). 
 642. 1987 CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI art. 268-1 (Haiti). 
 643. GUATEMALA CONSTITUTION art. 38.  
 644. See supra text accompanying notes 433–36. 
 645. See supra text accompanying notes 437–41. 
 646. Kopel, Gallant & Eisen, supra note 58. 
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In a non-genocide context, it would be wrong to use international 
law to attempt to impose the gun laws of the American state of Wyoming 
on Japan (or vice versa). The narrowest statement of international human 
rights law is that all people have a human right to self-defense, and 
therefore a human right to possess and learn how to use some arms, and 
that this right encompasses a right to firearms under some 
circumstances.647
It is important to distinguish nations where there is a direct, explicit 
right to arms (the United States, Mexico, Haiti, and Guatemala, and, in a 
weaker sense, the common law nations)648 from other nations. In the 
former, the possession of arms is itself a right. The express right is not 
dependent on the citizen showing that he has a “need,” let alone a 
“necessity,” to exercise the right. 
In many other countries, arms possession is not a right in itself. Arms 
possession would be only a derivative right of the primary right of self-
defense, which is a universal right.649 In the latter nations, the right to 
arms would exist only to the extent reasonably necessary to effectuate 
the primary right of self-defense. Similarly, a right to firearms would 
exist only to the extent that the possession of other arms could not 
reasonably effectuate the self-defense right. 
We offer two suggestions in which a right to arms, derivative of the 
right of self-defense, would appear to be at its strongest. First of all: in 
the home. As discussed supra, the right to arms and the right to security 
of the home are closely related in the common law tradition.650 The 
sanctity of the home against violent and unexpected invasion is a widely 
expressed fundamental human right all over the world.651 More broadly, 
a violent home invasion is an especially atrocious crime because it 
destroys the peace and security of the home, which are the right of every 
person and family. That is one reason why breaking into a home is 
usually punished more severely than breaking into an unoccupied 
warehouse. Accordingly, the primary right to self-defense, and the 
derivative right to arms, are at their apex in the home. 
Conversely, prudential concerns about the risks of arms possession—
such as the mistaken shooting of a stranger—are significantly lower in 
one’s own home than in a public place. For precisely this reason, the 
 647. See supra Part V.J. There are always implicit exceptions to almost every broadly stated 
rule. For example, a person in a prison or in an institution for the insane would not have a right to 
arms. Moreover, as detailed in Part VII, violent criminal aggressors forfeit their legal right to self-
defense. 
 648. See supra text accompanying notes 506–11. 
 649. See supra Part V.J. 
 650. See supra Part VI.E.3. 
 651. Id. 
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Wisconsin Supreme Court, interpreting the state’s newly enacted right to 
arms, rejected a right to carry arms in an automobile, while affirming a 
right to carry arms in one’s home or privately-owned business.652
The second situation in which the right to arms for self-defense 
would be at its apex would be when a particular arm (including, in some 
situations, a firearm) is necessary for self-defense. At the least, the 
human right to defensive arms would become a human right to defensive 
firearms in situations when, like genocide victims, the potential victim 
faces grave danger, and, practically speaking, there is no adequate 
substitute for a defensive firearm. There are wide varieties of 
interpretations that can be placed on “necessary;” at the least, 
“necessary” means more than “under no circumstances.” 
So, for example, in Canada, the law states that a person may be 
issued a permit to possess a handgun for defensive purposes (as opposed 
to collecting or target shooting) only to protect life where other 
protection is inadequate.653 Yet currently in Canada—a nation of more 
than thirty million people, some of whom live in very dangerous areas of 
Toronto or Vancouver, or who live in very isolated areas many hours or 
days from the nearest police—no one has been issued a permit to possess 
a handgun for defense of life.654 A government policy of ignoring an 
express statutory command, and refusing to issue defensive handgun 
permits in even the most compelling, demonstrated cases of necessity 
 652. State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 804–07 (Wis. 2003) (quoting Moore v. East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)): 
 
None of these rationales is particularly compelling when applied to a person 
owning and operating a small store. Although a shopkeeper is not immune 
from acting on impulse, he or she is less likely to do so in a familiar setting in 
which the safety and satisfaction of customers is paramount and the liability 
for mistake is nearly certain. There is less need in these circumstances for 
innocent customers or visitors to be notified that the owner of a business 
possesses a weapon. Anyone who enters a business premises, including a 
person with criminal intent, should presume that the owner possesses a 
weapon, even if the weapon is not visible. A shopkeeper is not likely to use a 
concealed weapon to facilitate his own crime of violence in his own store. The 
stigma of the law is inapplicable when the public expects a shopkeeper to 
possess a weapon for security . . . . [Thus,] a citizen’s desire to exercise the 
right to keep and bear arms for purposes of security is at its apex when 
undertaken to secure one’s home or privately owned business. Conversely, the 
State’s interest in prohibiting concealed weapons is least compelling in these 
circumstances, because application of the CCW statute “has but a tenuous 
relation to alleviation” of the State’s acknowledged interests. 
 653. Authorizations to Carry Restricted Firearms and Certain Handguns Regulations SOR/98-
207 (Can) (regulation implementing section 20 of the Firearms Act), 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cr/SOR-98-207/bo-ga:l_1-gb:s_2//en#anchorbo-ga:l_1-gb:s_2. 
 654. Letter from Yves Marineau, Departmental Privacy and Access to Information 
Coordinator, R.C.M.P., to Dennis Young, assistant to M.P. Garry Breitkruz (Feb. 15, 2007), 
available at http://www.garrybreitkreuz.com/ publications/2007_new/126.pdf. 
  
43] THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE 177 
 
would appear to be inconsistent with the right of self-defense. 
Defensive arms possession in cases of necessity—as a derivative of 
the right of self-defense—might be effectuated by a fact-specific analysis 
of the dangers to the family or individual, and the practical adequacy of 
other defensive measures.655
The derivative right of arms possession might also imply that 
“alternative defensive measures” not be construed to include the sacrifice 
of express rights in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, the argument 
that “you wouldn’t need a gun for protection from terrorists if you would 
just order your newspaper staff to stop writing editorials in favor of 
religious liberty” is not valid. It sacrifices one right to eviscerate the need 
to use another right—self-defense.656
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
As Grotius wrote in his introduction: 
 
I have used in proof of this law, the testimony of philosophers, 
historians, poets, and lastly even of orators. Not that they are 
indiscriminately to be relied on as impartial authority, since 
they often bend to the prejudices of their sect, the nature of 
their argument, or the interest of their cause, but where many 
minds of different ages and countries concur in affirming the 
same general sentiment, this general concurrence must be 
referred to some general cause; which in the questions we 
have undertaken to examine, can be no other than a right 
induction from the principles of natural justice, or some 
common consent. The former indicates the law of nature, the 
latter the law of nations . . . . 657
 
The human right of self-defense is affirmed by the concurrence of 
many minds of different ages. Grotius knew this, and as this Article has 
elaborated, the concurrence has continued in the nearly four centuries 
 655. This does not mean that the licensing authority would have to devote resources 
equivalent to a criminal homicide investigation. See id. 
 656. In the United States, the principle that the government cannot withhold a license in order 
to coerce people into surrendering a right is known as the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 
526 (1958); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). 
 657. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, Prolog. § 41, quoted in WHEATON, supra note 315, at 29 
n.13. While this Article has usually quoted from the 2005 edition of Grotius, we chose to use the 
alternative translation quoted in Wheaton because its English flows more naturally than does the 
2005 text’s version of the same quote. 
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since Grotius. This Article has cited fewer orators and poets than did 
Grotius,658 and we have enjoyed the benefit of many sources which did 
not exist at the time of Grotius, including the written constitutions all 
over the world, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the vast 
structure of international law that was built on the foundation of Grotius. 
We have only rarely touched on the many heated arguments between the 
great scholars, or the tremendous differences in practices between 
leading systems of law, or how the modern world’s constitutions and 
treaties are based on strikingly diverse views of civilization and justice. 
We have not addressed all the differences among our many sources 
because, regarding self-defense, “many minds of different ages and 
countries concur in affirming the same general sentiment.” 
To examine the evidence is to discover what the Special Rapporteur 
so artfully concealed—the overwhelming consensus among the sources 
of international law, from ancient times to the present, among diverse 
legal systems, religions, and nations: self-defense is a fundamental 
human right. 
This Article does not claim that the evidence produced thus far 
proves the existence of a universal international human right to possess 
and carry firearms in all circumstances. It does suggest that the evidence 
of an international human right to self-defense is clear. The existence of 
a right of personal defense undoubtedly must imply some right to 
defensive training, and to the possession of some type of defensive arms. 
However, this Article has only attempted to suggest some possible lines 
of exploration for subsequent scholarly analysis of the derivative rights 
to defensive arms and defensive training. It does seem apparent that it 
would be a violation of human rights law for a government to forbid self-
defense, to forbid defensive training, or to forbid the possession of 
reasonably necessary defensive arms. No government has the legitimate 
authority to forbid a person from exercising her human right to defend 
herself against a violent attack or to forbid her from taking the steps and 
acquiring the tools necessary to exercise that right. 
 
 658. Indeed, the only orator we cited was Cicero (who was also a lawyer), and we have not 
cited any poets. So we will conclude the footnotes with an especially apt poet: “the sword Was given 
for this, that none need live a slave.” Lucan, Pharsalia, bk. 4, ll. 644–45 (Edward Ridley trans., 
1896) (composed between 59–65 AD) (epic poem of the Roman civil war), available at 
http://omacl.org/Pharsalia/book4.html. 
